Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

40,407 detections

Detects network connections from non-browser processes to domains identified as DGA (Domain Generation Algorithm) anomalies by UEBA rules using abused TLDs.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
F S@Fsdr
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
2 days ago
8028
Detection rule that sweeps across Microsoft Defender XDR sources (including TVM software inventory, vulnerabilities, process events, file events, image loads, and registry entries) to identify potentially vulnerable Java installations associated with CVE-2026-114938.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
5 days ago
73060
Identifies devices running Java runtimes within the affected version ranges for Java4Shell (CVE-2026-114938), and provides the detected runtime version alongside the corresponding fixed version required for remediation.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Nicholas Yovanovich@nicholas303030
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
3 days ago
25031
Lists processes a JVM started on any host where a JVM crashed, from the first crash until 6 hours after the last one. This matches the crash-and-retry pattern before RCE succeeds. Shells are listed only when they run an inline or interactive command, so CI build steps that run script files are excluded.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Awais Munir@iawais
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
4 days ago
32148
Detects potential post-exploitation or escalation activity (such as Java4Shell CVE-2026-114938) where a Java Virtual Machine (JVM) crash artifact (hs_err_pid) is generated, followed closely by the same Java process or process tree spawning a shell or interpreter.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
5 days ago
25055
Indicators decay quickly, so this is a one-time exposure sweep, not a standing detection. The ten Previdian scan sources are honeypot observations; The Storm-0940 spray IPs.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Awais Munir@iawais
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
5 days ago
31159
A svchost.exe is only suspicious when it runs outside System32/SysWOW64, and the reported companion files resemble legitimate capture software. Requiring both in the same folder removes each signal's standalone false positives.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Awais Munir@iawais
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
6 days ago
42187
During the Optimizely compromise investigation, the article below list different domains related to the reported compromise. This KQL determine which devices generated the most connections and whether they contacted multiple malicious domains + which type of malicious URLs are ( PayLoad, Data Exfiltration, Screenshoot, others).
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Sergio Albea@Sergio_Albea
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
01 | 🇨🇭 Swiss Cyber Hunters
5 days ago
29152
The following analytic detects a binary running from a user-writable or Windows directory (C:\Users, C:\ProgramData, C:\PerfLogs or C:\Windows) that creates or modifies a Chrome or Edge NativeMessagingHosts registry key.
This activity is significant because registering a native messaging host manifest lets a malicious browser extension launch arbitrary local programs, which has been abused for command and control and persistence.
If confirmed malicious, an attacker could execute code through the browser each time the extension connects, outside the usual extension sandbox.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Splunk Security@SplunkSecurity
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Splunk Security Content
6 days ago
1073
Detects network connection events to known indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the Optimizely Web supply-chain compromise.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Falcon Eye@FalconEye
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
5 days ago
66052
Lists Java runtimes that actually started on endpoints, grouped by device, install path and reported version. Use it to find bundled or forgotten Java runtimes during a Java vulnerability response, such as unmanaged copies inside third party apps. Renamed launchers and apps that embed their own JVM are not matched, and the reported version can differ from the java -version output. It does not decide whether a build is vulnerable.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Goksel Atakan@gokselatakan
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
4 days ago
13036
This rule detects the installation or presence of a rogue ScreenConnect (ConnectWise Control) instance by extracting client IDs from file creation events and comparing them against a baseline of known historical client IDs over a 30-day period.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Dylan Evans@decksy
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
7 days ago
31081
The analytic finds Java Base64 decoder references and argument exceptions on the same JVM process within one minute. JIT messages add context when present. These logs indicate decoder activity and errors, but do not prove that a native overwrite or code execution occurred.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Splunk Security@SplunkSecurity
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Splunk Security Content
4 days ago
6032
This rule performs an IOC sweep across multiple telemetry sources (DeviceNetworkEvents, DeviceEvents, DeviceFileEvents, CommonSecurityLog, DnsEvents) to detect network connections, DNS queries, and file activity associated with the Optimizely supply chain attack distributing Coruna/DarkSword malware.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Arnold Chan@slaz
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
5 days ago
20039
Detects non-browser processes on endpoints making successful connections to well-known AI model API hosts. Shells, CLI tools and script runtimes are listed first. Use it to build an inventory of shadow AI use and to find unapproved automation or unexpected use of AI API keys.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Goksel Atakan@gokselatakan
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
4 days ago
23132
Detects a single internal host resolving an unusually high number of unique
subdomains under the same parent domain within a short window. Autonomous AI
attack frameworks like ARTEX decompose reconnaissance into parallel worker
agents that enumerate subdomains at machine speed — hundreds of queries in
seconds rather than the trickle a human operator produces. The signal is not
any single query but the volume and uniqueness ratio: many distinct FQDNs,
most returning NXDOMAIN, all sharing the same registrable domain.

Tune the count threshold against your DNS resolver baseline. Developers
testing microservice meshes or CI runners pulling from many subdomains can
produce similar volumes — whitelist known build infrastructure.

BQL (Bloo Query Language):

stream=ep-dns where action='DNS_QUERY'
and QueryName rlike '.*\..*\..*'
and not (QueryName like '%.internal' or QueryName like '%.local' or QueryName like '%.corp')
| groupby system, QueryName
| having count > 80
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Siddhant Mishra@Siddhant
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Bloo SpecterForce
3 days ago
1118
Command output sent to rotating webhook.site endpoints (491 distinct URLs in one intrusion- threat intel report). A single use is dual-use (developers), but three or more distinct webhook IDs from command-line tools on one host in an hour matches agent-style exfiltration. The distinct-ID count is the compound predicate.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Awais Munir@iawais
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
6 days ago
27151
During the Optimizely compromise investigation, the article below highlights several affected organizations, including BBC, CNN, Zoom, GitLab, IKEA, and Ledger.
We can correlate visits to these legitimate websites with subsequent connections to malicious domains to identify potential infection paths.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Sergio Albea@Sergio_Albea
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
01 | 🇨🇭 Swiss Cyber Hunters
5 days ago
60134
Detects a burst of JVM crash logs (hs_err_pid) associated with Java processes on a host within a short window, compared against the host's 14-day historical baseline, which may indicate exploitation attempts or instability.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
5 days ago
16030
A memshell or Java-native payload never spawns a child process, so H1 cannot see it. It can still write files or change critical files, and the sensor attributes those to the JVM process. Lists server JVMs that wrote a script or executable to a web-shell, startup or staging location, or changed a critical system file. Each row is one file event.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Awais Munir@iawais
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
2 days ago
7114
The following analytic correlates modifications to the Windows RunMRU registry key with clipboard content
changes initiated by browsers. It aims to detect ClickFix scenarios in which commands copied
from a browser are subsequently executed on the Windows system through the Run dialog box.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Splunk Security@SplunkSecurity
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Splunk Security Content
7 days ago
10057
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