Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of a self-deletion routine associated with the TinyRCT backdoor. The rule identifies the use of the Windows 'choice' command to introduce a deliberate delay before deleting the malicious executable 'PerfWatson2.exe' from the AppData Local directory.
Detects the use of the Windows 'fsutil' utility with the 'setZeroData' argument to zero out file content. This technique is often used by adversaries to perform data destruction or prevent file recovery.
Detects the use of rundll32.exe to invoke the MiniDump function of comsvcs.dll to create a memory dump of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). This technique is a common method for dumping LSASS memory to harvest credentials, often used by tools like lsassy and various post-exploitation frameworks. The rule monitors for the specific command line patterns used in this attack, including referencing comsvcs.dll and the 'full' dump argument, initiated by suspicious parent processes frequently seen in lateral movement scenarios.
This rule detects abnormal, high-frequency network connection patterns originating from common web browser processes (msedge.exe, chrome.exe, brave.exe). It identifies scenarios where a browser process makes repetitive connections to a very small set of non-standard external domains, excluding common legitimate browser-related traffic. This behavior is indicative of background polling or C2 activity, such as that observed in malicious browser extensions (e.g., StegoAd) following an activation period.
Detects remote LSASS memory dumping patterns associated with the lsassy tool, leveraging comsvcs.dll to create memory dumps of the LSASS process. The rule identifies suspicious command lines involving comsvcs.dll ordinal-based exports (ordinal #+000024), tasklist enumeration for PID discovery, and subsequent dump file creation within \Windows\Temp\. It monitors remote execution methods often observed in Bumblebee and Akira campaigns, such as WMI or DCOM/MMC-based process spawning.
This rule detects potential Mythic C2 implant or payload build activity occurring via Docker. It monitors for executions of docker.exe, docker-compose.exe, or docker commands initiated by shells (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) containing keywords associated with the Mythic C2 framework, while explicitly excluding common CI/CD runner parent processes to reduce noise.
Detects the self-deletion mechanism used by the TinyRCT backdoor, which employs a timed delay loop using either 'choice.exe' or 'ping.exe' before executing a file deletion command ('del' or 'erase') to remove its own executable from the system. This behavior is indicative of a malware cleanup routine designed to erase traces of its presence after activity has concluded.
Photo-themed ZIP phishing campaign dropping a Node.js implant
Detects the Payouts King malware creating, running, or deleting specific scheduled tasks named \Mozilla\UpdateTask or \Mozilla\ElevateTask, as well as indirect execution of these tasks via cmd.exe redirection.
Detects potential payload staging activities within a WSL2 environment where a process writes an executable or script to the Windows filesystem using the DllHost.exe (COM Surrogate) proxy. This rule uses process activity on the host to infer the presence of a WSL2 environment (wsl.exe or vmmem) and analyzes the absence of Windows-native network events, which is a characteristic pattern of WSL2-based network activity being hidden from Windows host telemetry.
Detects the execution of PowerShell via WScript or CScript (ActiveX Scripting hosts) where the PowerShell command line includes suspicious arguments typically used for obfuscation, bypassing security policies, or launching payloads from the ProgramData directory.
Detects the execution of PowerShell via wscript.exe or cscript.exe, often indicative of malicious VBScript or JScript files executing obfuscated or hidden payloads. The rule checks for specific PowerShell arguments (e.g., -windowstyle hidden, -noni, -decode) or references to the ProgramData directory in the command line.
Detects the deletion of a .jse file from the user's Downloads directory by Windows Script Host (wscript.exe or cscript.exe). This behavior is consistent with the NUKESPED loader's anti-forensic cleanup routine, where the initial dropper deletes itself after staging subsequent payloads in secondary locations like ProgramData.
Detects execution of 'netstat.exe' with specific flags ('-a', '-n', '-o', or '-b') initiated by command-line interpreters like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, or cscript.exe. These flags are commonly used for network reconnaissance and discovery of active TCP connections, listening ports, and associated process IDs.
Detects the execution of known NTLM relay and credential harvesting tools such as Responder, Inveigh, and PetitPotam, or suspicious command-line patterns involving the use of 'net use' or common Windows binaries (e.g., powershell.exe, rundll32.exe) to access or force SMB authentication with remote IP addresses.
Detects the execution of mshta.exe with command-line arguments that include remote protocols (http/https) or scripts (javascript/vbscript). This behavior is commonly associated with fileless malware execution and proxying malicious code via a trusted Windows binary.
Detects instances where wscript.exe or cscript.exe executing a VBScript file subsequently spawns taskkill.exe with arguments intended to terminate PowerShell processes. This is a common pattern used by malicious scripts to disrupt security monitoring or automated management tasks.
Detects reconnaissance activity targeting Active Directory group structures and membership, utilizing common administrative tools such as net.exe, PowerShell, and dsquery. This rule identifies patterns associated with domain group discovery and identification of privileged accounts.
This rule detects network connections initiated by common Windows script interpreters (PowerShell, WScript, CScript, MSHTA) to known public paste or text sharing services. Adversaries often use these sites to host malicious payloads, C2 configurations, or to exfiltrate data, bypassing traditional network blocks by using reputable services. The rule excludes processes signed by Microsoft to reduce noise.
This rule detects potential persistence mechanisms associated with Microsoft Outlook, specifically targeting registry modifications related to Outlook security settings or suspicious child processes (cmd.exe or powershell.exe) spawned by outlook.exe.
This rule detects potential tampering with security software processes and services, as well as the execution of suspicious batch scripts (i.bat). It identifies when administrative tools like sc.exe, taskkill.exe, or net.exe are used to stop or delete security agents such as Sysmon, Filebeat, SentinelAgent, or antivirus services. It also monitors for the execution of 'i.bat' via command shell, which is commonly associated with malicious automation or persistence.
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