Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

40,063 detections

Detects a multi-stage attack pattern involving a non-MFA login to a Citrix portal, followed by lateral movement, and concluding with ransomware deployment behaviors such as shadow copy deletion, recovery disablement, or the dropping of ransom notes associated with ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
1 month ago
000
Detects a multi-stage attack pattern involving a non-MFA login to a Citrix portal, followed by lateral movement, and concluding with ransomware deployment behaviors such as shadow copy deletion, recovery disablement, or the dropping of ransom notes associated with ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
000
Detects a multi-stage attack pattern involving a non-MFA login to a Citrix portal, followed by lateral movement, and concluding with ransomware deployment behaviors such as shadow copy deletion, recovery disablement, or the dropping of ransom notes associated with ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
1 month ago
000
Detects a multi-stage attack pattern involving a non-MFA login to a Citrix portal, followed by lateral movement, and concluding with ransomware deployment behaviors such as shadow copy deletion, recovery disablement, or the dropping of ransom notes associated with ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
This rule detects potential HTML smuggling activity by identifying a browser process writing an executable file named 'config.exe' to the user's Downloads folder without a traditional network download event, followed immediately by Microsoft Defender SmartScreen or Antivirus reporting a warning or scan failure on the file. This behavior is indicative of a payload being reconstructed on the client-side via JavaScript blobs or data URLs, which is a common characteristic of HTML smuggling delivery chains.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
001
Detects the UAT-11587 TestAssembly.dll downloader by its shared AssemblyAttribute GUID b2b3adb0-1669-4b94-86cb-6dd682ddbea3 embedded in .NET metadata across all campaign builds
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
Detects Antino backdoor binaries (slc.dll and standalone) via embedded AntinoApp application manifest string and Rust PDB path patterns matching GitHub Actions Windows runner structure.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
Detects UAT-11587 diplomatic-lure LNK file exploiting ZDI-CAN-25373 whitespace padding to conceal a PowerShell command that extracts CanonStager (cnmpaui.exe/dll) from TAR archives into %TEMP%
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
This rule identifies potential activity related to the Kothamine malware by monitoring for specific file hashes associated with the malware in process and file execution events, as well as network connections to a specific malicious GitHub repository path used for payload delivery.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
1 month ago
101
This rule identifies potential activity related to the Kothamine malware by monitoring for specific file hashes associated with the malware in process and file execution events, as well as network connections to a specific malicious GitHub repository path used for payload delivery.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
1 month ago
001
This rule identifies potential activity related to the Kothamine malware by monitoring for specific file hashes associated with the malware in process and file execution events, as well as network connections to a specific malicious GitHub repository path used for payload delivery.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
001
Detects the creation of a scheduled task intended to masquerade as 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTask' using either schtasks.exe or PowerShell. The rule specifically monitors for tasks being registered in AppData/Roaming directories, which is a common indicator of persistence by malicious actors attempting to mimic legitimate Microsoft Edge update processes.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
1 month ago
001
Detects the creation of a scheduled task intended to masquerade as 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTask' using either schtasks.exe or PowerShell. The rule specifically monitors for tasks being registered in AppData/Roaming directories, which is a common indicator of persistence by malicious actors attempting to mimic legitimate Microsoft Edge update processes.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
001
Detects the creation of a scheduled task intended to masquerade as 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTask' using either schtasks.exe or PowerShell. The rule specifically monitors for tasks being registered in AppData/Roaming directories, which is a common indicator of persistence by malicious actors attempting to mimic legitimate Microsoft Edge update processes.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
1 month ago
001
Detects the use of PowerShell to add an exclusion to Microsoft Defender. The detection looks for common obfuscation flags (Hidden, NonI, NoP, Bypass) in the command line and targets the MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore executable or DLL for exclusion, which is a common persistence or evasion technique. It excludes parent processes known for administrative activity to reduce noise.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
1 month ago
001
Detects the use of PowerShell to add an exclusion to Microsoft Defender. The detection looks for common obfuscation flags (Hidden, NonI, NoP, Bypass) in the command line and targets the MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore executable or DLL for exclusion, which is a common persistence or evasion technique. It excludes parent processes known for administrative activity to reduce noise.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
1 month ago
001
Detects the use of PowerShell to add an exclusion to Microsoft Defender. The detection looks for common obfuscation flags (Hidden, NonI, NoP, Bypass) in the command line and targets the MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore executable or DLL for exclusion, which is a common persistence or evasion technique. It excludes parent processes known for administrative activity to reduce noise.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
001
Detects Kothamine Agent via hardcoded base64 AES-GCM key combined with C2 loop markers and plugin command strings, gated on PE structure to reduce false positives
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
001
Detects Kothamine Agent via hardcoded base64 AES-GCM key combined with C2 loop markers and plugin command strings, gated on PE structure to reduce false positives
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
1 month ago
001
Detects the execution of 'tailcat.exe' from non-standard locations such as user directories (AppData, Users), which is indicative of potential unauthorized use of Tailscale portable binaries to establish network proxies or unauthorized tunnels.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
1 month ago
101
Detects the execution of 'tailcat.exe' from non-standard locations such as user directories (AppData, Users), which is indicative of potential unauthorized use of Tailscale portable binaries to establish network proxies or unauthorized tunnels.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
001
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