Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects DNS queries, TLS SNI, and HTTP requests to a list of known malicious domains associated with the STAC4924 threat activity, specifically linked to the TerminalFix or Lorem Ipsum Loader malware.
Detects network indicators associated with the BambooToken C2 infrastructure, including DNS lookups for specific domains, TLS SNI mismatches, non-standard MQTT port usage, and specific command-and-control tasking keywords within MQTT payloads.
Detects DNS queries containing long, high-entropy subdomain labels, which are characteristic of DNS tunneling techniques. Adversaries use DNS tunneling to bypass network controls by embedding C2 communications within DNS protocol fields. This rule identifies suspicious query structures, specifically targeting extended length and high character diversity in subdomains while filtering out common CDN domains that exhibit similar structural behaviors.
Detects DNS queries to major public LLM API endpoints (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google Generative Language). This may indicate potential use of these services as a command and control (C2) channel or for data exfiltration by insiders or compromised systems, which may bypass traditional security controls.
This rule detects outbound network beaconing from the SCKit malware to known command-and-control (C2) domains hosted on skyleen.fr or to a specific malicious IP address (139.84.223.178). The rule monitors both TLS SNI indicators in HTTPS traffic and direct IP connections to identify compromised hosts communicating with the attacker's infrastructure.
Detects anomalous DNS query patterns originating from AI agent hosts that are characteristic of DNS tunneling, such as the use of TXT or NULL records and excessively long subdomain labels. These techniques are often used by attackers to establish covert Command and Control (C2) channels and exfiltrate data by bypassing traditional HTTP/HTTPS egress filtering.
Detects anomalous network behavior consistent with the PolinRider malware, which uses public Ethereum JSON-RPC endpoints and blockchain explorers (e.g., Etherscan.io) as a dead-drop resolver for command-and-control (C2) communication. The rules monitor for specific RPC methods (eth_getTransactionByHash, eth_call, eth_getBalance) over HTTP/TLS and DNS resolution queries to known blockchain explorer infrastructure.
Detects network connections originating from or connecting to hosts that utilize known Cobalt Strike default JA3 or JA3S TLS fingerprints. These fingerprints are indicative of Cobalt Strike's default beacon communication patterns.
Detects network traffic (DNS queries, TLS SNI, and HTTP Host headers) associated with the known TukTuk C2 infrastructure domain 'borjumaniya.store'.
Detects DNS queries for domains resolving to specific Cloudflare nameserver pairs associated with the Exvicy malware distribution framework. The rule monitors for NS records pointing to 'randy.ns.cloudflare.com' and 'stevie.ns.cloudflare.com', optionally filtering by domains containing keywords commonly used in Exvicy-themed phishing or C2 infrastructure.
Detects anomalous DNS traffic patterns indicative of command-and-control (C2) or data exfiltration over the DNS protocol. The rule identifies suspicious queries containing long, high-entropy subdomain labels that suggest payload encoding, as well as the use of TXT records for unauthorized data transmission.
Detects anomalous DNS traffic patterns indicative of DNS tunneling, which is often used for command-and-control (C2) communication or data exfiltration. The rule identifies suspicious indicators such as abnormally long subdomain labels (potentially containing encoded payloads), misuse of TXT or NULL record types for data transport, and high-frequency queries to a single apex domain, while excluding common CDN providers to reduce false positives.
Detects endpoint DNS resolution for the 'mysignins.microsoft.com' domain. This domain is frequently used in Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attacks to facilitate user interaction with legitimate Microsoft portals while the attacker intercepts session tokens.
Detects browser-based network requests to 'script.google.com'. This can indicate usage of Google Apps Scripts, which are sometimes abused by attackers for Command and Control (C2) infrastructure, data exfiltration, or as a proxy for malicious payloads, by blending in with legitimate Google traffic.
Detects DNS, TLS SNI, and HTTP Host header requests to known phishing domains mimicking Passkey or Single Sign-On (SSO) authentication services. These domains attempt to deceive users into providing credentials or performing unauthorized authentication actions.
This rule detects network connections or DNS queries to known typosquatted and malicious domains associated with the SilverFox campaign. These domains impersonate legitimate software (e.g., SteelSeries GG, Bcut, DeepSeek) to lure users into downloading malware via SEO poisoning and deceptive downloads.
Detects network activity associated with the 'ClickFix' campaign, specifically targeting DNS queries, TLS SNI, HTTP Host headers, and direct IP connections to known malicious infrastructure domains (cdnsuicaches.com, mnl.ac) and exfiltration endpoints (23.227.198.199).
Detects anomalous DNS traffic patterns indicative of command-and-control (C2) or data exfiltration over the DNS protocol. The rule identifies suspicious queries containing long, high-entropy subdomain labels that suggest payload encoding, as well as the use of TXT records for unauthorized data transmission.
Detects periodic beaconing and C2 communication patterns associated with the RapidRust Golang RAT, attributed to the APT36 (Transparent Tribe) threat group. The rule monitors for specific DNS queries to typosquatted domains, TLS SNI mismatches, and specific HTTP API polling activities commonly used by this malware for C2 tasking.
Detects network activity associated with SilkParasite infrastructure, including the use of specific self-signed TLS certificates (swarm ca, proxy.local, 127.0.0.1) and connections to known malicious pivot domains such as socket.ayakliborsa.net or certificate subjects like *.scalefast.ninja.
Detects DNS queries or network connections to the itorrents.org domain, which has been identified as a compromised repository used in the MovieReaper supply-chain campaign to distribute malicious torrent files.
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