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Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule performs a sweep across device file and network events for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the UAT-11587/Antino campaign. It detects malicious file hashes, specific C2 domain connections, and known lure URLs (HTA/WSF) identified by Cisco Talos.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and network events for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the UAT-11587/Antino campaign. It detects malicious file hashes, specific C2 domain connections, and known lure URLs (HTA/WSF) identified by Cisco Talos.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and network events for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the UAT-11587/Antino campaign. It detects malicious file hashes, specific C2 domain connections, and known lure URLs (HTA/WSF) identified by Cisco Talos.
This rule monitors for two indicators of potentially malicious WinRM activity: first, the execution of suspicious child processes (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe, rundll32.exe, certutil.exe) originating from the Windows Remote Management host process (wsmprovhost.exe); and second, a 'fan-out' pattern where a single account establishes WinRM/PSRemoting sessions on three or more distinct hosts within a short time window, which is often indicative of automated lateral movement or credential abuse.
Detects changes to the Access Control List (ACL) of the AdminSDHolder object in Active Directory. AdminSDHolder is a protected object whose ACL is automatically propagated by the SDProp process every 60 minutes to all privileged groups and accounts in the domain. Modifying the ACL on this object allows an adversary to establish a durable, self-healing backdoor by granting persistent access to high-privileged security principals.
Detects changes to the Access Control List (ACL) of the AdminSDHolder object in Active Directory. AdminSDHolder is a protected object whose ACL is automatically propagated by the SDProp process every 60 minutes to all privileged groups and accounts in the domain. Modifying the ACL on this object allows an adversary to establish a durable, self-healing backdoor by granting persistent access to high-privileged security principals.
Detects the misuse of the legitimate odbcconf.exe utility via the /A switch combined with the REGSVR action. Attackers leverage this behavior to execute malicious DLLs, often utilizing response files or executing from non-standard directories to bypass application control policies.
Detects the assignment of SeDebugPrivilege or SeImpersonatePrivilege to a non-SYSTEM account, followed by the execution of a new process from common service parents (spoolsv.exe, w3wp.exe, dllhost.exe) within the same logon session. This behavior is indicative of privilege escalation attempts using local potato-style exploits (e.g., PrintSpoofer, JuicyPotato) that leverage service tokens for impersonation.
This rule monitors for two indicators of potentially malicious WinRM activity: first, the execution of suspicious child processes (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe, rundll32.exe, certutil.exe) originating from the Windows Remote Management host process (wsmprovhost.exe); and second, a 'fan-out' pattern where a single account establishes WinRM/PSRemoting sessions on three or more distinct hosts within a short time window, which is often indicative of automated lateral movement or credential abuse.
Detects changes to the Access Control List (ACL) of the AdminSDHolder object in Active Directory. AdminSDHolder is a protected object whose ACL is automatically propagated by the SDProp process every 60 minutes to all privileged groups and accounts in the domain. Modifying the ACL on this object allows an adversary to establish a durable, self-healing backdoor by granting persistent access to high-privileged security principals.
This rule detects potentially malicious network activity by monitoring for specific query parameters ('bmodule', 'smodule', 'lmodule', 'task', 'upload.php') in web requests or communication with a specific known-malicious IP address ('62.60.226.50'). This pattern is characteristic of C2 (Command and Control) traffic or unauthorized file staging/upload operations.
This rule detects the execution of potentially malicious binaries masquerading as legitimate Windows utilities (e.g., Windows Update, Defender, or Phone Link) from within a ScreenConnect temporary directory. This behavior is indicative of a phishing attack where an adversary uses remote access tools to stage and execute malicious payloads on a victim's system.
Detects potential persistence and network persistence mechanisms associated with the MSP360 RMM agent. The rule correlates the creation of a Windows service for RMM.Agent.exe or RMM.Agent.Launcher.exe with the addition of a firewall rule allowing UDP traffic on port 48678 by netsh or PowerShell, occurring within a one-hour window.
This rule monitors for DNS queries and network connections to a known list of malicious domains associated with phishing campaigns that deploy remote access tools (such as ScreenConnect or MSP360). These campaigns typically involve users interacting with malicious links to trigger downloads or remote management sessions.
Detects the presence or execution of known malicious Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool binaries associated with phishing campaigns, such as those impersonating MSP360 or ScreenConnect.
This rule monitors for DNS queries and network connections to a known list of malicious domains associated with phishing campaigns that deploy remote access tools (such as ScreenConnect or MSP360). These campaigns typically involve users interacting with malicious links to trigger downloads or remote management sessions.
Detects the execution of MSP360 or generic RMM-labeled binaries originating from common user download directories (Downloads or Temp folders) when the filename mimics common phishing lures such as invoice, e-card, RSVP, or document-related naming conventions. This activity indicates a potential social engineering attempt to execute remote monitoring and management tools.
Detects potential persistence and network persistence mechanisms associated with the MSP360 RMM agent. The rule correlates the creation of a Windows service for RMM.Agent.exe or RMM.Agent.Launcher.exe with the addition of a firewall rule allowing UDP traffic on port 48678 by netsh or PowerShell, occurring within a one-hour window.
Detects network connections or DNS queries to known suspicious domains associated with command and control infrastructure.
Detects the presence or execution of known malicious Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool binaries associated with phishing campaigns, such as those impersonating MSP360 or ScreenConnect.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and network events for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the UAT-11587/Antino campaign. It detects malicious file hashes, specific C2 domain connections, and known lure URLs (HTA/WSF) identified by Cisco Talos.
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