Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,063 detections
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Detects instances where browser processes (Chrome or Edge) are spawned by smartscreen.exe and subsequently access sensitive browser storage files such as Login Data, Cookies, or Local State. This pattern is indicative of a process injection or masquerading chain used to extract credentials or session data.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with command-line arguments that suggest programmatically capturing or redirecting console output using ScriptBlock techniques (Create, Console, In, ReadToEnd). This pattern is often associated with obfuscated script execution, in-memory payloads, or attempts to bypass logging by capturing output via .NET streams.
This rule detects rundll32.exe executing a DLL from the ProgramData directory and subsequently establishing five or more outbound network connections to external IP addresses over non-standard ports (excluding 80 and 443) within a one-hour window. This behavior is indicative of a potential malware beaconing or data staging activity using a proxy binary to evade detection.
Detects anomalous file activity associated with the PaperCut application (pc-app.exe), characterized by the creation of numbered binary chunks (.bin) followed by the creation of a status log file (pcxboot_l.txt) and the subsequent deletion of the binary chunks. This behavior is indicative of an in-memory Java payload loader pattern used to evade detection.
This rule detects suspicious activity originating from the PaperCut 'pc-app.exe' process. It monitors for the creation or execution of a file named 'mscopilot.exe' within the non-standard directory 'C:\Microsoft.Office365\'. The rule matches based on a known malicious SHA1 hash or the specific file-write-then-execute behavior within a one-hour window, indicating potential AdaptixC2 loader activity.
Detects instances where the WMI Provider Host (wmiprvse.exe) spawns suspicious child processes such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or rundll32.exe, which are correlated with inbound network connections on ports 135 (RPC/DCOM) or 445 (SMB). This behavior is characteristic of lateral movement techniques used by tools like Impacket's wmiexec.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe that involve suspicious arguments (such as encoded commands, execution from volatile directories like Temp/AppData, or run-once triggers) shortly after a file has been downloaded into a temporary or user-writable directory. This pattern is commonly indicative of an adversary establishing persistence for downloaded malware.
Detects non-SYSTEM processes enabling SeDebugPrivilege or SeImpersonatePrivilege shortly before launching a process as the SYSTEM user. This behavior is highly indicative of token manipulation and impersonation techniques (e.g., Potato-family exploits) used to elevate privileges from a standard or administrative account to SYSTEM.
Detects an attempt to perform Active Directory replication (DS-Replication-Get-Changes or DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All) initiated by a machine that is not a recognized Domain Controller. This is a common indicator of credential dumping or unauthorized domain information gathering.
Detects the 'ClickFix' attack pattern where explorer.exe (typically via a Run dialog interaction) spawns a command shell (PowerShell, cmd, or mshta) using obfuscated flags combined with execution indicators (download/execution), which then subsequently spawns a secondary child process. This chain provides high-confidence evidence of malicious intent compared to isolated process executions.
Detects the 'ClickFix' attack pattern where explorer.exe (typically via a Run dialog interaction) spawns a command shell (PowerShell, cmd, or mshta) using obfuscated flags combined with execution indicators (download/execution), which then subsequently spawns a secondary child process. This chain provides high-confidence evidence of malicious intent compared to isolated process executions.
Detects potential Kerberoasting activity by monitoring for an unusually high volume of Kerberos TGS requests (Event ID 4769) for tickets encrypted with RC4 (0x17) within a short timeframe. The rule tracks the count of requests and the diversity of Service Principal Names (SPNs) requested by a specific user account, excluding machine accounts.
Detects execution of regsvr32.exe with command-line arguments that include a remote URL ('/i:http...') combined with silent, unregistered, and notification-free execution flags ('/s', '/u', '/n'). This behavior is characteristic of the 'Squiblydoo' technique, where attackers use Regsvr32 to execute arbitrary scriptlets from remote servers to bypass application whitelisting.
Detects unauthorized attempts by processes to access the memory of sensitive Windows system processes, specifically LSASS.exe or winlogon.exe, using suspicious access masks associated with memory dumping or credential harvesting.
Detects DCSync attacks by monitoring for EventID 4662 where Active Directory replication extended rights (DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All) are requested. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized replication attempts used to extract sensitive data, such as password hashes, directly from a Domain Controller.
Detects the abuse of signed Windows system binaries regsvr32.exe and rundll32.exe for proxy execution, defense evasion, and credential access. The rule identifies suspicious command-line patterns including Squiblydoo (regsvr32 with remote scriptlets), rundll32 executing JavaScript via mshtml.dll, rundll32 performing LSASS credential dumping via comsvcs.dll, and the loading of DLLs from untrusted user-writable locations like Temp or Downloads folders.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using the 'schtasks.exe' utility where the task execution path points to common script interpreters (PowerShell, WScript, CScript, MSHTA, Rundll32) or is located in common user-writable directories (Users, Temp, AppData). Additionally, it flags tasks configured to execute under the 'SYSTEM' account, which is a common technique used to achieve persistence with elevated privileges.
Detects the creation of a new Windows service (EventID 7045) where the binary path references the ADMIN$ share, contains known remote execution tool artifacts (e.g., PSEXESVC, PAExec), or uses a randomized/GUID-like naming convention. This pattern is indicative of classic SMB-based lateral movement where an adversary performs remote code execution via service installation following credential compromise.
Detects the spawning of cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or powershell_ise.exe by the WMI Provider Host (wmiprvse.exe). This pattern is frequently used for fileless lateral movement, as threat actors leverage WMI (Win32_Process.Create) to execute remote commands which manifests as wmiprvse.exe launching a shell on the target host.
Detects attempts to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) in PowerShell by monitoring script block logs for specific patterns used to disable or manipulate memory scanning mechanisms, a common precursor to executing malicious, memory-resident payloads.
Detects the use of native Windows utilities such as vssadmin, ntdsutil, or diskshadow to create volume shadow copies for the purpose of accessing or extracting the ntds.dit Active Directory database file. This activity is a common indicator of credential theft attempts where adversaries bypass file access protections to offline-process the database and retrieve password hashes.
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