Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects Gitea act_runner processes spawning Docker containers with dangerous configurations, such as privileged mode, host namespace mounts, or security-opt bypasses, followed by the execution of 'nsenter' or shell processes, which are indicative of a container escape attempt to the host.
This rule detects the creation of Amazon Q Model Context Protocol (MCP) configuration files, identified by 'mcp.json' in specific directories. It additionally correlates this file creation event with concurrent Git operations (checkout, merge, pull, or fetch) performed by a user, flagging the activity as a higher risk signal if both conditions are met.
Detects potentially malicious child process creation or unauthorized outbound network connections initiated by AI-assisted coding tools (e.g., Claude, Cursor, Windsurf) through their integrated Node.js or Python environments. This rule identifies common post-exploitation behaviors such as shell execution, command-line reconnaissance, and connections to external non-internal IP addresses.
This rule detects activities related to the 'ipv6_extlen_wrap_probe' proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit, which targets IPv6 extension header vulnerabilities. The detection logic monitors for: 1. Execution of the PoC binary, 2. Compilation of the PoC source code using common compilers like g++ or MinGW, 3. Creation of files associated with the PoC, and 4. Nmap execution with specific flags indicative of an attempt to trigger the vulnerability via raw IPv6 scanning.
This rule detects activities related to the 'Exploitarium' DLX exploit proof-of-concept (PoC) toolkit. It monitors for the invocation of 'objdump' with specific flags used in these exploits, the presence of associated Python and shell scripts on the filesystem, and the spawning of suspicious child processes (like command interpreters or calculators) by 'objdump', which acts as an indicator of successful exploitation or exploit testing.
Detects Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) attempts targeting the Floci API Gateway, specifically looking for Velocity Template Language (VTL) payloads intended to trigger Remote Code Execution via 'java.lang.ProcessBuilder', along with indicators of an IAM credential scope bypass.
Detects network requests to a typosquatted domain 'perplexity-ai.online' initiated by a malicious browser extension. The extension uses the 'suggest_url' feature to exfiltrate keystrokes typed into the browser omnibox in real-time, effectively performing browser-based keylogging.
Detects suspicious activities originating from SimpleHelp remote support processes, including the spawning of unauthorized child processes, execution of potentially malicious JavaScript loaders (e.g., TaskWeaver-related), and access to sensitive browser-based credential or configuration files often targeted by infostealers like Djinn Stealer.
Detects the execution of known MyBB 'Limited ACP to Admin' proof-of-concept scripts via common python interpreters and identifies suspicious child process spawning behavior from typical web server applications (such as nginx, apache2, and php-fpm). This activity is indicative of post-exploitation attempts or web shell execution via injected plugins or templates.
Detects potential Velocity Template Language (VTL) injection attacks targeting API Gateway environments. The rule identifies suspicious payloads in HTTP request bodies or URLs that attempt to leverage Java-based classes (e.g., ProcessBuilder) for code execution. It also monitors for IAM scope bypass attempts, abnormal HTTP method/path combinations associated with API Gateway control-plane operations, and evidence of shell/system commands being spawned from API Gateway-related parent processes.
This rule identifies suspicious outbound network beaconing by analyzing flow statistics for consistency in interval and payload size. It flags processes that demonstrate periodic communication (heartbeats) to external endpoints on non-standard ports. The detection logic calculates a 'beacon_score' based on the consistency of the communication interval, small average payload sizes, low variance in payload sizes, and the number of connections. Additional weighting is applied to connections made by typically non-network processes (e.g., svchost, explorer, wscript) or those connecting to ports associated with known malware like SystemBC.
Detects anomalous child process execution from PHP web handler processes (e.g., php-fpm, php-cgi) indicative of exploitation of the StreamBucket SOAP RCE vulnerability. The rule identifies spawning of common shell tools or access to sensitive process memory files (/proc/self/maps or /proc/self/mem) associated with ASLR defeat techniques used in this exploit chain.
Detects instances where AI coding assistants (e.g., Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf) spawn shell interpreters or scripting runtimes that subsequently initiate outbound network connections to non-private IP addresses. This behavior is indicative of potential malicious activity, such as credential theft or workspace trust bypass exploits (e.g., CVE-2026-12957), where an attacker leverages an AI coding assistant to execute arbitrary code. The rule excludes common build and test runner processes to minimize false positives.
This rule detects potential post-exploitation activity on Linux systems where a web application process (e.g., Python-based servers like uvicorn or gunicorn) initiates network requests using curl or wget, followed within 30 minutes by attempts to disable the system firewall or terminate security monitoring agents.
This rule detects the execution of specific malicious npm packages (jsonwebauth, fake-font) and associated script files (lserver.js, errorHandler.js) linked to Lazarus Group activity. It monitors node.exe processes for suspicious command lines, child processes originating from associated directories, and npm installation activities involving these packages.
Detects instances where common scripting runtimes (Python, Node.js) or development-related parent processes (e.g., VS Code, npm) access sensitive cloud credential or configuration files (AWS, Google Cloud, Azure). This behavior may indicate an adversary or an unauthorized script attempting to exfiltrate or leverage stored cloud credentials from an developer workstation.
This rule detects suspicious activities originating from Python processes spawned by development tools like VS Code, Node.js, or npm. It flags potential credential access when such processes attempt to read sensitive files (e.g., browser profiles, SSH keys, cloud configuration files) or perform suspicious network communication to external, non-standard ports, which may indicate data exfiltration or command-and-control behavior.
Detects the installation of known malicious npm packages designed to impersonate the legitimate 'rollup-plugin-polyfill-node' dependency. This pattern is associated with Lazarus Group supply chain attacks targeting developer environments and CI/CD pipelines.
Detects a sequence of events where a non-root user attempts to manipulate kernel components (specifically involving xfrm/esp modules via ip or modprobe) followed immediately by a sudo or su command, suggesting an attempt to load malicious kernel modules or exploit kernel vulnerabilities to escalate privileges.
Detects the creation or modification of a file named 'maisum.dat', which has been associated with malicious activity and malware behavior.
Identifies post-exploitation reverse shells resulting from the LiteLLM RCE vulnerabilities. The rule looks for processes initiated by 'litellm' (either directly or via python running litellm) that then spawn child processes with common reverse shell command line patterns such as 'bash -i', '/dev/tcp/', 'nc -e', or 'sh -i'.
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