Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule performs a sweep across device file and network events for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the UAT-11587/Antino campaign. It detects malicious file hashes, specific C2 domain connections, and known lure URLs (HTA/WSF) identified by Cisco Talos.
Detects the abuse of the Windows Scripted Diagnostics framework (sdiagnhost.exe) by the Antino threat actor. The attack leverages sdiagnhost.exe to proxy the execution of a malicious script (result.ps1) that subsequently establishes persistence by creating a Registry Run key (GatherOSStateKit). The rule correlates the execution of the scripted diagnostic package with the specific registry modification event within a 5-minute window.
Detects the abuse of the Windows Scripted Diagnostics framework (sdiagnhost.exe) by the Antino threat actor. The attack leverages sdiagnhost.exe to proxy the execution of a malicious script (result.ps1) that subsequently establishes persistence by creating a Registry Run key (GatherOSStateKit). The rule correlates the execution of the scripted diagnostic package with the specific registry modification event within a 5-minute window.
Detects the abuse of the Windows Scripted Diagnostics framework (sdiagnhost.exe) by the Antino threat actor. The attack leverages sdiagnhost.exe to proxy the execution of a malicious script (result.ps1) that subsequently establishes persistence by creating a Registry Run key (GatherOSStateKit). The rule correlates the execution of the scripted diagnostic package with the specific registry modification event within a 5-minute window.
Detects the abuse of the Windows Scripted Diagnostics framework (sdiagnhost.exe) by the Antino threat actor. The attack leverages sdiagnhost.exe to proxy the execution of a malicious script (result.ps1) that subsequently establishes persistence by creating a Registry Run key (GatherOSStateKit). The rule correlates the execution of the scripted diagnostic package with the specific registry modification event within a 5-minute window.
Detects the abuse of the Windows Scripted Diagnostics framework (sdiagnhost.exe) by the Antino threat actor. The attack leverages sdiagnhost.exe to proxy the execution of a malicious script (result.ps1) that subsequently establishes persistence by creating a Registry Run key (GatherOSStateKit). The rule correlates the execution of the scripted diagnostic package with the specific registry modification event within a 5-minute window.
This rule detects potentially malicious command execution initiated by web browsers (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Safari, Opera). It identifies scenarios where browsers spawn PowerShell on Windows with encoded command arguments or spawn shells (zsh, bash, sh) on macOS while piping commands retrieved via curl or wget, which is a common pattern for dropper and fileless malware delivery.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity involving LNK files being modified, created, or renamed in common locations (Desktop, Quick Launch, Start Menu) correlated with the creation of files ending in '.backup' within 30 minutes. It also independently detects the presence or execution of 'VLCAssistant.exe', which may indicate unauthorized launcher activity or masquerading.
Detects a specific pattern associated with AvisLoader or similar malware: a device establishes a network connection to known Cloudflare Tunnel infrastructure domains (trycloudflare.com or workers.dev), followed by the creation and execution of an executable file (.exe, .dll, or .scr) in user-writable directories such as Downloads, AppData, or Temp within a 15-minute window.
Detects activity associated with the MALFEX npm supply-chain campaign (also known as Overlord/movinlike). This rule performs a sweep for known malicious file hashes, suspicious process command lines, outbound network connections to malicious domains or IPs, and email communications from identified adversary-controlled accounts.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a process modifies a Windows Registry Run key to ensure execution at logon, followed shortly by the same executable file being copied into the current user's startup folder. This pattern is often used by malware to establish persistence.
This rule detects potential malicious activity by correlating device events against a known set of malicious file hashes, domains, and URLs. It identifies files with known malicious hashes, network connections to known malicious domains, and command-line processes attempting to download files from known malicious URLs using common living-off-the-land tools like PowerShell, curl, or wget.
This rule detects potential malicious activity by correlating device events against a known set of malicious file hashes, domains, and URLs. It identifies files with known malicious hashes, network connections to known malicious domains, and command-line processes attempting to download files from known malicious URLs using common living-off-the-land tools like PowerShell, curl, or wget.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe or PowerShell that reference specific task names associated with potentially suspicious activity or persistence (e.g., PlutonAgentScheduler, EnterpriseMgmtServicesScheduler). The rule specifically looks for tasks being placed or modified within 'microsoft' or 'pluton' directories or paths, which may indicate an attempt to masquerade as legitimate system services.
Detects potential abuse of Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) for process execution. It monitors for wmic.exe creating processes, PowerShell cmdlets Invoke-WmiMethod or Invoke-CimMethod used for remote execution, and unexpected process spawns from the WmiPrvSE.exe provider service, which are common indicators of lateral movement and remote command execution.
Detects the creation of WMI event subscriptions via wmic.exe, PowerShell, or the compilation of MOF files. These techniques are commonly used by adversaries to establish persistence or execute malicious payloads by binding event filters to event consumers.
Detects attempts to bypass or disable the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) in PowerShell by identifying specific commands used to manipulate the AmsiUtils class or its field values in memory.
This rule detects unauthorized or suspicious cross-process access attempts by monitoring relationships between source and target processes. It specifically flags instances where common target processes (e.g., browsers or core system processes) are accessed by a source process that is not on a known allowlist of legitimate parent/child or service-related processes. This pattern is often indicative of process injection or unauthorized memory access attempts.
IOC sweep against network telemetry for confirmed BengalSEO/MayaBot campaign infrastructure: the Hostmaza backend IP (5.101.140.80), Matomo tracking domains (stats.us3.org, us3.my), named MayaBot C2 domains (cus.cam, dll.lat, us99.org), and the ~170-domain Traffic Distribution System redirector fleet used to funnel victims to payload delivery. The source intel report contains no file hashes (MD5/SHA1/SHA256) -- only IPs, domains, and URLs -- so this sweep is IP/domain-only. Note the much larger corpus of single-use lure-page domains (~1,000 additional indicators) is excluded as too high-churn for static embedding.
IOC sweep against network telemetry for confirmed BengalSEO/MayaBot campaign infrastructure: the Hostmaza backend IP (5.101.140.80), Matomo tracking domains (stats.us3.org, us3.my), named MayaBot C2 domains (cus.cam, dll.lat, us99.org), and the ~170-domain Traffic Distribution System redirector fleet used to funnel victims to payload delivery. The source intel report contains no file hashes (MD5/SHA1/SHA256) -- only IPs, domains, and URLs -- so this sweep is IP/domain-only. Note the much larger corpus of single-use lure-page domains (~1,000 additional indicators) is excluded as too high-churn for static embedding.
Detects the creation of Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Event Filter, Event Consumer, or FilterToConsumerBinding objects. Attackers use these objects to create event subscriptions that trigger malicious code or scripts upon specific system events, providing a stealthy and persistent execution mechanism.
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