Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
539 detections
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Detects instances where a user pastes and executes commands, specifically those containing reCAPTCHA verification strings or base64-encoded bash commands, within a macOS Terminal session. This behavior is indicative of a 'ClickFix' social engineering attack where a user is tricked into manually executing malicious commands in their shell.
Detects coordinated usage of 'xattr' to manipulate the com.apple.quarantine attribute and 'chmod' to grant executable permissions on sensitive macOS system or library paths. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to bypass Gatekeeper or bypass execution restrictions on malicious payloads placed in system directories.
Detects a suspicious sequence of network downloads initiated by bash, sh, or zsh using curl or wget where the command-line includes the 'force=1' parameter. This behavior is indicative of the ClickFix macOS dropper chain often associated with the Macfinger campaign, where multiple payloads (shell scripts and Mach-O binaries) are retrieved from a common C2 infrastructure.
Detects execution of encoded commands in macOS terminal environments that originate from clipboard content mimicking a reCAPTCHA verification process. This pattern often involves users being social-engineered into pasting a malicious string that decodes a payload and pipes it directly into a shell interpreter (sh/bash/zsh). The rule monitors for the co-occurrence of base64/openssl decoding commands and shell execution pipes, while filtering out known legitimate software installation patterns.
Detects execution of encoded commands in macOS terminal environments that originate from clipboard content mimicking a reCAPTCHA verification process. This pattern often involves users being social-engineered into pasting a malicious string that decodes a payload and pipes it directly into a shell interpreter (sh/bash/zsh). The rule monitors for the co-occurrence of base64/openssl decoding commands and shell execution pipes, while filtering out known legitimate software installation patterns.
Detects suspicious command execution patterns on macOS frequently associated with the 'ClickFix' technique utilized by AMOS (Atomic macOS Stealer). This includes piping base64-encoded curl downloads directly to a shell, utilizing osascript to execute shell commands, and modifications to LaunchAgents for potential persistence.
This rule detects the use of the macOS 'security' utility to unlock the login keychain and modify its access-control list, a technique observed in PamStealer malware to facilitate subsequent unauthorized access to the keychain database.
Detects unauthorized modifications to the 'endo_voyager_dictation_endpoint' preference key within the 'com.meta.muse.plist' file on macOS. This key is an undocumented configuration setting that, if modified, allows an attacker to redirect dictation traffic to a malicious, attacker-controlled endpoint.
This rule detects activities associated with the MacSync backdoor, specifically focusing on persistence mechanisms such as LaunchAgent manipulation, .repair-run scripts, and suspicious GIT hook usage. It also correlates these events with the termination of macOS notification agents (BTMNotificationAgent, NotificationCenter, BackgroundTaskManagementAgent), which is a tactic used to suppress security alerts during malicious operations.
This rule detects activities associated with the MacSync backdoor, specifically focusing on persistence mechanisms such as LaunchAgent manipulation, .repair-run scripts, and suspicious GIT hook usage. It also correlates these events with the termination of macOS notification agents (BTMNotificationAgent, NotificationCenter, BackgroundTaskManagementAgent), which is a tactic used to suppress security alerts during malicious operations.
This rule detects activities associated with the MacSync backdoor, specifically focusing on persistence mechanisms such as LaunchAgent manipulation, .repair-run scripts, and suspicious GIT hook usage. It also correlates these events with the termination of macOS notification agents (BTMNotificationAgent, NotificationCenter, BackgroundTaskManagementAgent), which is a tactic used to suppress security alerts during malicious operations.
Detects the Cursor IDE application launching specific macOS system binaries ('SystemUpdate', 'iSync', 'loginwindow') that are potentially being used to execute hidden backdoors, often associated with the 'FLATROOF' or 'ROOFDECK' threats. The rule looks for process spawning behavior where Cursor initiates these binaries with specific suspicious command-line flags ('nohup', '--type=renderer') or in directories associated with known malicious activity.
Detects the execution of piped curl-to-shell or curl-to-bash commands originating from a macOS Terminal process, a common pattern used in ClickFix-style social engineering attacks where users are tricked into copying and pasting malicious commands.
Detects the installation of Parallels Desktop on macOS endpoints. This rule identifies when the Parallels Desktop application is installed or updated, providing visibility into the deployment of virtualization software within the environment.
Detects potential anti-analysis or sandbox evasion behavior where a process checks for the existence of the Cursor IDE application using native system utilities like ps, pgrep, or lsof. This check is often used by malware (such as the FLATROOF/ROOFDECK backdoors) to gate beaconing activity by ensuring the execution environment is not an analysis sandbox.
This rule detects executions of the 'osascript' utility on macOS where the command line argument is exceptionally long and contains high entropy, suggesting the use of base64 or other encoding techniques to obfuscate malicious scripts or payloads.
Detects the execution of command-line sequences associated with the second stage of ClickFix-style malware (often linked to AMOS or fake-Xcode campaigns). This rule looks for the concatenation of hex decoding (xxd), AES decryption (openssl), decompression (gunzip), and subsequent evaluation (eval) of a shell variable, which is a signature pattern for decrypting and executing malicious payloads in memory.
Detects a sequence of actions often used to bypass macOS Gatekeeper protections: removing the quarantine extended attribute using 'xattr -c' on a file in the /tmp directory, followed by making that file executable with 'chmod +x', and finally executing the file. This behavior is indicative of malicious software attempting to evade Apple's security checks for downloaded files.
Detects attempts to bypass macOS Gatekeeper security controls by manually removing the 'com.apple.quarantine' extended attribute using 'xattr' or by modifying executable permissions with 'chmod' on specific system or sensitive file paths, such as 'iSync'. These actions are commonly performed to evade execution restrictions on downloaded or untrusted files.
Detects macOS Terminal commands that involve decoding a base64 string and piping the output directly to bash. This behavior is characteristic of 'ClickFix' social engineering campaigns, where users are lured into pasting a malicious command into their terminal, often under the guise of fake 'reCAPTCHA' or 'bot-verification' instructions.
Detects known samples of the Atomic Stealer (AMOS) malware on macOS, specifically those associated with the Macfinger/ClickFix campaign, by matching their SHA256 hashes.
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