Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the obfuscated 'setup.cjs' dropper associated with the easy-day-js npm supply chain attack. The rule identifies unique obfuscated variable names, XOR-encoded marker bytes, and specific campaign-related strings, including postinstall commands, package names, second-stage payload filenames, self-deletion patterns, and TLS bypass indicators.
Detects high-volume file modification or renaming operations targeted at specific file extensions (dcm, tf, parquet) commonly associated with sensitive data (DICOM imaging, Terraform states, database parquet files) or operations occurring within Docker volume directories. The detection uses an aggregation logic to identify when a process performs more than 20 such file operations on an endpoint, which may indicate bulk data exfiltration, encryption, or tampering.
This rule detects the use of 'sshpass' in conjunction with specific command-line arguments that indicate automated SSH logins. It specifically looks for the presence of '/sshpass/' and '/StrictHostKeyChecking=no/' in the command line, combined with common administrative account names like 'psoft', 'oracle', or 'linuxadm'. This activity is often associated with lateral movement techniques, as observed in attacks like those by ShinyHunters targeting Oracle/PeopleSoft environments.
Monitors for the use of 'sshpass' to automate SSH logins using specific accounts commonly associated with Oracle/PeopleSoft administration (psoft, oracle, linuxadm). This technique was observed in ShinyHunters attacks.
This rule detects a multi-stage Linux privilege escalation exploitation sequence often associated with kernel vulnerabilities (such as CVE-2023-32233). It identifies: 1) The creation of a user namespace to acquire CAP_NET_ADMIN privileges, 2) The use of 'tc' (traffic control) with 'pedit' actions by a non-root user, 3) The loading of the 'act_pedit' kernel module by a non-root user, 4) Execution of known proof-of-concept binaries (e.g., PACKET_EDIT_MEME, pedit_cow_demo), and 5) Post-exploit evidence cleanup involving the clearing of system page caches via 'drop_caches'.
Detects suspicious command-line activity indicative of an adversary attempting to disable security controls (such as SELinux, AppArmor, UFW, and IPTables) or performing cleanup and maintenance tasks on suspected cryptominer-related files on a Linux system.
This rule detects the suspicious execution of the Bun runtime spawned as a child process of Node.js or during npm package installation, which is a pattern observed in the Miasma/Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain attacks. It monitors for child processes named 'bun' or 'bun.exe' initiated by Node.js, or activities involving 'bun run _index.js' and 'node-gyp' which are characteristic of loader chains used to facilitate credential theft during package installation.
Detects suspicious activity originating from web application processes (python, uvicorn, gunicorn) involving the download and execution of a payload (isp.sh), followed by the deployment and execution of a binary (lambsys) within hidden directories in /var/tmp/. This rule flags indicators of compromise such as curl/wget calls to suspicious IPs, creation of hidden directories, and execution of binary files in temporary storage locations.
Detects potential unauthorized cryptocurrency mining activity by correlating process execution, network connections to known mining pools or C2 IPs, and the presence of known miner binaries in temporary directories. The rule calculates a confidence score based on the overlap of these behavioral indicators.
This rule detects potential exploitation of the DirtyClone vulnerability (CVE-2026-43503) by correlating prerequisites (XFRM state/policy creation, specific kernel module loading, or namespace manipulation) with a subsequent local privilege escalation where an unprivileged process spawns a root shell using 'su'.
Detects a two-stage activity pattern where a non-root user compiles C source code using common compilers (gcc, clang) within writable system directories (/tmp, /dev/shm, /var/tmp) using command-line arguments indicative of kernel or low-level exploits (e.g., skbuff, xfrm, static compilation), followed by the immediate execution of a newly created binary from those same directories within 60 seconds.
Detects activities related to the compilation and execution of the DirtyClone PoC exploit (CVE-2026-43503) on Linux systems, including compilation from source, direct execution of the binary, and permission modifications on binaries within world-writable directories.
Detects coordinated security defense evasion activities by the Lambsys cryptominer campaign. The rule triggers when a shell process (bash, sh, or dash) is used to stop or disable security services (auditd, ClamAV, osquery, Falco, CrowdStrike Falcon), forcibly terminate their processes using pkill or kill -9, and delete or shred critical system security and audit logs (auth.log, syslog, audit).
Detects instances where the Squid proxy application is used to establish network connections over ports 21 (FTP) or 22 (SSH) to specific external IP ranges. This behavior may indicate an attacker using the internal proxy server to anonymize command-and-control (C2) traffic or perform unauthorized external reconnaissance.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) beaconing activity by identifying devices communicating with known suspicious remote IP addresses at regular, repeating intervals. It calculates the time difference between consecutive connections to specific suspicious IPs and identifies devices that establish at least three connections within one-hour bins, adhering to a 1 to 15-minute heartbeat interval.
Detects anomalous authentication patterns where a single source IP address exhibits multiple failed login attempts followed by at least one successful login within a 10-minute time window, indicative of credential stuffing or password spraying.
Detects successful authentication events from accounts identified as service, managed, or robot accounts (e.g., svc_, sa_, msol, robot) originating from external IP addresses or exhibiting an unusually high number of distinct source IP addresses. This behavior is indicative of potential credential theft, token replay attacks, or unauthorized usage of service account identities.
This rule detects attempts to tamper with critical Linux log files such as /var/log/auth.log, /var/log/syslog, and /var/log/audit/audit.log. It specifically looks for file deletion or modification events, or process creation events that involve commands like 'rm', 'shred', 'truncate', 'unlink', or 'dd' targeting these log files. Legitimate processes like 'logrotate', 'rsyslog', 'syslog-ng', 'auditd', 'systemd', and 'journald' are excluded to reduce false positives.
Detects unauthorized processes attempting to access or perform operations on sensitive files such as browser credentials, SSH keys, crypto wallets, and password manager databases. The rule specifically looks for non-standard or unsigned processes interacting with a high volume of these files in a short time frame, which is indicative of credential harvesting by infostealer malware like Lumma, Redline, or Vidar.
Detects DNS lookups and network connections to known AI API endpoints (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google Generative Language) initiated by non-standard processes. This rule excludes common web browsers, productivity applications, and development tools to identify potentially unauthorized or suspicious interaction with AI services from internal processes.
Detects unauthorized access or modification to common CI/CD credential files (.npmrc, .pypirc, .git-credentials, jenkins credentials.xml) and CI/CD configuration files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml). The rule monitors both file system activities by non-standard processes and the execution of command-line tools that reference these sensitive files.
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