Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
368 detections
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Detects the registration of the 'gitlab-runner' Windows Event Log provider on hosts that are not recognized as legitimate CI/CD build servers. This can indicate unauthorized installation of GitLab runner agents or persistence mechanisms leveraging service-related event logging.
This rule detects malicious deserialization attempts targeting Microsoft SharePoint, specifically leveraging System.Data.Services.Internal.ExpandedWrapper combined with LosFormatter and System.Xaml.XamlServices. This signature is indicative of exploitation attempts related to CVE-2026-65660, allowing an attacker to achieve remote code execution by bypassing SafeControls restrictions.
Detects the presence of specific ysoserial gadget chain strings (ActivitySurrogateSelector/ActivitySurrogateDisableTypeCheck) indicative of deserialization attacks targeting Microsoft SharePoint via System.Web.UI.LosFormatter. This typically occurs in memory within w3wp.exe processes following an initial RCE exploit, such as those targeting EditingPageParser or ToolPane.
Detects a single host or account interacting with a high volume of archive (PST/OST) and document files, or initiating mailbox exports within a short window, which is often indicative of mass data staging and collection prior to exfiltration.
This rule detects attempts to clear Windows Event Logs using the 'wevtutil.exe' command-line utility or by identifying the generated Windows Security Event ID 1102 (Audit log was cleared). It tracks multiple instances of log clearing to identify suspicious bulk log deletion activity.
Detects attempts to clear Windows event logs using built-in utilities such as wevtutil.exe or PowerShell cmdlets (Clear-EventLog, Clear-WinEvent). Adversaries often perform this action to remove traces of malicious activity from the system.
Detects the use of the 'wevtutil.exe' utility to clear Windows Event Logs. This is a common technique used by adversaries to disrupt logging and evade detection of their actions on a host. The rule specifically monitors for the 'cl' (clear-log) command applied to sensitive operational channels, triggering when multiple clearing operations are detected within a 5-minute window.
Detects the presence of known artifacts associated with the GhostContainer backdoor, including indicators of Neo-reGeorg web shell usage, ysoserial payloads, and exploitation attempts targeting the CVE-2020-0688 vulnerability via VIEWSTATE manipulation.
Detects instances where the ScreenConnect remote access client processes perform file creation or modification actions that are not preceded by or correlated with legitimate session activity logs (such as 'SessionConfirmed' or 'TransferFiles') within a 5-minute window. This behavior may indicate an unauthorized remote session or abuse of the remote access tool.
Detects potential anti-forensic activity involving the clearing of multiple Windows Event Logs within a short time frame using the 'wevtutil' utility. This behavior is often indicative of an adversary attempting to remove traces of post-compromise activity.
Detects potential tampering with Windows Event Logs or audit services by correlating manual service stops or log clearing events (EventIDs 1100, 1102, 104, 7036, 7040) with a sudden, significant decrease in total event volume on the same host. The rule accounts for planned maintenance and legitimate event log service restarts to reduce noise.
Detects Python scripts containing natural-language comments that narrate attack rationale, reasoning, or step-by-step intent. This behavior is a diagnostic signature of scripts generated or operated by AI agents, which tend to document their own processes in plain text comments, unlike human-written malicious code.
Detects potential tampering with Windows Event Logs or audit services by correlating manual service stops or log clearing events (EventIDs 1100, 1102, 104, 7036, 7040) with a sudden, significant decrease in total event volume on the same host. The rule accounts for planned maintenance and legitimate event log service restarts to reduce noise.
This rule monitors the Windows Application event log for critical Microsoft SQL Server (MSSQL) events. It detects server crashes, access violations, stack overflows, and high-severity (20+) errors. These events often indicate severe database corruption, underlying system instability, or potential exploitation attempts targeting the database engine.
Detects unexpected crashes of major security software agents (e.g., Antivirus, EDR) that are not associated with authorized vendor update or installation activities, potentially indicating tampering or exploitation attempts to disable security controls.
Detects potential tampering with Windows Event Logs or audit services by correlating manual service stops or log clearing events (EventIDs 1100, 1102, 104, 7036, 7040) with a sudden, significant decrease in total event volume on the same host. The rule accounts for planned maintenance and legitimate event log service restarts to reduce noise.
Detects potential tampering with Windows Event Logs or audit services by correlating manual service stops or log clearing events (EventIDs 1100, 1102, 104, 7036, 7040) with a sudden, significant decrease in total event volume on the same host. The rule accounts for planned maintenance and legitimate event log service restarts to reduce noise.
Detects potential tampering with Windows Event Logs or audit services by correlating manual service stops or log clearing events (EventIDs 1100, 1102, 104, 7036, 7040) with a sudden, significant decrease in total event volume on the same host. The rule accounts for planned maintenance and legitimate event log service restarts to reduce noise.
Detects the frequent clearing of specific Windows Event Logs using the built-in wevtutil.exe utility. Attackers often clear logs to hide evidence of post-exploitation activity such as credential access, lateral movement, or persistence installation.
Detects the suspicious sequential execution of the 'wevtutil cl' command to clear multiple critical Windows Event Log channels, including security, system, and application logs. This behavior is indicative of anti-forensic activities performed by adversaries, such as the Settra ransomware, to hinder incident response and forensic analysis.
Detects the use of the wevtutil.exe utility to clear specific Windows Event Logs. Adversaries may clear event logs to hide evidence of malicious activity on a system.
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