Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
462 detections
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Detects the execution of a renamed Microsoft CoreCLR Debugger (vsdbg.exe) from a directory outside of standard Visual Studio installation paths. This behavior is indicative of DLL side-loading, where a malicious vsdbg.dll is planted alongside the renamed vsdbg.exe, a technique observed in malware loader chains like Rapuncel/BoryptGrab.
Detects the presence of PIVOTPIPE .NET loader components within files by searching for specific magic bytes, debug strings, hardcoded developer file paths, and agent-related operational strings.
Detects the execution of rnpkeys.exe dropped by an MSI installer (msiexec.exe) from the C:\ProgramData\keyroll directory. The rule specifically monitors for side-loading of the rnp.dll or tdwp.dll libraries by rnpkeys.exe, a technique associated with the Sauron loader.
Detects instances where PowerShell is executed with an explorer.exe parent process, but the actual creating process differs from explorer.exe. This behavior is indicative of parent PID (PPID) spoofing, a technique often used to evade detection or masquerade the execution source by abusing the PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_PARENT_PROCESS flag in the Windows API.
Detects the execution of DahuaConsole processes that are spawned by or associated with the scannerdahua utility. This pattern is often associated with discovery or exploitation activities targeting Dahua devices.
Detects a suspicious execution chain where WScript.exe initiates a process with '--headless' arguments, which in turn spawns a PowerShell process with hidden, encoded, and non-interactive command line flags. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries to execute malicious scripts while attempting to evade detection and user interaction.
Detects instances where the process 'UBPUpdater.Exe' spawns a process or command line utilizing 'UBPPatch.Psh'. The rule highlights that 'UBPPatch.Psh' is masquerading as a non-executable PowerShell script while likely operating as a malicious binary or PowerShell executable.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity where a Python-based process or a PyInstaller-compiled executable invokes a command shell (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) or command execution via 'os.popen', followed by a network connection to 'api.telegram.org' within a 60-second window. This behavior is often characteristic of malware or tools using Telegram's API as a command-and-control (C2) channel or for data exfiltration.
Detects unauthorized child processes spawned by ScreenConnect client binaries. The rule specifically looks for files created or modified within 60 seconds prior to execution, which is indicative of attackers leveraging an authentication bypass vulnerability (CVE-2026-84869) to transfer and execute malicious payloads via an active remote access session without requiring additional user interaction or authentication.
Detects techniques used by SloppyRAT, including indirect NTDLL syscalls bypassing API hooks (Hell's Gate style), and the use of DJB2 API hashing for NtAllocateVirtualMemory and NtCreateThreadEx. It monitors for CallTrace patterns indicating unbacked memory calls into ntdll.dll, detection of hardcoded DJB2 hash constants, or the presence of the B8 (mov eax, imm32) instruction followed by the 0F 05 syscall opcode.
Detects instances where PowerShell attempts to inject code into legitimate processes (such as csc.exe, chrome.exe, msedge.exe, or SearchIndexer.exe) using direct syscalls NtAllocateVirtualMemoryRemote or NtSetContextThreadRemote, indicating potential process injection activity.
This rule monitors for any process execution event captured by the EDR solution. It serves as a catch-all for recording process creation telemetry.
The following analytic detects email files (.pst or .ost) being created outside the standard Outlook directories.
It leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem data model to identify file creation events and filters for email files not located in "C:\Users\*\My Documents\Outlook Files\*" or "C:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Outlook*".
This activity is significant as it may indicate data exfiltration or unauthorized access to email data.
If confirmed malicious, an attacker could potentially access sensitive email content, leading to data breaches or further exploitation within the network.
It leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem data model to identify file creation events and filters for email files not located in "C:\Users\*\My Documents\Outlook Files\*" or "C:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Outlook*".
This activity is significant as it may indicate data exfiltration or unauthorized access to email data.
If confirmed malicious, an attacker could potentially access sensitive email content, leading to data breaches or further exploitation within the network.
Detects the presence of the CastleLoader intermediate loader binary on disk, associated with the SloppyRAT infection chain. The rule identifies specific file content patterns, including hardcoded strings such as 'CastleLoader', 'CastleRAT', specific user-agents, and embedded Python code used for base64/zlib decoding of further payloads.
Detects instances where browser processes (chrome.exe or comet.exe) access multiple files in sensitive or unexpected directories (e.g., System32, /etc/, Documents) without an associated user click event. This activity often indicates potential malicious scripts or automated data collection running within the context of a browser process.
Detects obfuscated PowerShell commands bypassing execution policy to download or execute 'configuration.ps1' or communicate with known malicious infrastructure associated with the ClickFix campaign. The rule specifically looks for caret-based obfuscation, bypass switches, and known IOCs in the command line.
Detects when AI-powered coding assistant plugins or CLI tools (e.g., Claude, Copilot, Gemini) execute subprocesses that attempt to access sensitive configuration files, SSH keys, or cloud credential stores. This may indicate an AI tool being manipulated or misconfigured to exfiltrate sensitive local secrets.
This rule detects the execution of the HTSPnew.Exe ransomware payload, associated with a trojanized HTS DLL, and subsequent ransomware-related file operations, such as the creation of .krsid encrypted files and the dropping of a Korean-language ransom note (README_KRSID.Txt).
Detects the execution of 'HTSPnew.Exe', a utility associated with suspicious activity or ransomware simulation, combined with command-line arguments that suggest testing, batch execution, or help requests.
This rule detects potential masquerading activity where an executable is signed by 'Discord Inc' or 'Lenovo' but the image path does not correspond to expected legitimate installation directories or filenames. It flags processes that claim a trusted publisher identity while residing in suspicious or unexpected locations.
This rule detects the potential bypassing of Protected Process Light (PPL) in Windows, characterized by kernel-mode driver activity (such as ObOpenObjectByPointer) correlated with the mass termination of security-related processes (e.g., Defender, CrowdStrike, SentinelOne). The correlation between driver-level object handle manipulation and the termination of protected security binaries is a strong indicator of an adversary attempting to disable EDR/AV protections via kernel exploitation or driver abuse.
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