Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
7,277 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
3,349
1,086
505
478
472
Contributors
1,824
1,622
874
505
300
Categories
3,035
2,546
1,076
1,051
932
Platforms
39,971
7,277
6,539
3,868
3,652
Products / Services
1,332
1,114
993
658
494
MITRE Techniques
2,274
1,337
1,319
905
886
CVEs
66
65
33
32
28
IDS Classtypes
81
80
56
27
10
IDS Protocols
149
98
6
5
4
Detects suspicious usage of the Bun runtime, specifically when it is spawned by common Node.js development processes (like npm or node-gyp) or downloaded from non-official sources using command-line tools or browsers. This behavior is associated with the Miasma malware campaign, which abuses the Bun runtime for malicious operations.
Detects Node.js processes being executed with specific require flags or environment variables, while having parent processes or command-line arguments indicative of Flowise integration. This behavior is often associated with the execution of custom MCP (Model Context Protocol) tools or extensions within a Flowise workflow, which could potentially be abused for unauthorized operations or persistence.
Detects instances where a user within the MyBB Admin Control Panel (ACP) attempts to create a new user account and assign it to the administrator usergroup (gid=4). This activity is indicative of a privilege escalation attempt by an authenticated user with limited administrative access or an attacker who has compromised such an account.
Detects outbound network connections over standard SSH ports (22, 2222) initiated by process names typically associated with web requests or package management (curl, git, php), potentially indicating unauthorized remote access, lateral movement, or data exfiltration from a compromised host to an external, non-private network address.
This rule detects two distinct malicious activities related to Gitea installations: 1) Container escape attempts involving 'act-runner' processes configured with dangerous flags like --pid=host, --cap-add=ALL, or usage of nsenter, and 2) Potential administrative impersonation attempts against a Gitea instance via injection of the X-WEBAUTH-USER: admin HTTP header.
Detects DNS queries originating from endpoints to common URL shortening services such as bit.ly, goo.gl, and others. These services are frequently abused by adversaries for C2 communications, distributing malware, or phishing, as they can mask malicious destination URLs.
Detects attempts to escape a Docker container to the host filesystem by exploiting directory traversal vulnerabilities within the 'docker cp' command. It identifies suspicious CLI arguments indicating path traversal, the presence of known PoC artifacts, and file write events initiated by the Docker daemon outside of expected container directory paths.
Detects exploitation attempts against Gitea instances where an attacker impersonates an admin user by injecting the 'X-WEBAUTH-USER' header. This vulnerability typically occurs when 'REVERSE_PROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES' is misconfigured to trust all proxies ('*'), allowing unauthenticated users to gain administrative access via header manipulation. The rule covers web request headers, container logs for suspicious admin creation, and process execution arguments associated with the exploitation.
Detects the presence of malicious artifacts associated with the RoguePlanet campaign by ShinyHunters and Chaotic Eclipse, including specific malware families (BlueHammer, RedSun, UnDefend, Bluekit) and libpwn exploit harness components related to CVE-2026-55200.
This rule detects the execution of container runners (act-runner/gitea-act-runner) with insecure container isolation flags, such as mounting the host root filesystem, disabling security profiles (seccomp/apparmor), or running with host namespaces and excessive capabilities. These configurations indicate potential container escape attempts or misconfigurations that allow significant host-level access.
This rule detects when a command-line shell (bash, sh, cmd, powershell) is spawned by a parent process (curl, git, php, ssh) that has recently established an outbound network connection on port 22 (SSH). It also flags instances where the child shell process subsequently opens a network listener, often indicating a potential reverse shell or unauthorized remote access attempt.
Detects rapid enumeration of system binaries related to SSH and networking libraries (libssh2, libcurl, libgit) or version checks within a 5-minute window, which may indicate reconnaissance or pre-exploitation activity related to vulnerabilities like CVE-2026-55200.
Detects the exploitation of CVE-2026-20896 in Gitea, where an unauthenticated attacker sends a crafted POST request to user registration or installation endpoints. The rule triggers when this network activity is followed by the creation of a new user account with administrative roles within a 10-minute window, indicating potential privilege escalation.
Detects instances where processes associated with Claude AI (e.g., node, shell) spawn suspicious child processes such as Python interpreters, pip package managers, or shell scripts (sh, bash) with command-line arguments indicative of AI-driven project initiation, package installation, or automated setup tasks. This pattern is characteristic of AI-based agents executing code or performing automation on a developer workstation.
Detects suspicious command execution patterns, including reverse shell techniques (/dev/tcp, bash -i), DNS-based C2 communication (axiom-config, m100.cloud), and fileless payload retrieval (dig TXT queries). It specifically highlights commands initiated by common AI developer tools or runtimes (claude, node, python) that correlate with known adversarial setup scripts or potential prompt injection outcomes.
This rule detects potentially suspicious process executions originating from the Amazon Q language server or related processes. It monitors for commands involving MCP configuration files, AWS STS identity verification, and generic HTTP POST requests, which may indicate unauthorized activity or credential/configuration harvesting.
Detects the execution of the 'unshare' utility on Linux systems using command-line arguments that indicate the creation of new namespaces, particularly targeting user and network namespace isolation. Adversaries often use 'unshare' to bypass security controls or to facilitate container escapes by isolating processes from the host's environment.
This rule detects the use of specific Linux utilities often associated with local privilege escalation or container escape techniques. It monitors for commands involving 'unshare' with flags that allow user or network namespace manipulation, network traffic control ('tc') commands specifically interacting with 'pedit' or 'qdisc' which can be abused for kernel-level manipulation, 'ip netns' commands to manage network namespaces, and execution of known exploit-related filenames like 'pedit_cow_demo' or 'packet_edit_meme'.
Detects non-root users utilizing the 'tc' or 'ip' utilities to interact with kernel traffic control structures (qdisc/filter/action) specifically involving 'pedit' actions. This activity is a documented prerequisite for exploiting CVE-2026-46331, a vulnerability enabling page cache poisoning and local privilege escalation.
Detects the resolution of DNS TXT records using dig, followed by piping the decoded base64 output directly to bash for execution. This technique is characteristic of fileless payload delivery and remote command execution, specifically observed in the Axiom indirect prompt injection attack chain.
Detects the creation of user namespaces combined with network namespace flags using 'unshare' or 'ip netns' by non-root users. This activity is a necessary precursor for exploiting the CVE-2026-46331 vulnerability (pedit COW) to gain CAP_NET_ADMIN capabilities and subsequently corrupt the Linux page cache.
Page 189 of 347