Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the creation of cron jobs in /etc/cron.d/ that are associated with known miner file names (e.g., redis-miner, xminer). It explicitly looks for instances where the initiating process or its parent process is associated with Redis, suggesting a compromise or exploitation of a Redis service to establish persistence for a crypto miner.
Detects modifications or creations of files within the /var/spool/cron directory specifically involving the postgres user, as well as process execution of the 'crontab' utility by or for the postgres user. This activity may indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence or execute code with postgres privileges.
This rule detects the creation of cron jobs in /etc/cron.d/ that are associated with known miner file names (e.g., redis-miner, xminer). It explicitly looks for instances where the initiating process or its parent process is associated with Redis, suggesting a compromise or exploitation of a Redis service to establish persistence for a crypto miner.
This rule detects the creation of cron jobs in /etc/cron.d/ that are associated with known miner file names (e.g., redis-miner, xminer). It explicitly looks for instances where the initiating process or its parent process is associated with Redis, suggesting a compromise or exploitation of a Redis service to establish persistence for a crypto miner.
Detects the creation or modification of crontab files, as well as the execution of crontab commands, that involve suspicious paths (e.g., /tmp, /var/tmp, /dev/shm, hidden files) or command obfuscation techniques such as base64 encoding. This behavior is often associated with the establishment of persistence by adversaries.
This rule detects modifications or creation of files named 'crond' in standard system paths ('/usr/bin' or '/usr/sbin') that occur within a 4-second window of an 'ssh' binary file event. This pattern is indicative of potential persistence establishment where an adversary replaces or modifies a system daemon while simultaneously interacting with SSH services.
This rule detects unauthorized or suspicious automated scraping behavior by identifying periodic, non-interactive tasks that perform high-volume outbound network requests to multiple external hosts. It specifically filters for processes launched via scheduling mechanisms (Task Scheduler, cron) that exhibit indicators of anti-bot or proxy-rotation bypass techniques (such as usage of headless browser tools or proxy-related keywords in command lines). The rule is tuned to ignore legitimate system maintenance, update, and monitoring processes.
This rule detects unauthorized or suspicious automated scraping behavior by identifying periodic, non-interactive tasks that perform high-volume outbound network requests to multiple external hosts. It specifically filters for processes launched via scheduling mechanisms (Task Scheduler, cron) that exhibit indicators of anti-bot or proxy-rotation bypass techniques (such as usage of headless browser tools or proxy-related keywords in command lines). The rule is tuned to ignore legitimate system maintenance, update, and monitoring processes.
Detects evidence of persistence mechanisms associated with the StyleSmuggler implant. The rule monitors for malicious crontab entries and file system activity related to gvfsd-user, .gvfsd, and /tmp/.kw_ artifacts.
This rule detects unauthorized or suspicious automated scraping behavior by identifying periodic, non-interactive tasks that perform high-volume outbound network requests to multiple external hosts. It specifically filters for processes launched via scheduling mechanisms (Task Scheduler, cron) that exhibit indicators of anti-bot or proxy-rotation bypass techniques (such as usage of headless browser tools or proxy-related keywords in command lines). The rule is tuned to ignore legitimate system maintenance, update, and monitoring processes.
This rule detects unauthorized or suspicious automated scraping behavior by identifying periodic, non-interactive tasks that perform high-volume outbound network requests to multiple external hosts. It specifically filters for processes launched via scheduling mechanisms (Task Scheduler, cron) that exhibit indicators of anti-bot or proxy-rotation bypass techniques (such as usage of headless browser tools or proxy-related keywords in command lines). The rule is tuned to ignore legitimate system maintenance, update, and monitoring processes.
This rule detects unauthorized or suspicious automated scraping behavior by identifying periodic, non-interactive tasks that perform high-volume outbound network requests to multiple external hosts. It specifically filters for processes launched via scheduling mechanisms (Task Scheduler, cron) that exhibit indicators of anti-bot or proxy-rotation bypass techniques (such as usage of headless browser tools or proxy-related keywords in command lines). The rule is tuned to ignore legitimate system maintenance, update, and monitoring processes.
Detects the creation or modification of crontab files, as well as the execution of crontab commands, that involve suspicious paths (e.g., /tmp, /var/tmp, /dev/shm, hidden files) or command obfuscation techniques such as base64 encoding. This behavior is often associated with the establishment of persistence by adversaries.
This rule detects modifications or creation of files named 'crond' in standard system paths ('/usr/bin' or '/usr/sbin') that occur within a 4-second window of an 'ssh' binary file event. This pattern is indicative of potential persistence establishment where an adversary replaces or modifies a system daemon while simultaneously interacting with SSH services.
The following analytic detects the use of the crontab command with the list parameter (-l) to enumerate scheduled tasks configured in the invoking user's crontab on Linux systems.
Adversaries may use this information to identify persistence mechanisms, scheduled execution, or potential privilege escalation opportunities.
The use of crontab -l is also common administrative activity and may require tuning based on the executing user, parent process, and environment.
Adversaries may use this information to identify persistence mechanisms, scheduled execution, or potential privilege escalation opportunities.
The use of crontab -l is also common administrative activity and may require tuning based on the executing user, parent process, and environment.
Detects evidence of persistence mechanisms associated with the StyleSmuggler implant. The rule monitors for malicious crontab entries and file system activity related to gvfsd-user, .gvfsd, and /tmp/.kw_ artifacts.
Detects direct unauthorized modifications to Linux crontab files or the addition of specific known malicious cron job patterns. It specifically monitors for file changes in '/var/spool/cron' and correlates them with 'crontab -e' process executions to identify manual versus automated or malicious modifications. Additionally, it checks for specific hardcoded malicious patterns commonly associated with known threat activity.
Detects the creation or modification of crontab files, as well as the execution of crontab commands, that involve suspicious paths (e.g., /tmp, /var/tmp, /dev/shm, hidden files) or command obfuscation techniques such as base64 encoding. This behavior is often associated with the establishment of persistence by adversaries.
This rule detects activities associated with the 'clean.sh' script often used by cryptocurrency miners to remove competing miner processes, terminate services, clear persistence mechanisms (cron jobs), and delete artifacts from temporary directories like /tmp, /var/tmp, or /dev/shm.
This rule detects modifications or creation of files named 'crond' in standard system paths ('/usr/bin' or '/usr/sbin') that occur within a 4-second window of an 'ssh' binary file event. This pattern is indicative of potential persistence establishment where an adversary replaces or modifies a system daemon while simultaneously interacting with SSH services.
Detects the creation or modification of crontab files, as well as the execution of crontab commands, that involve suspicious paths (e.g., /tmp, /var/tmp, /dev/shm, hidden files) or command obfuscation techniques such as base64 encoding. This behavior is often associated with the establishment of persistence by adversaries.
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