Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,063 detections
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Detects the use of 'terraform init' where the command line arguments reference known typosquatted HashiCorp registry domains. This behavior is indicative of a supply chain attack attempting to pull malicious providers or modules from an adversary-controlled source.
Detects Node.js processes executing suspicious command lines that involve fetching and executing remote JavaScript code. This behavior is indicative of a loader or downloader script commonly used to pull and evaluate malicious payloads at runtime, specifically referencing indicators associated with 'GHAPPIER'.
This rule detects potential staging activity for ClickFix or Vidar malware campaigns. It identifies the creation of files or folders in directories mimicking Windows Diagnostics infrastructure (WDI) or known payload paths, correlated with the execution of suspicious PowerShell commands or archive-related utilities within a 30-minute window on the same device.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) communication and malicious process execution associated with the Vidar stealer malware. It monitors both network connections and process command lines for indicators of known Telegram C2 channels and secondary Steam community profile C2 infrastructure. The rule specifically highlights activity originating from processes other than common web browsers to identify suspicious automated beaconing or control.
This rule monitors network, DNS, and HTTP activity to identify connections to known infrastructure associated with the ClickFix social engineering campaign and Vidar infostealer malware. The rule correlates device network events, HTTP request events, and DNS queries against a list of known malicious domains, IP addresses, and URL patterns used for C2, staging, and lures.
This rule monitors network, DNS, and HTTP activity to identify connections to known infrastructure associated with the ClickFix social engineering campaign and Vidar infostealer malware. The rule correlates device network events, HTTP request events, and DNS queries against a list of known malicious domains, IP addresses, and URL patterns used for C2, staging, and lures.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) communication and malicious process execution associated with the Vidar stealer malware. It monitors both network connections and process command lines for indicators of known Telegram C2 channels and secondary Steam community profile C2 infrastructure. The rule specifically highlights activity originating from processes other than common web browsers to identify suspicious automated beaconing or control.
This rule detects malicious activity related to the exploitation of MpDlpService.exe. It looks for the execution or presence of known malicious file hashes associated with this threat, including a P-stage script, payload files, and a malicious mpclient.dll. Additionally, it identifies instances where the legitimate MpDlpService.exe binary is executed from a non-standard, suspicious directory, which is a common indicator of side-loading or persistence techniques.
This rule monitors network, DNS, and HTTP activity to identify connections to known infrastructure associated with the ClickFix social engineering campaign and Vidar infostealer malware. The rule correlates device network events, HTTP request events, and DNS queries against a list of known malicious domains, IP addresses, and URL patterns used for C2, staging, and lures.
Detects a process accessing browser credential files (Login Data) followed by an outbound network connection to a suspicious exfiltration endpoint commonly associated with credential-stealing malware.
Detects the clearing of Windows event logs using native 'wevtutil.exe' or PowerShell cmdlets. The rule monitors for common log-clearing commands and triggers an alert when multiple such events occur on a single host within a 15-minute window, which is indicative of bulk log-wiping often performed by ransomware or during post-exploitation defense evasion.
Detects the execution of WinRAR utilities (WinRAR.exe, Rar.exe) with suspicious command-line arguments typically associated with data staging, archiving, or encryption. The rule filters out legitimate WinRAR installations and only triggers when the process is spawned by a script interpreter (e.g., PowerShell, CMD) or operates within sensitive file paths (e.g., Users, Shares, Finance, HR, Backup).
Detects file, process, and network activity associated with the TraderTraitor/KelpDAO malware campaign based on known hashes, filenames, paths, and C2 infrastructure.
Detects unauthorized processes accessing the 'ConsoleHost_history.txt' file across user profiles. This behavior is indicative of ransomware operators or malicious actors attempting to harvest stored credentials, tokens, or sensitive command-line history before performing lateral movement or privilege escalation.
Detects the use of PsExec to remotely execute binaries on target hosts, a technique observed in The Gentlemen ransomware lateral movement phase when domain controller access is unavailable. The rule identifies psexec.exe process creation with common flags (-s, -d, -c) while filtering out common administrative parent processes.
Detects lateral movement activities associated with The Gentlemen ransomware group. The rule monitors for the execution of PowerShell scripts named 'deploy_gpo.ps1' from the %TEMP% directory, PowerShell interactions with the NETLOGON share for malware distribution, creation of ScheduledTasks.xml via PowerShell (a common GPO manipulation technique), and the subsequent enforcement of policy changes using 'gpupdate /force' invoked by scripting engines.
Detects the specific sequence of administrative utilities used by Gentlemen ransomware to seize control of files before encryption. This involves using 'takeown.exe' to claim ownership, 'icacls.exe' to grant full access to the Everyone group, and 'attrib.exe' to remove read-only file attributes, a common precursor to mass file encryption.
Detects ClickFix-style social engineering attacks where a user is tricked into manually executing a PowerShell command. The command typically utilizes Invoke-RestMethod to fetch a remote payload and Invoke-Expression to execute it in memory, bypassing execution policies. This behavior is commonly associated with campaigns like SmartApeSG and DeepLoad.
Detects the DeepLoad malware staging process injection by spawning trusted Windows binaries (LockAppHost.exe, makecab.exe, or Magnify.exe) in a suspended state from an unauthorized parent process. This behavior is indicative of an APC-based injection sequence where malicious code is written into the suspended process before execution.
Detects the execution of PowerShell scripts 'first.ps1' and 'main1.ps1', which are components of a known credential phishing toolset. This tool displays a fake Windows Update dialog to trick users into providing their credentials, which are then exfiltrated via SMB, DNS, or HTTP.
Detects instances where a single process on a device communicates with two or more distinct hosted LLM provider APIs (OpenAI, Anthropic, DeepSeek, Google) within a 24-hour window. This behavior is indicative of multi-model orchestration or 'consensus' techniques, which may be employed by sophisticated implants for automated tasking, data processing, or evasion.
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