Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects large PUT/POST uploads from a single source to cloud storage destinations in cloud proxy/CASB logs,
the exfiltration stage that follows archive staging in autonomous AI attack chains.
Limitation: Sigma cannot natively correlate this with a preceding staging burst (archives created in temp
directories, Sysmon Event ID 11) or count uploads per source. Correlate in the SIEM by joining on the
source host/IP within a short window after the staging detection. Tune the BytesSent threshold and the
destination list to the environment and sanction approved storage tenants and backup tooling.
the exfiltration stage that follows archive staging in autonomous AI attack chains.
Limitation: Sigma cannot natively correlate this with a preceding staging burst (archives created in temp
directories, Sysmon Event ID 11) or count uploads per source. Correlate in the SIEM by joining on the
source host/IP within a short window after the staging detection. Tune the BytesSent threshold and the
destination list to the environment and sanction approved storage tenants and backup tooling.
Detects outbound WinRM (5985/5986) and SSH (22) connections from a host as a building block for fan-out detection. Intended to be correlated by the SIEM as a count of distinct DestinationIp per SourceIp within 5 minutes (>3 small / >5 medium / >8 large environments). A single Sigma event cannot express the distinct-count threshold; apply the aggregation in the backend (e.g. a correlation rule or threshold on DestinationIp grouped by SourceIp over 5m).
Detects Security audit log clearing (Event ID 1102) and is intended to be correlated so that the same SubjectUserName clears logs on more than 2 distinct hosts (Computer) within 15 minutes (>3 for large environments). The single-event match below is the base event; the multi-host threshold is applied in the SIEM (see comments at the end of the rule).
Detects the building block of Kerberoasting at machine tempo: Windows Security Event 4769 (Kerberos service ticket requests) for user-style service accounts using RC4 encryption. The velocity element is a correlation and must be applied by the SIEM. Alert when a single account (TargetUserName / IpAddress) requests more than 10 distinct ServiceName values within 5 minutes (tune: >5 small, >10 medium, >15 large environments). A single event matching this rule is not malicious on its own.
Correlation: group by TargetUserName (and IpAddress), timeframe 5m, count_distinct(ServiceName) > 10.
Correlation: group by TargetUserName (and IpAddress), timeframe 5m, count_distinct(ServiceName) > 10.
Detects failed Windows logons (4625) from a single IpAddress targeting many distinct TargetUserName values within 30 minutes, indicating machine-speed password spraying that stays under per-account lockout thresholds. Success-after-failure from the same source (4624) should be correlated. Thresholds follow the report guidance (>10 small / >15 medium / >25 large environments); tune to environment size and enrich with VPN/proxy reputation and authorized scanner inventory.
Detects execution of the SpikeStrip CLI via Node.js with dynamic provider configurations for OpenAI or Anthropic, correlated with outbound network connections to their respective public APIs from the same node process.
Detects network connections to webhook.site, execution of command-line tools referencing webhook.site or ArtexProbe, and creation or writing of files associated with ArtexProbe or known webshells.
Detects the execution of the tar.exe utility extracting archive files (-xf or -x) within common temporary or public directories (such as programdata, appdata, temp, downloads, public, tmp, or dev/shm) by non-system actors, potentially indicating staging or unpacking of malicious payloads.
Detects a suspicious execution chain where a LNK file executed from a mounted VHDX launches cmd.exe, opening a decoy .xls/.xlsx file while simultaneously launching a silent MSI installation using msiexec.
Detects DNS queries containing patterns associated with Kerberos coercion attacks via DNS object spoofing.
The pattern "1UWhRCAAAAA..BAAAA" is a base64-encoded signature that corresponds to a marshaled CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION structure.
Attackers can use this technique to coerce authentication from victim systems to attacker-controlled hosts.
It is one of the strong indicators of a Kerberos coercion attack, where adversaries manipulate DNS records
to spoof Service Principal Names (SPNs) and redirect authentication requests like CVE-2025-33073.
The pattern "1UWhRCAAAAA..BAAAA" is a base64-encoded signature that corresponds to a marshaled CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION structure.
Attackers can use this technique to coerce authentication from victim systems to attacker-controlled hosts.
It is one of the strong indicators of a Kerberos coercion attack, where adversaries manipulate DNS records
to spoof Service Principal Names (SPNs) and redirect authentication requests like CVE-2025-33073.
Detects the addition of a new "Allow" firewall rule by the WMI process (WmiPrvSE.EXE).
This can occur if an attacker leverages PowerShell cmdlets such as "New-NetFirewallRule", or directly uses WMI CIM classes such as "MSFT_NetFirewallRule".
This can occur if an attacker leverages PowerShell cmdlets such as "New-NetFirewallRule", or directly uses WMI CIM classes such as "MSFT_NetFirewallRule".
Detects potential User Account Control (UAC) bypass attempts or privilege elevation loops initiated by node.exe, electron.exe, or Swarm Desktop.exe, followed by suspicious post-elevation actions such as modifying Defender preferences, executing msiexec with app.msi, or invoking ScreenConnect Client.
Detects instances where the Claude Desktop application launches package managers (such as npm, npx, node, pnpm, or yarn) to perform global package installations. This helps identify potentially unintended or malicious code execution or package installations initiated by AI assistants.
Detects the usage of "reg.exe" in order to dump sensitive registry hives. This includes SAM, SYSTEM and SECURITY hives.
Detects when a non-system process creates a named pipe with a non-standard name, followed within 10 minutes by an inbound SMB connection (port 445) from another host to the same device. This behavior can indicate lateral movement or post-exploitation framework activities like Adaptix using named pipes and SMB.
Detects PowerShell execution of an executable from the Temp directory with a randomly generated name and long base64-like encoded arguments, characteristic of Metro4Shell activity.
Detects potential exploitation of CVE-2025-11953 (Metro4Shell) where a Node.js development server spawns a command shell executing an encoded PowerShell command. The PowerShell script performs defense evasion via Windows Defender exclusions (Add-MpPreference), downloads a payload over raw TCP sockets (System.Net.Sockets.TcpClient), and executes it using Start-Process.
Detects a sequence where a non-browser process connects to a dead drop/paste or chat service (such as Pastebin, Nostr, or Telegram), followed on the same device by contact with the FLATROOF C2 webhook domain.
Detects instances where svchost.exe runs outside the standard System32 or SysWOW64 directories and loads the graphics-hook-filter64.dll library, or where the known hash of this sideloaded payload is observed. This behavior is correlated with the presence of the encrypted configuration file graphics-hook_config.bin on the same device.
Detects Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) logons, reconnections, and session disconnections involving specific actor hostnames or client names over a 7-day aggregation window, summarizing by IP address and source name.
Detects behavioral indicators where the Qlik Sense scheduler process (scheduler.exe) spawns PowerShell with reverse shell command-line arguments, initiates outbound network connections via PowerShell, or connects to known malicious staging IP infrastructure.
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