Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects persistence mechanisms installed by the trojanized Claude Code extension: macOS LaunchAgent plists, Windows scheduled tasks or Startup scripts, and Event ID 4698 scheduled task creation, when created by Node.js, Electron, Cursor, or VS Code processes
The following analytic detects PHP command-line interpreters executing code supplied directly on the command line with the CLI -r / --run options, or code supplied to PHPDBG through standard input.
It covers common CLI executable names on Linux and Windows, including php.exe, php-win.exe, the legacy php-cli.exe name, versioned Linux php binaries, phpdbg, and FrankenPHP's php-cli subcommand.
PHP-CGI and PHP-FPM are excluded because they do not support the PHP CLI inline -r option.
This behavior can be used legitimately for administration and automation, but unexpected or obfuscated inline PHP execution may indicate an attacker using an installed interpreter to run commands without dropping a script file.
It covers common CLI executable names on Linux and Windows, including php.exe, php-win.exe, the legacy php-cli.exe name, versioned Linux php binaries, phpdbg, and FrankenPHP's php-cli subcommand.
PHP-CGI and PHP-FPM are excluded because they do not support the PHP CLI inline -r option.
This behavior can be used legitimately for administration and automation, but unexpected or obfuscated inline PHP execution may indicate an attacker using an installed interpreter to run commands without dropping a script file.
Detects the execution and network activity of known tunneling, proxy, and VPN tools such as Chisel, SoftEther, and Tor based on process names, command-line arguments, file paths, and network connections.
Detects certificate-based (PKINIT) Kerberos authentication by a domain controller machine account originating from a non-DC device, which may indicate unauthorized ticket usage or shadow credentials abuse.
Detects the presence of the compromised anthropic.claude-code VS Code extension version 2.1.313 or its associated bad hash on disk, reverse SSH tunneling spawned by code editors or extension hosts, and network connections to known malicious C2 IP address 134.209.82.225.
Detects network communication to api.telegram.org from a process that is not identified as an authorized Telegram client application, potentially indicating command and control (C2) activity.
Detects potential pass-the-hash (PtH) attacks via command-line execution of offensive tooling (such as Impacket, CrackMapExec, NetExec, Evil-WinRM) specifying NT hashes, as well as remote NTLM network logons from non-standard workstation names characteristic of Linux-based attacker tools spreading across multiple endpoints.
Detects behavioral artifacts associated with Impacket remote execution tools (such as wmiexec, smbexec, and atexec) on target hosts using Microsoft Defender XDR process telemetry. It identifies command-line signatures spawned by system processes like WmiPrvSE.exe, services.exe, and svchost.exe.
Esta detección identifica posibles conexiones relacionadas con el uso de VPNs dentro del entorno corporativo, correlacionando puertos asociados a protocolos VPN, dominios no habituales, procesos iniciadores y adaptadores de red virtuales o tunelizados. El objetivo es descubrir actividad de VPN no autorizada, conexiones cifradas ocultas dentro de tráfico HTTPS y el uso de extensiones de navegador que actúan como túneles tipo VPN.
La lógica de esta consulta aplica múltiples capas de filtrado para reducir falsos positivos:
- Filtra conexiones salientes hacia puertos característicos de IPsec, OpenVPN, WireGuard, L2TP y PPTP.
- Detecta túneles sobre puerto 443 cuando el proceso iniciador no corresponde a aplicaciones del sistema.
- Excluye ruido generado por procesos de Windows y dominios legítimos asociados a Microsoft, Google y servicios cloud corporativos.
- Identifica adaptadores TAP, TUN, Wintun, WireGuard, Tailscale o ZeroTier presentes en el host.
- Clasifica el tipo probable de VPN según el puerto utilizado y el proceso que inicia la conexión.
Esta detección permite encontrar:
- Clientes VPN instalados sin autorización.
- Extensiones de navegador que establecen túneles SSL-VPN encubiertos.
- Herramientas de túneles encubiertos como WireGuard stealth, Tailscale o ZeroTier.
- Actividad anómala desde navegadores que podría indicar proxies cifrados o VPNs embebidas.
La lógica de esta consulta aplica múltiples capas de filtrado para reducir falsos positivos:
- Filtra conexiones salientes hacia puertos característicos de IPsec, OpenVPN, WireGuard, L2TP y PPTP.
- Detecta túneles sobre puerto 443 cuando el proceso iniciador no corresponde a aplicaciones del sistema.
- Excluye ruido generado por procesos de Windows y dominios legítimos asociados a Microsoft, Google y servicios cloud corporativos.
- Identifica adaptadores TAP, TUN, Wintun, WireGuard, Tailscale o ZeroTier presentes en el host.
- Clasifica el tipo probable de VPN según el puerto utilizado y el proceso que inicia la conexión.
Esta detección permite encontrar:
- Clientes VPN instalados sin autorización.
- Extensiones de navegador que establecen túneles SSL-VPN encubiertos.
