Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
327 detections
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This rule monitors Android device process events for the execution of 'adb' commands aimed at modifying sensitive system configurations. It specifically tracks attempts to enable accessibility services, toggle wireless debugging, or establish unauthorized ADB pairings. The rule identifies potential malicious intent by aggregating multiple suspicious configuration changes on the same device within a short time window.
Detects malicious Android application installation or launch behavior consistent with the 'Corp MDM' implant. This rule specifically identifies instances where a package named 'com.corp.mdm' is installed or launched and rapidly requests a combination of high-risk permissions including SMS and telephony access (RECEIVE_SMS, READ_SMS, CALL_PHONE) alongside notification permissions, which is characteristic of the implant's initial setup phase.
Detects outbound network requests from non-standard Android application processes to Google's generative-AI API endpoints (e.g., Gemini). This behavior is indicative of malware, such as RatHat, attempting to exfiltrate accessibility information or UI trees to an LLM to facilitate automated screen interaction and navigation.
Detects a suspected anti-debugging and anti-instrumentation sequence on Android devices. This rule identifies instances where 'getprop' is used to query system properties related to device security (ro.debuggable, ro.secure) followed shortly by a local network probe to the standard Frida instrumentation server port (27042). This combination is indicative of malware gating its execution to ensure it is not running within a controlled or debugged environment.
Detects the sequential activation of Android Accessibility services followed by Device Administrator activation by the same application within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of sophisticated Android malware, such as RatHat, establishing persistence and preventing uninstallation by combining Accessibility-based control with Device Admin-based device management capabilities (e.g., remote wipe or anti-uninstall).
Detects outbound network requests from non-standard Android application processes to Google's generative-AI API endpoints (e.g., Gemini). This behavior is indicative of malware, such as RatHat, attempting to exfiltrate accessibility information or UI trees to an LLM to facilitate automated screen interaction and navigation.
Detects the sequential activation of Android Accessibility services followed by Device Administrator activation by the same application within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of sophisticated Android malware, such as RatHat, establishing persistence and preventing uninstallation by combining Accessibility-based control with Device Admin-based device management capabilities (e.g., remote wipe or anti-uninstall).
Detects network activity associated with the RatHat Android malware agent, including C2 tasking, Go agent 'frpc' tunnel configuration retrieval, tunnel deployment status reporting, and internal loopback C2 server communication.
Detects network activity associated with the RatHat Android malware, specifically identifying C2 data exfiltration API calls over FRP (FRP/Go Agent) tunnels and WebSocket handshake traffic for command-and-control communication.
Detects malicious staging and C2 activity characteristic of RatHat Android malware. The rule identifies processes running under the Android shell user (UID 2000) that execute specific tools (minicap, minitouch, or disguised libraries) from the /data/local/tmp directory, followed by an outbound network connection, which is indicative of a persistence mechanism and reverse-tunneling command-and-control communication.
Detects the use of the 'getevent' utility on Android/Linux systems to monitor and capture raw input events from '/dev/input'. This technique is often used by mobile malware to perform keylogging by intercepting touch or physical keystroke event streams, bypassing standard application-level input handling.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity on Android devices where the 'shell' user is performing silent application installations using 'pm install' and subsequently granting accessibility permissions via 'settings put secure'. This sequence is indicative of malware attempting to gain elevated control over the device by bypassing user-interactive prompts for installation and permission authorization.
Detects specific HTTP traffic patterns associated with the RatHat malware's FRP (Fast Reverse Proxy) reverse-tunneling deployment and C2 status reporting. The rule identifies the sequence of fetching configuration, initiating WebSocket tunnel links, and reporting deployment status to a remote command-and-control server.
Detects outbound HTTP requests from endpoints to a known C2 infrastructure associated with mobile device spyware. The rule identifies two specific stages: polling for new commands using a GET request and posting command execution results using a POST request, both targeting an MDM-mimicking API structure.
Detects an Android device registration attempt to a known malicious C2 IP address using parameters characteristic of a mobile device management (MDM) implant. The rule looks for a POST request to a specific registration endpoint containing device identifiers like deviceId, manufacturer, model, and osVersion.
This rule detects HTTP POST requests from mobile user agents (Android, Dalvik, okhttp) that contain keywords indicative of contactless payment card data exfiltration, specifically looking for fields such as 'track2', 'pan', 'atc', and 'cryptogram'. This behavior is consistent with malicious mobile applications attempting to transmit skimmed NFC credit card data to an external server.
Detects network traffic associated with the RatHat Android RAT, specifically monitoring for HTTP and TLS connections to the command and control (C2) delivery domain 'kingbss.com', as well as detecting characteristic FRP (Fast Reverse Proxy) client login handshake patterns used for tunnel establishment.
Detects rapid termination of specific mobile messenger applications (Max) within seconds of starting, while indicators of the Frida dynamic instrumentation tool are concurrently detected on the device. This pattern suggests the application is identifying the presence of a hooking/instrumentation environment and self-terminating as a defense mechanism. The detection is further correlated with failed connection attempts to the application's backend.
Detects potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) MFA bypass attacks (quishing). The rule correlates receipt of an email containing an image attachment (potential QR code) but no URL, followed by a risky mobile sign-in event from a device that is unmanaged or lacks trust within a two-hour window.
Detects suspicious mobile-device HTTP traffic patterns indicative of 'quishing' (QR code phishing). The rule identifies mobile HTTP GET requests (iPhone, Android, Mobile Safari, iPad) that lack a Referer header, followed by HTTP POST requests to common credential entry URI patterns (e.g., /login, /signin) over the same protocol, which is a behavioral indicator of a user being redirected from a scanned QR code to a malicious phishing landing page.
Detects Android device management (MDM) components (specifically 'com.corp.mdm') re-launching registration or sticky services upon system events such as boot completion, quick-boot, or package updates. This monitoring is intended to identify persistent components that maintain functionality across device restarts.
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