Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the deployment of the IronWorm eBPF kernel rootkit by monitoring for unauthorized bpf() syscalls, specifically when invoked by suspicious parent processes such as npm or shells. The rule tracks the loading of eBPF programs, the usage of tools like bpftool, tc, and ip, and the presence of specific file artifacts and indicators associated with rootkit behavior like hiding PIDs or network sockets.
Detects instances where npm or node processes execute potentially malicious scripts (such as 'tools/setup' or '.github/scripts/precheck') during the package installation lifecycle, specifically when operating within a 'node_modules' context. This is indicative of supply chain attacks where malicious actors inject code into project dependencies.
Detects anomalous process behavior characterized by rapid access to multiple sensitive credential files or enumeration of critical environment variables (e.g., cloud, AI, or cryptocurrency wallet keys). This behavior aligns with the mass credential harvesting techniques observed in the IronWorm/Shai-Hulud campaign.
Detects the execution of non-JavaScript ELF binaries (e.g., Rust-compiled binaries) from within npm package directories or specific setup paths, typically during 'preinstall' or 'postinstall' npm lifecycle hooks. This behavior is indicative of potential supply-chain attacks where malicious code is executed during dependency installation.
Detects behavior associated with the IronWorm threat, including Tor-based command and control communication by unsigned binaries or Node.js processes, unauthorized DNS resolution of .onion domains, automated npm package management operations by Node.js, and git configuration modifications attempting to impersonate common developer automation identities.
Clipboard hijacking malware for cryptocurrency address substitution
Detects the execution of MeshCentral agent commands, specifically the 'RunCommand' functionality, which can be used to stage payloads or execute unauthorized commands on compromised systems. This detection monitors both process execution events on endpoints and generic syslog data.
Detects the execution of QEMU hypervisor binaries (qemu-system-x86_64, qemu.exe, etc.) when initiated from non-standard parent processes or from non-standard directories, or when associated with disk image files. This behavior may indicate the unauthorized deployment of virtualization software to facilitate lateral movement, data exfiltration, or environment evasion.
Detects instances where npm or node processes spawn child processes associated with common software supply chain attack patterns, specifically targeting 'preinstall' or setup lifecycle hooks as seen in IronWorm-like activity. The rule monitors for child processes executing in 'tools/setup', '.github/scripts/precheck', or within 'node_modules/.bin' directories while filtering out legitimate node-gyp build operations.
Detects processes that access a threshold of five or more sensitive configuration, credential, or browser-stored login files within a single execution context, which is indicative of credential harvesting or automated collection activity.
This rule monitors for suspicious child processes spawned by Node.js or npm-related processes (e.g., node, npm, node-gyp). It identifies potentially malicious activity such as shells, Python scripts, or custom scripts executing within the context of 'preinstall', 'postinstall', or 'binding.gyp' phases, which are common vectors for software supply chain compromises via malicious npm packages.
Detects IronWorm rootkit activity on Linux, specifically focusing on cases where npm or node processes spawn tools like bpftool, insmod, or modprobe to load eBPF programs or kernel modules. It also flags the usage of specific IronWorm-associated filenames (q2.bpf, libbpf) within directories managed by npm or node.
Detects the creation or modification of shell script files within known Linux system persistence directories ('/etc/profile.d/' and '/usr/local/lib/') that contain specific naming patterns (' .sh.local' or '.cache-update.sh'). This activity often indicates an attempt to establish persistence or inject code that executes upon user logon or system initialization.
Detects the execution of known Command and Control (C2) frameworks such as Sliver, Havoc, SparkRAT, or VShell from common suspicious temporary or staging directories (temp, tmp, appdata, programdata). This rule monitors process creation events to identify the presence of these unauthorized remote access tools.
Detects the use of BPF syscalls by non-root processes or the execution of BPF-related utilities (bpftool, bpfcc) from an interactive shell. This behavior is often associated with the ShadowGuard rootkit and potential BPF-based backdoor activity, which leverages BPF programs for stealthy system monitoring or command execution.
This rule monitors for suspicious Linux kernel operations, including the loading of BPF programs via bpftool or system calls, and attempts by debugging or tracing tools to interact with processes using forceful termination signals. It also includes an anomaly detection branch that identifies processes with active network connections that are missing from the system process list, which may indicate process ghosting or hiding techniques.
Detects unauthorized access to sensitive developer credential files and browser credential stores, typical of the IronWorm Rust-based infostealer. The rule monitors processes that are not known developer or browser tools as they read paths associated with AWS, SSH, Kubernetes, Docker, browser login data, and cryptocurrency wallets.
Detects miner binaries and watchdog scripts associated with the CVE-2026-33017 Langflow cryptominer campaign being staged in hidden directories under /var/tmp, specifically /var/tmp/.xlamb/ and related files used to evade detection. The rule looks for file events or process events where the folder path or file name matches known indicators like '/var/tmp/.xlamb', '/var/tmp/init_rmount', 'lambsys', 'lambsys.elf', or 'init_rmount', or if the process command line contains these paths/filenames.
Detects HTTP requests that reference or serve the 'cors_exploit_poc.html' file, which is associated with the MexicanMafia (Operation Escaneo) actor's method of exploiting Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) misconfigurations. This exploit attempts to hijack active administrative sessions by leveraging CORS with 'withCredentials=true'.
Detects the unauthorized exfiltration of SSL private key files using Netcat to a known malicious C2 IP address (62.171.185.97). The rule monitors process execution commands that include specific file names associated with certificate harvesting or extraction tools being piped or transmitted over the network.
This rule detects potential exploitation of SAP Remote Function Call (RFC) mechanisms, specifically targeting abuse of SXPG_CALL_SYSTEM and SXPG_COMMAND_INSERT which allow execution of OS commands via SAP. It identifies the execution of known malicious SAP-related scripts, suspicious OS commands (such as whoami, reading /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow) spawned by SAP work processes, and command line activity originating from privileged SAP service accounts.
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