Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects persistence attempts on Windows by monitoring for modifications to common Registry Run/RunOnce keys or the creation of executable files within the user startup directory. The rule excludes common legitimate processes like msiexec.exe, trustedinstaller.exe, and explorer.exe to minimize false positives.
Detects the use of rundll32.exe to invoke the MiniDump function of comsvcs.dll targeting the lsass.exe process. This technique is a well-known living-off-the-land (LotL) method used by adversaries to create a memory dump of LSASS, which can then be exfiltrated and analyzed offline using tools like Mimikatz to extract credentials.
Detects the execution of msbuild.exe targeting project files (.csproj, .proj, .xml) located in user-writable directories such as Temp or Downloads, or containing command-line indicators of inline C# task execution (e.g., UsingTask, CodeTaskFactory). This behavior is commonly used for proxy execution and bypassing application allow-listing via LOLBAS.
Detects the creation of named pipes associated with default Cobalt Strike malleable profiles and common open-source C2 frameworks (e.g., Sliver, Havoc) via EDR pipe-creation telemetry. These pipes are frequently used for SMB beacon communication within compromised networks.
Detects WmiPrvSE.exe spawning child processes within 120 seconds of a Type 3 (Network) logon event. This behavior is a common indicator of remote command execution, frequently used by lateral movement tools like Impacket's wmiexec or similar WMI-based remote execution frameworks.
This rule detects potential Kerberoasting activity by monitoring for high volumes of Kerberos TGS (Ticket Granting Service) requests using the weak RC4 encryption type (0x17) from a single account within a 5-minute window. It excludes machine accounts and common system service requests to reduce noise.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks (via Event ID 4698 or schtasks.exe) involving suspicious action paths, encoded PowerShell commands, LOLBins, or tasks configured to run as SYSTEM by non-administrator users, which is a common persistence mechanism for malware.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using Event ID 4698 or command-line execution of schtasks.exe. The rule specifically looks for tasks created in suspicious paths such as AppData or ProgramData, or tasks configured to run with highest privileges and/or marked as hidden, which are common indicators of persistence mechanisms used by adversaries.
Detects anomalous Kerberos service ticket (TGS) requests or successful logons where the corresponding Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) request (Event ID 4768) is absent within the monitored window. This pattern is a primary indicator of offline-forged Kerberos tickets, such as those generated by Mimikatz, which bypass legitimate KDC interaction for ticket issuance.
Detects lateral movement techniques leveraging Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). The rule identifies instances where the WMI provider host, WmiPrvSE.exe, spawns common administrative or interactive shell tools (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe). This pattern is consistent with the abuse of Win32_Process.Create() via WMI/DCOM/RPC for remote command execution, a method frequently utilized by frameworks like Impacket (wmiexec.py) for fileless, agentless lateral movement.
Detects the use of the BITSAdmin command-line utility to perform file downloads or add files to a transfer job. Adversaries may abuse the Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) for downloading malicious files while evading detection or maintaining persistence.
Detects unauthorized usage of the DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All extended rights, which are required for the DCSync technique. The rule monitors for Windows Event ID 4662 (Object Access) where a non-domain controller account attempts these replication operations, typically indicative of credential dumping and domain compromise.
Detects processes requesting specific access rights to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process, which are commonly associated with credential dumping techniques. The rule filters out known security software that performs legitimate LSASS inspection.
This rule detects the use of native Windows utilities (vssadmin, wmic, wbadmin, bcdedit) to perform actions associated with ransomware, such as deleting volume shadow copies, deleting the backup catalog, or disabling system recovery features. This is a common precursor to data encryption to prevent the user from restoring files.
Detects the abuse of signed Windows system binaries (LOLBins: certutil, mshta, regsvr32, rundll32, bitsadmin, msiexec) through the identification of command-line arguments that suggest malicious activity, such as downloading remote content, decoding files, executing scriptlets, or loading DLLs from temporary storage directories.
Detects attempts to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) in PowerShell. The rule looks for command-line arguments referencing AMSI-related memory structures, methods, and DLLs such as AmsiUtils, AmsiScanBuffer, AmsiInitFailed, and amsi.dll. Bypassing AMSI is a common technique used by attackers to execute malicious scripts and deploy fileless payloads, such as Cobalt Strike or Sliver, while avoiding detection by endpoint security solutions.
Detects the use of data archival utilities (7zip, WinRAR) or command-line cloud synchronization tools (Rclone) to stage files in common temporary directories, immediately followed by network connections to known cloud storage endpoints. This pattern is characteristic of pre-encryption exfiltration activities often seen in ransomware campaigns.
The following analytic identifies instances where CrushFTP has blocked access due to exceeding the maximum number of simultaneous connections from a single IP address. This activity may indicate brute force attempts, credential stuffing, or automated attacks against the CrushFTP server. This detection is particularly relevant following the discovery of CVE-2025-31161, an authentication bypass vulnerability in CrushFTP versions 10.0.0 through 10.8.3 and 11.0.0 through 11.3.0.
Detects potential process injection attempts (e.g., Early Bird APC injection or process hollowing) where a process is spawned in a suspended state, followed shortly by a remote-thread or QueueUserAPC injection primitive targeting that same process. The rule correlates process creation events with subsequent API calls while excluding known legitimate patterns like .NET runtime operations, system updaters, and EDR/AV security components.
Detects potential process injection attempts (e.g., Early Bird APC injection or process hollowing) where a process is spawned in a suspended state, followed shortly by a remote-thread or QueueUserAPC injection primitive targeting that same process. The rule correlates process creation events with subsequent API calls while excluding known legitimate patterns like .NET runtime operations, system updaters, and EDR/AV security components.
Detects the ClosedQuorum 'unhook' evasion technique where a process patches ntdll's EtwEventWrite to suppress ETW telemetry, occurring within a 5-minute window of the same process initiating outbound network connections to known LLM C2 provider APIs or Discord webhooks used for AI-arbitrated decision cycles.
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