Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

40,063 detections

This rule detects the Kothamine dropper chain by correlating network connections or command-line activity fetching payloads from a specific GitHub repository ('cphc811-ui/new-tails') with the subsequent creation of associated malicious files (e.g., tailscale-related binaries, injector DLLs) on the same host within a one-hour window.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
001
This rule detects the Kothamine dropper chain by correlating network connections or command-line activity fetching payloads from a specific GitHub repository ('cphc811-ui/new-tails') with the subsequent creation of associated malicious files (e.g., tailscale-related binaries, injector DLLs) on the same host within a one-hour window.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
1 month ago
001
This rule monitors network connections initiated by common web browsers (chrome.exe, msedge.exe, brave.exe) to known domains associated with a specific VPN proxy service or subscription-based proxy farm infrastructure. The rule flags endpoints communicating with URLs involved in proxy beaconing, fallback hosting, and subscription API calls.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
Matches archived SHA-256 hashes of known malicious CRX builds from the 'VPN for X' proxy farm extension family
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
Detects browser-side network activity involving known command-and-control or subscription API domains associated with a malicious VPN browser extension proxy campaign. The rule monitors for beaconing behavior from popular web browsers (Chrome, Edge, Brave) to specific domains utilized by the campaign.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
This rule monitors for network connections to known malicious domains or IP addresses, and for the presence or execution of files with known malicious file hashes (MD5, SHA1, SHA256). It consolidates detections from network traffic, file events, and process execution logs over a 30-day lookback period.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
1 month ago
004
Detects network connection attempts to known typosquatted domains (thecovnresation.com/net) commonly associated with the CLEANGULP malware beaconing activity, specifically targeting the /beacon/pre-register URI path.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
1 month ago
004
Detects network connection attempts to known typosquatted domains (thecovnresation.com/net) commonly associated with the CLEANGULP malware beaconing activity, specifically targeting the /beacon/pre-register URI path.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
1 month ago
004
This rule detects the loading of the 'vsstrace.dll' module by processes that are not standard system processes or authorized software. The 'vsstrace.dll' is a library used by the Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS). Unauthorized or unexpected processes loading this DLL may indicate an attempt to interact with or manipulate volume shadow copies, which is a common behavior for ransomware attempting to inhibit system recovery.
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Kaung Khant Ko@kaungkhantko
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
107
Detects the execution of known Remote Monitoring & Management (RMM) software on Windows systems. This behavior is frequently abused by threat actors, including Scattered Spider, to maintain persistent access after gaining control via social engineering or identity-based attacks (e.g., vishing-driven credential or MFA resets).
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
003
Detects evidence of a SharePoint pre-authentication RCE exploit chain where an adversary injects a malicious Namespace containing an ExpandedWrapper-wrapped XamlServices payload (e.g., ObjectDataProvider or LosFormatter gadget) into the w3wp.exe worker process. This specifically looks for command-line arguments indicative of deserialization-based exploit attempts targeting SharePoint web server components.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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SlimKQL
2 months ago
405
Detects a suspicious execution sequence associated with the SectopRAT loader. The rule monitors for ReportDump.exe being launched from a ProgramData directory by common scheduling or service host processes, followed immediately by the loading of a malicious sdkcra.dll library.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
Detects outbound network connections to known SectopRAT C2 infrastructure, specifically targeting the hardcoded IP 98.142.252.140 or the non-standard port 15847 often used for encrypted exfiltration.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
This rule detects the suspicious pattern of a process reading a 'pool.db' file followed immediately by the loading of .NET Common Language Runtime (CLR) modules (clr.dll or mscoreei.dll). This behavior is characteristic of fileless execution chains where a secondary payload is retrieved and executed directly in memory.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
Detects the SectopRAT shellcode execution stage by identifying the concurrent access of a specific encrypted database file (Activation.Desktop.db) and the loading of a malicious DLL (stp_aim_x64_vc15.dll) on the same device within a 5-minute window. This behavior suggests the decryption and execution of shellcode via DLL callback abuse.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
Detects the ReportDump.exe process initiating a network connection on port 15847 followed by the loading of GDI/User32 libraries shortly thereafter. This behavior is indicative of SectopRAT establishing a command-and-control channel and initializing screen capture capabilities.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
This rule detects potential malicious activity by matching endpoint file events against a known list of malicious file hashes (SHA256, SHA1, MD5) and monitoring for connections to known malicious domains or URLs.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
307
Detects scenarios where common download utilities are used to fetch a file from the internet, followed by the immediate execution or loading of that same file within a 10-minute window, indicative of an Ingress Tool Transfer followed by execution.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
Detects successful remote authentication events (Network or Interactive) performed by AI agent orchestration service accounts. This rule monitors for atypical lateral movement patterns where an automated service account pivots to remote hosts using protocols such as RDP or WinRM, diverging from its standard operational context.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
Detects attempts to inject code into an AI agent orchestrator process by monitoring for suspicious CreateRemoteThread events. This rule is designed to identify potential process hijacking attacks by malicious actors seeking to bypass application-layer controls, while excluding common legitimate security monitoring tools that may exhibit similar behavior.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
Detects attempts to disable Windows Defender features via PowerShell, terminate critical security services using administrative tools like sc.exe or net.exe, or inject/patch AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) within a process context to evade detection.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
003
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