Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
3,864 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
2,523
525
299
218
131
Contributors
999
706
554
263
188
Categories
1,448
1,199
1,091
792
575
Platforms
39,931
7,261
6,535
3,864
3,642
Products / Services
1,755
1,449
1,120
438
406
MITRE Techniques
1,888
1,391
913
814
726
CVEs
12
5
4
3
2
IDS Classtypes
10
7
6
6
5
IDS Protocols
37
2
1
This query looks for Entra ID role adds identified by Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps. It will require an corresponding app connector in Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps.
'This hunting query looks for users whose total returned data that is significantly above their average.'
'This hunting query looks for users who have run queries that have not previously been seen running queries.'
'Identifies IPs with failed attempts to sign in to one or more disabled accounts signed in successfully to another account.
To use this analytics rule, make sure you have deployed the [ASIM normalization parsers](https://aka.ms/ASimAuthentication)'
To use this analytics rule, make sure you have deployed the [ASIM normalization parsers](https://aka.ms/ASimAuthentication)'
'Identifies if an AV scan finds infected files in Azure App Services.'
'User account failed to logon in current period. Excludes Windows Sign in attempts and limits to only more than 10 failed logons or 3 different IPs used. Results may indicate a potential malicious use of an account that is rarely used.'
' Identifies measureable increase in successful sign-ins from user accounts.
Spike is determined based on Time series anomaly which will look at historical baseline values.
Ref : https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-for-successful-unusual-sign-ins'
Spike is determined based on Time series anomaly which will look at historical baseline values.
Ref : https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-for-successful-unusual-sign-ins'
'This query uses the Azure Defender Security Nested Recommendations data to find machines vulnerable to OMIGOD CVE-2021-38647.
OMI is the Linux equivalent of Windows WMI and helps users manage configurations across remote and local environments. The query aims to find machines that have this OMI vulnerability (CVE-2021-38647).
Security Nested Recommendations data is sent to Microsoft Sentinel using the continuous export feature of Azure Defender(refrence link below).
Reference: https://www.wiz.io/blog/omigod-critical-vulnerabilities-in-omi-azure
Reference: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/security-center/continuous-export?tabs=azure-portal'
OMI is the Linux equivalent of Windows WMI and helps users manage configurations across remote and local environments. The query aims to find machines that have this OMI vulnerability (CVE-2021-38647).
Security Nested Recommendations data is sent to Microsoft Sentinel using the continuous export feature of Azure Defender(refrence link below).
Reference: https://www.wiz.io/blog/omigod-critical-vulnerabilities-in-omi-azure
Reference: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/security-center/continuous-export?tabs=azure-portal'
This query helps hunting for Tenant allow/block list (TABL) changes in Defender for Office 365
'This hunting query looks for users who have run queries calling a watchlist template relating to sensitive data that have not previously been seen calling these watchlists.'
This query looks for file download events identified by Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps. It will require an corresponding app connector in Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps.
Reference - https://learn.microsoft.com/defender-cloud-apps/enable-instant-visibility-protection-and-governance-actions-for-your-apps
Reference - https://learn.microsoft.com/defender-cloud-apps/enable-instant-visibility-protection-and-governance-actions-for-your-apps
'This hunting query looks for potential command injection attempts via the vulnerable third-party driver against Azure IR with Managed VNet or SHIR processes as well as post-exploitation activity based on process execution and command line activity
Reference: https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2022-29972
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2022/05/09/vulnerability-mitigated-in-the-third-party-data-connector-used-in-azure-synapse-pipelines-and-azure-data-factory-cve-2022-29972'
Reference: https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2022-29972
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2022/05/09/vulnerability-mitigated-in-the-third-party-data-connector-used-in-azure-synapse-pipelines-and-azure-data-factory-cve-2022-29972'
'This query identifies when a new trust monitor event is detected.'
'Detects the redirect URL of an app being changed.
Applications associated with URLs not controlled by the organization can pose a security risk.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-applications#application-configuration-changes'
Applications associated with URLs not controlled by the organization can pose a security risk.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-applications#application-configuration-changes'
'This query will look for events where guest user was invited but has not accepted/redeemed invite for unusually longer period.
Any invites not redeemed for longer period of time can be misused and pose risk if suspiciously redeemed in other ways'
Any invites not redeemed for longer period of time can be misused and pose risk if suspiciously redeemed in other ways'
'Looks for activity that might indicate exploitation of the ProxyToken vulnerability - CVE-2021-33766
Ref: https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/30/proxytoken-an-authentication-bypass-in-microsoft-exchange-server'
Ref: https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/30/proxytoken-an-authentication-bypass-in-microsoft-exchange-server'
'Identifies when a new user is granted access and any subsequent audit related activity. This can help you identify rogue or malicious user behavior.'
Looks for a new device registration in Entra ID preceded by medium or high-risk sign-in session for the same user within maximum 6h timeframe.
This rule detects user logins from multiple distinct states or countries within a one-hour window, leveraging GeoIP enrichment. It specifically looks for successful login events where a user logs in from at least two different states or at least one country, indicating potential 'impossible travel' or suspicious access patterns.
This rule detects when an Azure Container Registry is either created or deleted. Monitoring these operations can help identify unauthorized infrastructure changes, potential resource manipulation, or attempts to cover tracks by removing evidence. An adversary might create a new container registry to host malicious images or delete an existing one to disrupt services or remove forensic artifacts.
Identifies when a Kubernetes account accesses sensitive objects such as ConfigMaps or Secrets within Azure Kubernetes Service. This rule specifically looks for write or delete operations on these objects, which could indicate unauthorized access or malicious activity.
Page 170 of 184