- Herramientas de túneles encubiertos como WireGuard stealth, Tailscale o ZeroTier.
- Actividad anómala desde navegadores que podría indicar proxies cifrados o VPNs embebidas.
Detects Microsoft Excel spawning script hosts or living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins) with command line parameters indicative of decoding or executing payloads, commonly associated with malicious macro-enabled .xlsm workbooks.
Detects a VS Code-family editor or extension host process running 'git config --global user.email' and, within one minute from the same parent process, a curl public-IP lookup (ifconfig.me / api.ipify.org), the host-profiling step of the trojanized anthropic.claude-code loader.
Detects any file write event in a user's Downloads folder on Windows endpoints, covering every CrowdStrike Falcon Written event type.
Downloads is a common landing spot for payloads from phishing links and drive-by downloads. This is the broad version of the PE file rule and includes it, so it is very noisy and suits threat hunting or investigation pivots more than alerting. To triage, review the event type, file name, writing process, hash and company name.
Downloads is a common landing spot for payloads from phishing links and drive-by downloads. This is the broad version of the PE file rule and includes it, so it is very noisy and suits threat hunting or investigation pivots more than alerting. To triage, review the event type, file name, writing process, hash and company name.
The following analytic identifies the execution of suspicious processes typically associated with WebShell activity on web servers.
It detects when processes like `cmd.exe`, `powershell.exe`, or `bash.exe` are spawned by web server processes such as `w3wp.exe` or `nginx.exe`.
This behavior is significant as it may indicate an adversary exploiting a web application vulnerability to install a WebShell, providing persistent access and command execution capabilities.
If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to maintain control over the compromised server, execute arbitrary commands, and potentially escalate privileges or exfiltrate sensitive data.
It detects when processes like `cmd.exe`, `powershell.exe`, or `bash.exe` are spawned by web server processes such as `w3wp.exe` or `nginx.exe`.
This behavior is significant as it may indicate an adversary exploiting a web application vulnerability to install a WebShell, providing persistent access and command execution capabilities.
If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to maintain control over the compromised server, execute arbitrary commands, and potentially escalate privileges or exfiltrate sensitive data.
Detects an Active Directory password spray attack originating from a single source IP, followed closely by a user account creation event (Event ID 4720) associated with a logon from that same source IP.
Detects a non-system process interacting with a high volume of sensitive files across multiple distinct categories (such as KeePass, RDP, VPN, email, and Office documents) within a short time window, which is indicative of data collection or staging prior to exfiltration.
Detects when an account reads a Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS) password attribute and subsequently modifies the resource-based constrained delegation (msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity) attribute within a 4-hour window, which may indicate privilege escalation activity.
Detects mass creation or renaming of files with the .L0CK3D extension (associated with C3RB3R / eCh0raix ransomware) within a short timeframe across multiple folders, optionally correlated with the creation of the read-me3.txt ransom note.
Flags endpoints tied to anonymous file-drop sites, paste services and chat platforms abused for exfiltration and C2. Sanctioned services (Dropbox, Drive, OneDrive, Box) are left out as in the original; an optional block is included.
Dual-use transfer tools (rclone, WinSCP, curl, AzCopy, AWS/gcloud CLI) are favored by ransomware affiliates and APT operators because they are signed/legitimate. The hunt keys on upload-oriented flags and verbs per tool, not binary presence. Each tool has its own
Detects installation of a Windows service (System EventID 7045)
named after known VirtualBox Guest Additions components (VBoxGuest, VBoxMouse, VBoxSF,
VBoxService, VBoxVideo, VBoxWDDM). Fires when either:
(a) the service binary is registered outside the legitimate VirtualBox install/driver
paths, or
(b) a driver-class component name (VBoxGuest/VBoxMouse/VBoxSF/VBoxVideo/VBoxWDDM) is
registered as a user-mode/own-process service instead of a kernel or file-system
driver — a structural mismatch that cannot occur with the genuine component and is
a strong indicator of name-based masquerading (T1036.005).
Adversaries reuse trusted VirtualBox names to blend malicious persistence into expected
guest-VM/EDR-noise telemetry.
named after known VirtualBox Guest Additions components (VBoxGuest, VBoxMouse, VBoxSF,
VBoxService, VBoxVideo, VBoxWDDM). Fires when either:
(a) the service binary is registered outside the legitimate VirtualBox install/driver
paths, or
(b) a driver-class component name (VBoxGuest/VBoxMouse/VBoxSF/VBoxVideo/VBoxWDDM) is
registered as a user-mode/own-process service instead of a kernel or file-system
driver — a structural mismatch that cannot occur with the genuine component and is
a strong indicator of name-based masquerading (T1036.005).
Adversaries reuse trusted VirtualBox names to blend malicious persistence into expected
guest-VM/EDR-noise telemetry.
Detects password spraying behavior (many accounts targeted with few failures each from the same source IP within a 1-hour window) preceded or accompanied by directory enumeration activity such as SAM-R queries, account enumeration, or LDAP queries from the same source.
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