Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,407 detections
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Detects the execution of known portable utilities (WinSCP or Rclone) from user-writable directories (such as AppData, Temp, or Downloads) making outbound connections on port 22 and performing file transfer operations, suggesting potential data exfiltration.
Detects endpoint telemetry indicators associated with DDoSia client activity, including specific process executions, file creations/renames for executables or scripts, and network connections to NoName057(16) Tor portal infrastructure (nnmo57).
Detects endpoints browsing or connecting to known replacement or backup Telegram and X (Twitter) channels associated with Dark Storm Team, based on specific URL regex matching in device network and browser events.
Detects Armorsteal persistence mechanism using scheduled tasks (SysCheck2/SysCheckX/SysHeal) to execute a bundled Python kit located in C:\Windows\SystemHealth\Update. It covers task creation via schtasks.exe and execution of script contents via the Task Scheduler service spawning interpreters or conhost.
Detects a sequence of actions where a non-standard process accesses sensitive system artifacts (such as .gitconfig, screenshots, or mobile device backups) followed by the creation of a staged archive named 'volta_log.zip' within 30 minutes, indicative of the VOLTA infostealer's collection and staging behavior.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task using schtasks.exe that triggers on logon at the highest privilege level and executes a binary from the AppData directory, or uses the specific DeviceSync task name, while filtering out known benign software updaters and installers.
Detects Cobalt Strike psexec or psexec_psh lateral movement behavior where a Windows service (Event ID 7045) is installed using either an ADMIN$ binary path or a hidden encoded PowerShell command, followed by the spawned process executing rundll32.exe.
Detects the NETRYX RAT shell handler (DeviceSync.exe) spawning cmd.exe with the /c parameter to execute operator-supplied commands, excluding legitimate application paths in Program Files and Windows directories.
Detects the use of the curl utility to download files from remote destinations that have not been observed in the prior 7 to 1 days, helping identify potential ingress tool transfers or anomalous data retrieval.
Detects a sequence where a remote-support or screen-share tool (such as Quick Assist or mstsc.exe) is launched followed by the execution of a commercial Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) agent (such as AnyDesk, Bomgar, Zoho Assist, or SuperOps) on the same device within a 2-hour window. This pattern is commonly associated with vishing and initial access tactics used by threat actors like UNC3753.
Detects Kerberoasting activity on endpoints via the execution of Impacket's GetUserSPNs with request flags or hashcat executing Kerberos TGS cracking modes (13100/19700).
Detects behavior where a process initiates an outbound public network connection and shortly afterwards deletes its own executable file from user-writable directories, a technique commonly associated with malware cleanup such as info-stealers.
Detects outbound network connections to known C2 domains and IP addresses associated with the Lazarus TraderTraitor campaign (ROOFDECK/FLATROOF).
Detects the execution of the AdFind utility launched from a command interpreter batch file script (cmd.exe wrapping a .bat or .cmd script) performing multiple Active Directory reconnaissance queries, such as enumeration of persons, computers, organizational units, groups, trusts, or subnets.
Correlates a type 9 'seclogo' logon event with a cmd.exe named-pipe echo command (not spawned by services.exe) on the same device within a 30-minute window, which can indicate lateral movement or credential manipulation techniques.
Detects the Remote Desktop client (mstsc.exe) attempting to open the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (lsass.exe) with PROCESS_VM_READ access rights (0x1010), which is indicative of credential dumping or process injection.
Detects potential malicious software installation via two branches: Branch A identifies MSI files downloaded from suspicious URLs or with meeting/update lures (e.g., Zoom, Google Meet) followed by msiexec installation within one hour. Branch B detects msiexec command lines referencing RMM tools (ScreenConnect, LogMeIn, GoToResolve) combined with paths like Downloads, Temp, or AppData.
Detects a sequence where a Python process connects to GitHub to retrieve files associated with Armorsteal/got.py, followed by the execution of a 'chromelevator' binary from the C:\Windows\SystemHealth\Update\getthem directory within a 30-minute window.
Detects the execution of Add-MpPreference or Set-MpPreference to add a Windows Defender exclusion for the C:\Windows path or xmrig.exe process, potentially indicative of defense evasion activities by malware such as Armorsteal.
Detects a sequence of actions where a non-standard process accesses sensitive system artifacts (such as .gitconfig, screenshots, or mobile device backups) followed by the creation of a staged archive named 'volta_log.zip' within 30 minutes, indicative of the VOLTA infostealer's collection and staging behavior.
Detects DNS queries containing patterns associated with Kerberos coercion attacks via DNS object spoofing.
The pattern "1UWhRCAAAAA..BAAAA" is a base64-encoded signature that corresponds to a marshaled CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION structure.
Attackers can use this technique to coerce authentication from victim systems to attacker-controlled hosts.
It is one of the strong indicators of a Kerberos coercion attack, where adversaries manipulate DNS records
to spoof Service Principal Names (SPNs) and redirect authentication requests like CVE-2025-33073.
The pattern "1UWhRCAAAAA..BAAAA" is a base64-encoded signature that corresponds to a marshaled CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION structure.
Attackers can use this technique to coerce authentication from victim systems to attacker-controlled hosts.
It is one of the strong indicators of a Kerberos coercion attack, where adversaries manipulate DNS records
to spoof Service Principal Names (SPNs) and redirect authentication requests like CVE-2025-33073.
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