Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
576 detections
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Detects outbound network connections from web server processes to steamcommunity.com, which is used by this malware to fetch steganographically encoded C2 payloads from profile comments.
Detects truncated 'whostmgrsession' cookies missing the comma delimiter, which is a necessary step for attackers to inject cleartext CRLF payloads into cPanel session files and bypass authentication. This rule specifically looks for the 'whostmgrsession' cookie in web or proxy logs where the cookie value matches a regex pattern indicating the absence of the expected comma delimiter, a characteristic of the CVE-2026-41940 exploitation.
Detects HTTP POST requests destined for specific PHP endpoints (/res.php, /tele.php) frequently used by the BlobPhish campaign to exfiltrate stolen credentials from memory-resident phishing pages.
Detects network requests to known malicious domains associated with the fake RedAlert Android malware campaign used by pro-Iranian actors, acting as a payload host or C2 endpoint.
Detects SSTI attempts sent via GET requests in access logs
This rule detects suspicious activity involving multiple POST requests to Livewire update endpoints on web servers, followed by the spawning of unusual processes from web server parent processes (php, apache, httpd, nginx, php-fpm). The spawned processes of interest include various shells (sh, bash), command-line tools (curl, wget, python, perl, nc), or commands containing base64 encoding, chmod +x, or /tmp/ paths. This behavior could indicate a web shell compromise or successful exploitation leading to command execution.
This rule detects attempts to exploit a vulnerability in ShareFile (CVE-2026-2699/CVE-2026-2701) by monitoring for HTTP GET requests to the `/ConfigService/api/StroageZoneConfig` URI path with a `h=` query parameter. This pattern is indicative of an attacker trying to leak API secrets.
Detects the creation of specific webshell files (GW.class, payload.bin, or dpr_<8-hex-digits>.jsp) associated with CVE-2026-4681 weaponization on PTC Windchill and FlexPLM servers, or suspicious web requests containing patterns which could indicate exploitation attempts.
Detects exploitation attempts against Oracle WebLogic via suspicious HTTP requests and command execution patterns. The rule identifies WebLogic-specific endpoints combined with RCE payload indicators such as cmd, bash, powershell, wget, curl, or encoded payloads within the URI query.
This rule detects network connections and DNS resolution requests to known typosquatted domains used by the TeamPCP threat actor for command and control (C2) and data exfiltration. These domains are associated with a compromised Trivy scanner. Detection indicates successful execution of the compromised scanner and attempted exfiltration.
Detects web requests to Cloudflare workers.dev subdomains containing specific keywords commonly used in the EvilTokens device code phishing campaign. The rule specifically looks for a pattern like '[lure-type]-[3char-id].[username]-[domain]...workers.dev' to identify malicious URLs.
This rule detects network connections and DNS resolution requests to known typosquatted domains used by the TeamPCP threat actor for command and control (C2) and data exfiltration. These domains are associated with a compromised Trivy scanner. Detection indicates successful execution of the compromised scanner and attempted exfiltration.
Identifies suspicious URI request patterns potentially indicative of CVE-2026-4681 exploitation attempts against PTC PLM solutions. This rule looks for these specific patterns within web traffic logs from various sources (access logs, IIS, Apache).
Detects Zimbra SOAP API requests attempting to enable IMAP access by setting zimbraPrefImapEnabled. This is a known persistence technique used by threat actors (such as in Operation GhostMail) to silently enable mail protocols, bypassing the web UI to maintain access using stolen app-specific passwords.
Detects web requests for specific JavaScript file names that are part of the DarkSword iOS exploit chain. The presence of these requests strongly suggests a device is being targeted with the exploit kit.
Detects attempts to exploit a remote code execution vulnerability (CVE-2025-40553) in SolarWinds Web Help Desk. Attackers use hex-encoded escape sequences (`\xNN`) and other JSON parsing gotchas to bypass security filters and achieve deserialization of malicious objects.
Detects HTTP requests to download the BoryptGrab stealer, which uses a specific URL pattern containing a hardcoded build name. This activity is characteristic of the initial launchers used in the BoryptGrab campaign to fetch the main stealer component from a C2 server.
This rule is based on a phishing method that abuses normal sign-in links instead of relying on an obviously fake website at the start. The trick works by sending a person to a real sign-in service with settings that force an error and then pass the browser along to the attacker’s page. The rule stays narrow by looking for both the hidden sign-in setting and the clearly bad scope value together. That matters because silent sign-in by itself can appear in normal environments, but the bad scope value changes the story and makes the pattern much more suspicious. In plain language, this rule is trying to spot a link that pretends to be a normal sign-in step but is really being used as a doorway to a phishing or malware page after the trusted service does the redirect. Keeping both parts together helps the rule stay tied to the abusive redirect trick instead of ordinary sign-in traffic.
Detects a web server process spawning tools commonly used for data staging and exfiltration, such as rar.exe, certutil.exe, and type.exe. This behavior is characteristic of the CL-UNK-1068 actor's exfiltration TTP, often performed via a web shell.
This rule is meant to catch a very specific web request pattern tied to the SolarWinds Web Help Desk issue described in the report. The attack sends a crafted request to a known application path and includes a small group of values that are unusual in normal traffic but important in the exploit chain. The rule stays tight by requiring the request method, the path, and the special body values together. That matters because web applications often have busy and messy traffic, and loose matching on only one keyword would create noise. In plain language, this rule tries to spot a request that is not just using the help desk site, but is trying to abuse it to make the server handle attacker-controlled data in a dangerous way. It is best used as a high-confidence lead for review rather than a generic web alert. When it fires, it should be treated as a focused sign of attempted abuse rather than normal help desk.
Detects HTTP POST requests to the SolarWinds Web Help Desk (WHD) AjaxProxy endpoint that contain hex-encoded JSON keys or values (e.g., `\xNN`).
Attackers use this technique to bypass security filters and achieve remote code execution, as detailed in the exploit chain for CVE-2025-40552 and CVE-2025-40553.
Attackers use this technique to bypass security filters and achieve remote code execution, as detailed in the exploit chain for CVE-2025-40552 and CVE-2025-40553.
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