Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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KQL Query from file: JivaChat Installer - Full Chain
Detects suspicious execution of command-line utilities (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, conhost.exe) directly from Windows Explorer (explorer.exe), which is often indicative of fileless malware execution, downloader activity, or 'ClickFix' style social engineering attacks.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity involving the execution of Node.js scripts initiated by system script proxies (wscript, cscript, msiexec) within specific paths, often associated with subsequent installation of VBScript agents or direct network communication with a known command-and-control IP address.
Detects an account takeover chain where a device loads a malicious JavaScript component ('load-addon.js') in a browser session, followed by repeated attempts to bypass bot detection mechanisms (targeting Google's 'errors/robot.png') as the payload attempts to force authentication challenges or password resets.
Detects network communication to specific Gusercontent endpoints consistent with malicious browser extensions exfiltrating captured session tokens or cookies. The rule monitors for POST requests containing parameters like leadId, email, and data, often used to transmit stolen authentication material.
Detects suspicious execution of command-line utilities (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, conhost.exe) directly from Windows Explorer (explorer.exe), which is often indicative of fileless malware execution, downloader activity, or 'ClickFix' style social engineering attacks.
Detects suspicious PowerShell process execution initiated by Windows Explorer, specifically involving WebDAV-related commands or network share mounting indicators. This pattern is commonly associated with attackers attempting to download and execute remote payloads from WebDAV shares to bypass security controls.
Detects the execution of PowerShell via explorer.exe (typically initiated through the Windows Run dialog) where the command line references a WebDAV UNC path (containing DavWWWRoot). This behavior is characteristic of 'ClickFix' social engineering attacks, where users are coerced into copying and pasting commands into the Run dialog that trigger remote script execution.
Sweeps DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents over a rolling 30-day window for known RevStealer indicators: exact SHA-256 matches against all 13 published file hashes, and exact-host matches (via parsed URL host, not substring) against the confirmed C2 domain meta7.archscreen68.one. An empty, extensible IP list is included for when a malicious IP is published.
Detects execution of package management commands (pip, npm, conda) that attempt to pull packages from registries other than the approved internal repositories. This behavior is indicative of potential AI supply-chain compromise, including malicious packages or namesquatting targeted at machine-learning or LLM-related development workflows.
Detects instances where machine learning runtime processes (e.g., Python, torch-model-loader) load serialized model files (e.g., .pkl, .joblib, .pth) and subsequently spawn suspicious child processes like command shells, scripting engines, or download utilities. This behavior is indicative of arbitrary code execution via unsafe deserialization of a malicious model artifact.
Detects high-volume outbound transfers of sensitive machine learning artifacts, such as model files, training datasets, and model registries, to unauthorized external destinations like personal email or unmanaged cloud storage. This behavior is indicative of potential intellectual property theft.
Detects potential poisoning of machine learning training data by identifying unauthorized file modifications to datasets, DVC repositories, or model registries that occur outside of authorized ETL or CI/CD windows.
This rule detects potential AI/ML supply chain compromise by monitoring for package installations (via pip, conda, poetry, etc.) from non-standard repositories, direct URLs, or version control systems within data science and CI/CD pipelines (e.g., Jupyter, Airflow, Jenkins). It further correlates this activity with subsequent suspicious outbound network connections from the host, which is indicative of slopsquatting or malicious dependency execution.
Detects a sequence of potentially malicious activity involving the bulk reading or downloading of sensitive AI-related artifacts (model files, datasets), followed by the staging of these files into a compressed archive, and finally an outbound network transfer to an external IP address. This behavior pattern is indicative of data exfiltration of intellectual property.
Detects the execution of known Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool binaries (ScreenConnect, AnyDesk, Atera) that are initiated by suspicious parent processes such as browsers, scripting hosts, or office applications, or run from non-standard locations. This behavior is indicative of threat actors deploying trojanized RMM tools to establish a covert command-and-control channel that blends into normal IT administrative traffic.
Detects suspicious cross-process access (Sysmon Event ID 10) and remote thread creation (Sysmon Event ID 8) targeting sensitive processes such as lsass.exe, svchost.exe, and explorer.exe, which are indicative of process injection or hollowing techniques used for evasion or persistence.
Detects bulk or repeated attempts to stop security-related services and processes (such as EDR or AV agents) or modification of Windows Defender registry keys. This behavior is indicative of a pre-encryption phase in ransomware attacks where adversaries attempt to neutralize endpoint defenses.
Detects malicious processes or scripts that perform multi-stage environment fingerprinting to identify virtualization or sandbox environments. The rule identifies chains of suspicious activities, including querying registry keys related to virtualization (e.g., VMware, VirtualBox, QEMU), WMI queries for BIOS/Computer system details, API calls common to sandbox evasion (GetCursorPos, GetTickCount), and artificial execution delays (sleep/timeout), typically used by malware like LummaC2 to perform conditional exits if an analysis environment is detected.
This rule detects a correlation between an Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certificate request (Event ID 4887) containing certificate attributes (SAN, altname, or UPN) and a subsequent Kerberos TGT request (Event ID 4768) within an hour, where the requested account name does not match the ticket user. This behavior is indicative of potential certificate-based authentication abuse, such as 'ESC1' or 'Golden Certificate' attacks where a certificate is requested and immediately used for credential impersonation.
This rule detects instances where common system processes (svchost.exe, explorer.exe, dllhost.exe) perform process injection activities, followed within a 5-minute window by a network connection to known SaaS and collaborative platforms (Slack, Discord, Dropbox, Trello). This combination is often indicative of malicious code executing within a trusted process to facilitate command and control or data exfiltration.
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