Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
507 detections
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Detects instances of potential lateral movement using PsExec or WMI following an alert related to credential compromise, infostealers, or session hijacking, where the same user account is involved in both events.
Detects automated reconnaissance using WMI or PowerShell to perform broad queries for system environment, security products, network adapters, software, and hardware attributes. The detection focuses on clusters of distinct WMI reconnaissance categories occurring within a 15-minute window, which is often indicative of pre-C2 profiling by adversaries.
Detects the execution of native Windows utilities such as vssadmin, wmic, wbadmin, and bcdedit used to delete volume shadow copies, the backup catalog, or disable system recovery boot policies. This activity is a common precursor to ransomware encryption to prevent data restoration.
Detects the use of native Windows utilities (vssadmin, wbadmin, bcdedit, wmic) to delete shadow copies, backup catalogs, or modify boot configuration data to disable recovery. This behavior is commonly associated with ransomware and data destruction attacks intended to prevent system restoration.
Detects modifications to the 'PlugPlay' Windows service using 'sc.exe', specifically involving changes to the binary path (binpath) and subsequent service status changes (start/stop) within a short timeframe (30 minutes). This behavior is often associated with the persistence or hijacking of services to execute malicious files, specifically targeting Microsoft Office or Copilot-related process names.
Correlates a sequence of suspicious activities on a single host within 90 minutes: LSASS memory access consistent with credential dumping, followed by remote service or WMI-based lateral movement, and finishing with mass file renames or modifications characteristic of ransomware encryption.
Detects instances where the WMI service (wmiprvse.exe) spawns common command-line or system tools such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or rundll32.exe. This behavior is often indicative of lateral movement or remote command execution via WMI.
This rule monitors for process creation events where the parent process is identified as the WMI Provider Host (wmiprvse.exe) or the Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line (wmic.exe) tool, executing a Win32_Process creation command. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries for remote execution and lateral movement.
This rule detects potential lateral movement activity by identifying the execution of PsExec service components or common lateral movement tools (PsExec, WMIC, CMD) interacting with Windows administrative shares (via UNC paths or specific network ports 135, 139, 445). It specifically looks for process creation events associated with these tools and network activity indicative of remote administration. Legitimate administrative tools signed by Microsoft or known management software (SolarWinds, Tanium, Ivanti, IBM BigFix) are explicitly excluded.
This rule detects potential lateral movement by identifying processes spawned via WMI (e.g., wmic.exe, WmiPrvSE.exe) or PowerShell Remoting (WinRM, Invoke-Command, Enter-PSSession) that occur shortly after a successful network or remote interactive logon on the same host.
Detects the deletion of volume shadow copies using standard Windows utilities vssadmin.exe or wmic.exe. This activity is a common indicator of ransomware or other destructive attacks attempting to inhibit system recovery.
Detects signs of the ClosedQuorum implant by correlating at least two redundant persistence mechanisms (Registry Run keys, Scheduled Tasks, WMI execution) on the same host within a 10-minute window. The rule focuses on artifacts originating from suspicious user-writable paths or unsigned binaries, while excluding known legitimate installation paths.
Detects attempts by malicious software to inhibit system recovery by deleting Volume Shadow Copies. The rule monitors for the execution of vssadmin.exe with deletion flags or wmic.exe with shadowcopy deletion commands combined with non-interactive flags, which are common indicators of ransomware preparation.
Detects automated reconnaissance using WMI or PowerShell to perform broad queries for system environment, security products, network adapters, software, and hardware attributes. The detection focuses on clusters of distinct WMI reconnaissance categories occurring within a 15-minute window, which is often indicative of pre-C2 profiling by adversaries.
Detects automated reconnaissance using WMI or PowerShell to perform broad queries for system environment, security products, network adapters, software, and hardware attributes. The detection focuses on clusters of distinct WMI reconnaissance categories occurring within a 15-minute window, which is often indicative of pre-C2 profiling by adversaries.
Detects a multi-stage installation of the Level RMM agent. This rule monitors for a correlation of events including the execution of 'LevelInstaller.exe' with specific installation arguments, file drops in potentially spoofed vendor paths (Dell or Level), the creation of a 'Level' service, and the addition of a 'Level Watchdog' scheduled task on the same device within a 24-hour window.
Detects signs of the ClosedQuorum implant by correlating at least two redundant persistence mechanisms (Registry Run keys, Scheduled Tasks, WMI execution) on the same host within a 10-minute window. The rule focuses on artifacts originating from suspicious user-writable paths or unsigned binaries, while excluding known legitimate installation paths.
Detects a sequence of suspicious activities on a Windows host aimed at inhibiting system recovery, such as deleting shadow copies, modifying boot recovery configurations, deleting backup catalogs, or stopping security and backup-related services. This rule aggregates distinct categories of these actions by DeviceId and Account to identify potential malicious intent characteristic of ransomware or data destructive attacks.
Detects a sequence of suspicious activities on a Windows host aimed at inhibiting system recovery, such as deleting shadow copies, modifying boot recovery configurations, deleting backup catalogs, or stopping security and backup-related services. This rule aggregates distinct categories of these actions by DeviceId and Account to identify potential malicious intent characteristic of ransomware or data destructive attacks.
Detects a sequence of suspicious activities on a Windows host aimed at inhibiting system recovery, such as deleting shadow copies, modifying boot recovery configurations, deleting backup catalogs, or stopping security and backup-related services. This rule aggregates distinct categories of these actions by DeviceId and Account to identify potential malicious intent characteristic of ransomware or data destructive attacks.
Detects a sequence of suspicious activities on a Windows host aimed at inhibiting system recovery, such as deleting shadow copies, modifying boot recovery configurations, deleting backup catalogs, or stopping security and backup-related services. This rule aggregates distinct categories of these actions by DeviceId and Account to identify potential malicious intent characteristic of ransomware or data destructive attacks.
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