Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,063 detections
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Detects a suspected ClickFix infection sequence associated with Psychedelic Stealer. The rule identifies a user navigating to known malicious lure pages (often mimicking Cloudflare CAPTCHAs) followed shortly by the Windows Run dialog (explorer.exe) initiating msiexec.exe to execute a remote MSI file.
Detects a suspected ClickFix infection sequence associated with Psychedelic Stealer. The rule identifies a user navigating to known malicious lure pages (often mimicking Cloudflare CAPTCHAs) followed shortly by the Windows Run dialog (explorer.exe) initiating msiexec.exe to execute a remote MSI file.
This rule detects the execution, file presence, or driver loading associated with 'EDRKiller' and 'WarsawKiller', which are malicious tools used to terminate or disable endpoint security products.
This rule detects the execution, file presence, or driver loading associated with 'EDRKiller' and 'WarsawKiller', which are malicious tools used to terminate or disable endpoint security products.
Detects the initialization of known-malicious Terraform providers (dockerd) followed within one hour by the execution of a 'go run' process from the .terraform directory. This pattern is indicative of a supply chain compromise where an adversary leverages a typosquatted or malicious Terraform provider to facilitate the execution of a secondary payload.
Detects network connection events associated with the download of machine learning model artifacts from public hubs that display indicators of malicious intent, such as unverified or newly created publisher accounts, missing or invalid cryptographic signatures, or the presence of embedded executable/pickle-deserialization payloads.
Detects network connection events associated with the download of machine learning model artifacts from public hubs that display indicators of malicious intent, such as unverified or newly created publisher accounts, missing or invalid cryptographic signatures, or the presence of embedded executable/pickle-deserialization payloads.
Detects the installation of machine learning or AI software dependencies (pip, conda, npm, poetry) that either pull from unauthorized registries or match known malicious/typosquatting naming patterns (e.g., LiteLLM supply-chain compromise). The rule also monitors for newly published packages that have been flagged as suspicious.
Detects an AI agent session that performs a data exfiltration action (e.g., sending an email, webhook, or file share) to an unauthorized or non-allowlisted destination shortly after the agent has ingested potentially untrusted external content. This behavior is indicative of an AI agent being manipulated to exfiltrate data after processing malicious or adversarial inputs.
This rule detects the execution of common Windows administration utilities (vssadmin.exe, wmic.exe, wbadmin.exe, bcdedit.exe) being used to delete Volume Shadow Copies, backup catalogs, or modify boot configuration data to disable automatic recovery. These actions are frequently performed by ransomware to prevent data restoration.
Detects the execution of suspicious child processes (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe, bash, wget) spawned by processes associated with public-facing appliances like Fortinet SSL-VPN, Veeam Backup & Replication, Citrix ADC, and cPanel/WHM. This behavior is often indicative of exploitation of public-facing applications (T1190) for initial access, frequently associated with ransomware actors targeting unpatched infrastructure.
Detects the execution of suspicious child processes (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe, bash, wget) spawned by processes associated with public-facing appliances like Fortinet SSL-VPN, Veeam Backup & Replication, Citrix ADC, and cPanel/WHM. This behavior is often indicative of exploitation of public-facing applications (T1190) for initial access, frequently associated with ransomware actors targeting unpatched infrastructure.
Detects persistence attempts via Windows Registry run keys and Startup folders. The rule identifies suspicious modifications to run/runonce registry keys involving common user-writable paths (e.g., Temp, AppData) or the execution of PowerShell commands with common obfuscation flags (e.g., -enc). Additionally, it detects the creation of executable files (.lnk, .ps1, .vbs, .bat) within user Startup folders.
Detects the deletion of Windows Volume Shadow Copies using vssadmin.exe, wmic.exe, or PowerShell (WMI/CIM objects). This activity is commonly used by ransomware to prevent local data recovery by destroying shadow copy backups before encryption.
Detects the use of command-line tools like s5cmd or aws-cli to synchronize or copy data to an Amazon S3 bucket. The rule identifies suspicious patterns by looking for specific transfer commands combined with recursive or high-concurrency flags that indicate mass data movement often associated with exfiltration.
Detects two suspicious Kerberos activity patterns indicative of potential credential theft or reconnaissance: 1) A single account requesting tickets for multiple services or across multiple hosts in a short duration, which may indicate automated credential harvesting such as Kerberoasting; 2) The use of RC4 encryption (0x17) for Kerberos tickets, which is an older, weaker protocol and may indicate a forced downgrade attack to facilitate offline password cracking.
Detects usage of the 'gem' command (install, build, push, publish) that includes naming patterns or specific command strings associated with the GemStuffer supply chain compromise campaign. This targets attempts to introduce malicious dependencies into the environment using RubyGems.
This rule identifies potential malicious activity by detecting the presence of known malicious file hashes (SHA256 and MD5) on endpoints and monitoring for DNS queries or network connections to a known malicious staging domain (yapw.life). The detection correlates file execution, file activity, and network communication to identify stages of an attack such as malware installation or C2 communication.
This rule monitors for known malicious file hashes (MD5) and network traffic (domains and specific URLs) associated with known threats. It aggregates events from DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents to identify potential interactions with threat infrastructure.
Detects a specific pattern of Windows API calls consistent with PIVOTPIPE C2 activity, involving process token impersonation (OpenProcessToken, DuplicateTokenEx, ImpersonateLoggedOnUser, or SetThreadToken) followed by a RevertToSelf call. The rule correlates these events within a single process, identifies artifacts related to PIVOTPIPE loader/payloads, and ensures the sequence completes within a short time window.
This rule detects potentially malicious modifications to package.json files in npm projects or suspicious npm registry telemetry. It flags manifest files containing common obfuscation markers or excessive/unusual dependencies often associated with supply chain attacks, such as crypto, child_process, and common third-party packages frequently used in malicious npm activity.
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