Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potential file timestamp manipulation (timestomping) and suspicious file operations commonly associated with web shell installation on Windows systems. It monitors for PowerShell commands, touch.exe execution, and cmd.exe file copy operations directed at web directories, as well as file write events involving specific known web shell filenames.
Detects potential CastleLoader delivery by monitoring for suspicious child process executions (e.g., PowerShell, cmd, mshta, wscript, cscript) spawned directly by common browser or email client parent processes. This behavior is indicative of a user interacting with a malicious phishing link or attachment as part of a malware delivery chain.
This rule detects the use of the 'pushd' command in the Windows Command Shell (cmd.exe) to mount a remote network share, immediately followed by the execution of a file on that remote share using 'rundll32.exe'. This pattern is a common technique used by attackers to execute malicious code (DLLs) stored on remote servers or network shares.
Detects LCRYX ransomware activity characterized by the execution of VBScript files via wscript/cscript, followed by attempts to disable security products (Windows Defender or third-party AVs) using command-line utilities, and establishing persistence via Registry Run keys within a 10-minute window on the same host.
Detects the execution of tcc.exe with specific command-line arguments '-nostdlib', '-run', and a reference to a 'config.ini.c' file. This pattern is indicative of the execution of potentially malicious scripts or payloads, often seen in the context of TCC (Take Command Console) or similar utilities being used to compile or run code after delivery.
This rule detects potentially malicious child processes spawned by Amazon Q or VS Code language server processes. It monitors for suspicious shell command-line invocations (e.g., bash, sh, cmd.exe) or tools (npx, python) immediately following the activation of language server processes, specifically looking for patterns associated with the unauthorized auto-loading or execution of Model Context Protocol (MCP) configuration files or utilities, potentially related to vulnerability patterns involving workspace-based execution.
This rule detects activities related to clearing or deleting Windows Event Logs, including usage of 'wevtutil.exe' to clear specific logs, 'cmd.exe' or PowerShell ('Remove-Item') to manually delete '.evtx' files, and the erasure of the USN journal via 'fsutil.exe'. It also detects the actual occurrence of Event IDs 1102 (Security log cleared) and 104 (System log cleared). The rule correlates these events with preceding service installations within the last 24 hours to distinguish between potential attacker anti-forensics activity and routine administrative maintenance.
This rule detects PowerShell processes initiated where the command line contains references to specific files ('vile_Decryptor.lnk' or 'vile_icon.ico'), which are indicative of suspicious shortcut file execution or associated malware staging activity.
This rule detects the execution of specific suspicious files (nvdaHelperRemote.dll or Mixed Reality.exe) when they originate from within the 'Windows Media Player' directory. Such behavior is indicative of potential DLL search order hijacking or masquerading attempts, where an adversary places malicious files in a predictable location to intercept execution.
Detects the execution of PowerShell from explorer.exe (the Windows Shell) involving commands that access the clipboard, which is a common indicator of the ClickFix social engineering attack technique. In this scenario, users are deceived into copying and pasting malicious commands into the Run dialog.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe that exhibit indicators associated with StrikeShark SharkLoader or Cobalt Strike persistence. Indicators include task actions that reference rundll32 with a DLL, execution from user-writable directories (AppData, ProgramData, Temp), the use of base64-encoded command lines, or specific task names mimicking OneDrive updates.
Detects the use of WinRAR (rar.exe) to archive files containing web server or database source code. The detection monitors for common staging flags (-k, -r, -s, -m1), password protection (-hp), or output paths indicative of staging activity (e.g., to a 'backup' directory or 'web.rar'), originating from standard Windows program file paths.
This rule detects the use of PowerShell or Command Prompt to execute commands related to Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) software or remote management tools such as IDrive or TeamViewer. It specifically looks for command-line arguments involving RMM-related keywords combined with execution flags or piping operators, which is a common pattern for automating the deployment, configuration, or malicious use of these remote access tools.
Detects a suspicious command pattern where 'cmd.exe' writes a transient batch file, immediately executes it, and then deletes it. This behavior is a common EDR evasion technique used to execute malicious payloads without leaving persistent traces on the disk.
Detects the installation of Visual Studio Code extensions from sources other than the official Marketplace. This activity is monitored by checking process command line arguments for the --install-extension flag combined with external URLs or local file paths, which may indicate an attempt to install malicious extensions.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity associated with the RustDesk remote access tool. It monitors for two conditions: 1) RustDesk spawning suspicious child processes (e.g., shells, scripting engines, or network tools) that indicate post-exploitation behavior. 2) The RustDesk binary being executed from an unusual parent process, which may indicate session hijacking or unauthorized installation.
Detects the execution of VBScript processes (wscript.exe/cscript.exe) that interact with WMI to enumerate installed antivirus products or perform external IP geolocation lookups via services like ip-api.com. This behavior is indicative of the Grandoreiro banking trojan performing environment reconnaissance and victim-targeted execution.
Smbexec Lateral Movement
YARA-L
Detects the command line pattern characteristic of Impacket's SMBExec, involving echoing a payload to a temporary batch file, executing, and deleting it.
This rule detects suspicious PowerShell script behavior that attempts to patch the Anti-Malware Scan Interface (AMSI) in-memory by manipulating internal .NET/CLR methods. It identifies the combination of dangerous API calls (e.g., VirtualProtect, Marshal.Copy, PrepareMethod) typically used to bypass AMSI scanning via JIT compilation patching targeting the WinScanContent method.
This rule detects potential Mythic C2 implant or payload build activity occurring via Docker. It monitors for executions of docker.exe, docker-compose.exe, or docker commands initiated by shells (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) containing keywords associated with the Mythic C2 framework, while explicitly excluding common CI/CD runner parent processes to reduce noise.
Detects the execution of common command-line utilities (cmd, powershell, wscript, cscript, mshta, certutil) directly spawned by Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Outlook). This is a common indicator of macro-based attacks or other exploit delivery chains where Office documents are used to execute malicious payloads.
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