Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the drop and execution of the AvisLoader rootkit component, hmn_hook.dll. The rule identifies suspicious file drops in non-standard, user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Temp) that are not associated with legitimate installers, as well as the loading of unsigned or non-Microsoft-signed versions of the DLL accompanied by hook-related process arguments such as HMN_HideStart or NtQuerySystemInformation.
Detects the drop and execution of the AvisLoader rootkit component, hmn_hook.dll. The rule identifies suspicious file drops in non-standard, user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Temp) that are not associated with legitimate installers, as well as the loading of unsigned or non-Microsoft-signed versions of the DLL accompanied by hook-related process arguments such as HMN_HideStart or NtQuerySystemInformation.
Detects potential manual paste-and-run execution patterns where a shell or interpreter is launched directly from Windows Explorer (e.g., via the Run dialog or manual clipboard paste), correlated with either command-line references to or outbound network connections towards Cloudflare Tunnel services (trycloudflare.com, workers.dev). The rule specifically identifies one-off execution events by excluding cases where explorer.exe spawns multiple child processes simultaneously, indicating non-routine shell behavior.
Detects potential manual paste-and-run execution patterns where a shell or interpreter is launched directly from Windows Explorer (e.g., via the Run dialog or manual clipboard paste), correlated with either command-line references to or outbound network connections towards Cloudflare Tunnel services (trycloudflare.com, workers.dev). The rule specifically identifies one-off execution events by excluding cases where explorer.exe spawns multiple child processes simultaneously, indicating non-routine shell behavior.
Detects execution of auto.exe (associated with AvisLoader) combined with a specific registry-based UAC bypass technique using the ICMLuaUtil COM elevation moniker (CLSID 3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7). This pattern is characteristic of UACME method 41 to achieve privilege escalation.
Detects execution of auto.exe (associated with AvisLoader) combined with a specific registry-based UAC bypass technique using the ICMLuaUtil COM elevation moniker (CLSID 3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7). This pattern is characteristic of UACME method 41 to achieve privilege escalation.
Matches known SHA-256 hashes of AvisLoader toolkit components recovered from an exposed staging server: the Windows loader client, UAC-bypass helper, and process-hiding DLL
Detects AvisLoader Windows loader requiring both decoy non-executable packer-named sections and an embedded c-toxcore developer build path to co-occur in a valid PE
Detects AvisLoader Windows loader requiring both decoy non-executable packer-named sections and an embedded c-toxcore developer build path to co-occur in a valid PE
This rule monitors for known malicious indicators, including a specific file hash, a C2 IP address, a remote URL associated with potential malicious activity (anydesk.exe), and a domain associated with C3Pool crypto-mining activity, across device processes, network events, and file operations.
Detects the execution of 'Silent XMR Miner Builder.exe' followed by the spawning of common compilers (e.g., csc.exe, gcc.exe, donut.exe), which is indicative of a developer tool being used to compile and build a cryptocurrency mining payload.
Detects the execution of 'Silent XMR Miner Builder.exe' followed by the spawning of common compilers (e.g., csc.exe, gcc.exe, donut.exe), which is indicative of a developer tool being used to compile and build a cryptocurrency mining payload.
Detects the execution of 'Silent XMR Miner Builder.exe' followed by the spawning of common compilers (e.g., csc.exe, gcc.exe, donut.exe), which is indicative of a developer tool being used to compile and build a cryptocurrency mining payload.
Detects the execution of 'Silent XMR Miner Builder.exe' followed by the spawning of common compilers (e.g., csc.exe, gcc.exe, donut.exe), which is indicative of a developer tool being used to compile and build a cryptocurrency mining payload.
Detects Node.js processes exhibiting network activity patterns consistent with 'EtherHiding' style C2 infrastructure, characterized by multiple distinct connections to external WebSocket hosts on non-standard TCP ports within a short timeframe, potentially following interaction with a blockchain/JSON-RPC endpoint.
Detects a UAC bypass sequence associated with the ChainScript/Rapuncel loader, where a process invokes an 'elevation:Administrator!new' COM moniker (such as CMSTPLUA or ICMLuaUtil) followed by the execution or hollowed-out spawning of 'ServiceModelReg.exe' to achieve elevated privileges.
Detects anomalous file staging activity combined with keyword-matched file access or suspicious Steam application launches, characteristic of the Rapuncel (BoryptGrab) malware's credential and crypto-wallet harvesting routine.
Detects evidence of the Rapuncel infostealer attempting to compromise Chrome or Edge browsers. The rule identifies suspicious image loads into browser processes linked to known malicious hashes or the creation of specific browser decryption log files used by the malware to defeat App-Bound encryption.
Detects evidence of the Rapuncel infostealer attempting to compromise Chrome or Edge browsers. The rule identifies suspicious image loads into browser processes linked to known malicious hashes or the creation of specific browser decryption log files used by the malware to defeat App-Bound encryption.
Detects persistence mechanisms associated with 'ComponentTask33Agent' which involves either creating a scheduled task or modifying Windows Registry Run keys, alongside potential VBScript-based agent execution via wscript.exe.
Detects outbound HTTP requests to identified scam infrastructure (e.g., herokuapp domains) containing platform-specific query parameters (win or mac). This behavior is indicative of a user interacting with a malicious site that is delivering an OS-tailored locker or malware payload.
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