Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the execution of processes that contain the command line argument 'Found sid:', which is commonly associated with security identifier (SID) enumeration or lookup tools/scripts, such as those used by security researchers or attackers during reconnaissance.
This rule correlates a suspicious process execution (identified by specific command-line indicators), with subsequent persistence modification in Windows Registry Run/RunOnce keys, and a subsequent external network connection (excluding internal IP ranges). The activity is captured within a 15-minute window, suggesting a multi-stage attack pattern involving execution, establishing persistence, and initiating C2 communication.
Detects the execution of PowerShell or pwsh with encoded command arguments containing a long base64 string, often used by attackers to hide malicious scripts from command-line logging and basic static analysis.
This rule detects the installation or operation of browser extensions that request overly broad host permissions (e.g., all URLs) or specifically target popular AI services (like Gemini, Copilot, or Claude). It also monitors the use of the declarativeNetRequest API to interact with these same AI service domains, which is a technique used by malicious extensions to intercept or manipulate web traffic.
Detects processes attempting to interact with the Anti-Malware Scan Interface (AMSI) via loading amsi.dll, calling functions such as AmsiScanBuffer or AmsiOpenSession, or modifying related registry keys. This behavior is highly indicative of attempts to disable or bypass AMSI protection, a common step in executing malicious scripts or payloads on Windows systems.
This rule detects system calls originating from unbacked, private, or unknown memory regions, which is a common indicator of reflective code loading or process injection techniques. It also flags suspicious call stacks where standard processes like PowerShell, rundll32, or .NET execute system calls on ntdll.dll from non-standard module memory.
Detects execution of known malicious files that subsequently interact with temporary directory debug logs and establish network listening sockets within a short timeframe. This behavior pattern is characteristic of post-exploitation activity, specifically the staging and operation of listener modules.
Detects the execution of known remote access and support tools on a host shortly after an email bombing or spam flood alert has been generated for the same user. This pattern is commonly associated with social engineering campaigns where attackers overwhelm a user's inbox to distract them while coercing them into running remote support software to 'resolve' the issue.
Detects the execution of AnyDesk shortly after a Microsoft Teams meeting or call initiation on the same host. This pattern is commonly observed in social engineering attacks where an adversary convinces a user to use remote access software during a live support or phishing call.
This rule detects a multi-stage attack chain targeting a single user within a 2-hour window. It identifies the combination of email bombing (a distraction technique), an incoming external or anonymous Teams call (social engineering channel), and the installation of common remote access tools (e.g., AnyDesk, TeamViewer) on the same host.
Detects the execution of AnyDesk shortly after a Microsoft Teams meeting or call initiation on the same host. This pattern is commonly observed in social engineering attacks where an adversary convinces a user to use remote access software during a live support or phishing call.
This rule detects a multi-stage attack chain targeting a single user within a 2-hour window. It identifies the combination of email bombing (a distraction technique), an incoming external or anonymous Teams call (social engineering channel), and the installation of common remote access tools (e.g., AnyDesk, TeamViewer) on the same host.
Detects instances where AI-assisted coding tools (such as Claude, Copilot, or Gemini) initiate Git operations (clone, checkout, fetch) in a non-interactive context. This behavior may indicate an automated process using AI tools to perform code repository interactions that should typically be user-initiated or are otherwise suspicious in a non-interactive environment.
Detects activity associated with the CARBONATO botnet, specifically the weaponization of the Hermes Agent framework. The detection monitors for the overwrite of the SOUL.md configuration file to inject a malicious GH0ST persona, execution of the hermes-agent binary from known malicious paths, and the presence of the CARBONATO_API_KEY environment variable or command-line parameter.
Detects activity associated with the CARBONATO botnet, specifically the weaponization of the Hermes Agent framework. The detection monitors for the overwrite of the SOUL.md configuration file to inject a malicious GH0ST persona, execution of the hermes-agent binary from known malicious paths, and the presence of the CARBONATO_API_KEY environment variable or command-line parameter.
Detects activity associated with the CARBONATO botnet, specifically the weaponization of the Hermes Agent framework. The detection monitors for the overwrite of the SOUL.md configuration file to inject a malicious GH0ST persona, execution of the hermes-agent binary from known malicious paths, and the presence of the CARBONATO_API_KEY environment variable or command-line parameter.
Detects activity associated with the CARBONATO botnet, specifically the weaponization of the Hermes Agent framework. The detection monitors for the overwrite of the SOUL.md configuration file to inject a malicious GH0ST persona, execution of the hermes-agent binary from known malicious paths, and the presence of the CARBONATO_API_KEY environment variable or command-line parameter.
Detects activity associated with the CARBONATO botnet, specifically the weaponization of the Hermes Agent framework. The detection monitors for the overwrite of the SOUL.md configuration file to inject a malicious GH0ST persona, execution of the hermes-agent binary from known malicious paths, and the presence of the CARBONATO_API_KEY environment variable or command-line parameter.
Detects techniques used by SloppyRAT, including indirect NTDLL syscalls bypassing API hooks (Hell's Gate style), and the use of DJB2 API hashing for NtAllocateVirtualMemory and NtCreateThreadEx. It monitors for CallTrace patterns indicating unbacked memory calls into ntdll.dll, detection of hardcoded DJB2 hash constants, or the presence of the B8 (mov eax, imm32) instruction followed by the 0F 05 syscall opcode.
This rule detects unauthorized or suspicious processes (like Python scripts or random executables) accessing Telegram Desktop's local 'tdata' directory, which contains user session information, and simultaneously exhibiting network activity directed towards Telegram API domains. This behavior is highly indicative of infostealer activity, where a malicious process attempts to harvest local Telegram session data for exfiltration.
This rule detects the use of 'npm' or 'node' to install packages from a registry other than trusted, standard registries (e.g., npmjs.org, GitHub). It specifically monitors command lines involving 'claude-code' that utilize custom, non-standard registry URLs. This behavior is indicative of potential supply chain attacks or the installation of unauthorized/malicious dependencies.
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