Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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IDS Protocols
1
Detects web or FTP server parent processes (such as apache2, httpd, nginx, php-fpm, or proftpd) spawning shell or utility processes (such as bash, sh, python, nc, curl, wget), which is consistent with webshell execution or post-exploitation activities.
Detects execution of Node.js and NPM related commands involving potential supply chain indicators, script execution, or download utilities (such as curl, wget, powershell, or eval) within command lines.
Detects when a web browser (such as Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Internet Explorer, Brave, or Opera) spawns common command interpreters, scripting engines, or Living off the Land Binaries (LOLBins) like cmd, powershell, mshta, rundll32, or certutil. This behavior is often indicative of a drive-by compromise or browser exploitation attempt.
The following analytic identifies the execution of commonly used NirSoft utilities on Windows systems.
It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution details such as process name, parent process, and command-line arguments.
This activity is significant for a SOC because NirSoft utilities, while legitimate, can be used by adversaries for malicious purposes like credential theft or system reconnaissance.
If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further system compromise.
Note that this search does not use a where clause to filter out known benign paths, as NirSoft utilities can be executed from various locations. This might hinder performance in environments with high data volumes.
Apply additional filtering as necessary to enhance this.
It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution details such as process name, parent process, and command-line arguments.
This activity is significant for a SOC because NirSoft utilities, while legitimate, can be used by adversaries for malicious purposes like credential theft or system reconnaissance.
If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further system compromise.
Note that this search does not use a where clause to filter out known benign paths, as NirSoft utilities can be executed from various locations. This might hinder performance in environments with high data volumes.
Apply additional filtering as necessary to enhance this.
Detects the execution of Wireshark or tshark with command-line arguments indicating TLS key logging or packet capture file handling, followed shortly by a crash handler process (WerFault.exe or WerFaultSecure.exe) for the same process.
Detects execution of Node.js and NPM related commands involving potential supply chain indicators, script execution, or download utilities (such as curl, wget, powershell, or eval) within command lines.
This rule detects suspicious driver loading from user-writable paths, kernel driver service creation, disabling of driver signing, loading of Linux kernel modules, and the usage of LD_PRELOAD for rootkit functionality.
Detects the execution of potential tunneling tools from temporary directories (/tmp, /dev/shm, /var/tmp) using characteristic CLI arguments such as --listen, --token, --obfs, and --ws-path, or the known binary name 'ingredi_ws'.
The following analytic detects the execution of known remote access software within the environment. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and parent processes mapped to the Endpoint data model. We then compare with with a list of known remote access software shipped as a lookup file - remote_access_software. This activity is significant as adversaries often use remote access tools like AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, and TeamViewer to maintain unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to control systems remotely, exfiltrate data, or deploy additional malware, posing a severe threat to the organization's security.
Detects the execution of potential tunneling tools from temporary directories (/tmp, /dev/shm, /var/tmp) using characteristic CLI arguments such as --listen, --token, --obfs, and --ws-path, or the known binary name 'ingredi_ws'.
Detects the execution of potential tunneling tools from temporary directories (/tmp, /dev/shm, /var/tmp) using characteristic CLI arguments such as --listen, --token, --obfs, and --ws-path, or the known binary name 'ingredi_ws'.
Generic rule content from file: Iranian APT - Blinder Tunnel - MicrosoftRuntime Run Key Persistence.cql
Detects the execution of potential tunneling tools from temporary directories (/tmp, /dev/shm, /var/tmp) using characteristic CLI arguments such as --listen, --token, --obfs, and --ws-path, or the known binary name 'ingredi_ws'.
Detects the execution of Wireshark or tshark with command-line arguments indicating TLS key logging or packet capture file handling, followed shortly by a crash handler process (WerFault.exe or WerFaultSecure.exe) for the same process.
Detects the usage of command-line flags in AI coding assistant CLIs (such as Claude Code, Amazon Q CLI, and others) that intentionally skip security permissions, bypass approvals, or disable sandbox protections. The rule identifies potential developer activity that may inadvertently reduce the security posture of the development environment.
Detects a sequence of events indicative of Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks or security control impairment. It monitors for the loading of a rare driver (seen on 3 or fewer hosts), accompanied by either the creation of a kernel service or defense tampering activities such as disabling security monitoring or stopping security-related services.
Detects the execution of potential tunneling tools from temporary directories (/tmp, /dev/shm, /var/tmp) using characteristic CLI arguments such as --listen, --token, --obfs, and --ws-path, or the known binary name 'ingredi_ws'.
The following analytic identifies the use of ping commands as a delay or sleep mechanism within batch-style command execution.
It leverages process creation telemetry from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents and examines process and parent process command-line fields for ping commands that specify a count and are chained with additional commands using command separators or redirection operators.
While execution of the command may generate individual process creation events, such as a separate ping.exe process, this analytic specifically focuses on the original command string passed to a command interpreter, such as cmd.exe /c, that combines the ping-based delay with subsequent command execution.
Adversaries may use ping as an alternative to explicit sleep or timeout commands to introduce execution delays, potentially evading automated analysis, sandboxing, or behavior-based detection.
Because ping is commonly used for legitimate network troubleshooting, findings should be reviewed in the context of the complete command line, parent process, user, and commands executed before or after the delay.
It leverages process creation telemetry from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents and examines process and parent process command-line fields for ping commands that specify a count and are chained with additional commands using command separators or redirection operators.
While execution of the command may generate individual process creation events, such as a separate ping.exe process, this analytic specifically focuses on the original command string passed to a command interpreter, such as cmd.exe /c, that combines the ping-based delay with subsequent command execution.
Adversaries may use ping as an alternative to explicit sleep or timeout commands to introduce execution delays, potentially evading automated analysis, sandboxing, or behavior-based detection.
Because ping is commonly used for legitimate network troubleshooting, findings should be reviewed in the context of the complete command line, parent process, user, and commands executed before or after the delay.
Detects msiexec.exe executing an MSI package named update_ms.msi
staged in ProgramData. Chaos ransomware disguises this installer's properties
and filename to impersonate a legitimate Windows Update package. On execution,
a custom action (CA_Run_EA2AEBC3) loads an embedded DLL (Bin_lib_EA2AEBC3,
lib.dll) directly into memory, deploying the msaRAT payload. This rule sees
the installer execution only; the in-memory module load is not observed here
and would need a separate PROCESS_MODULE_LOAD rule.
staged in ProgramData. Chaos ransomware disguises this installer's properties
and filename to impersonate a legitimate Windows Update package. On execution,
a custom action (CA_Run_EA2AEBC3) loads an embedded DLL (Bin_lib_EA2AEBC3,
lib.dll) directly into memory, deploying the msaRAT payload. This rule sees
the installer execution only; the in-memory module load is not observed here
and would need a separate PROCESS_MODULE_LOAD rule.
The following analytic identifies the execution of tools built by NirSoft by detecting specific command-line arguments such as "/stext" and "/scomma". It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, parent processes, and command-line executions. This activity is significant because NirSoft tools, while legitimate, can be exploited by attackers for malicious purposes such as credential theft or system reconnaissance. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the affected system.
The following analytic identifies processes with command-line parameters associated with web browser credential dumping tools, specifically targeting behaviors used by Remcos RAT malware. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and specific file paths. This activity is significant as it indicates potential credential theft, a common tactic in broader cyber-espionage campaigns. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to sensitive web credentials, leading to further system compromise and data breaches.
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