Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
734 detections
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Detects modification of an AWS IAM role's trust policy to include a principal from an unknown or untrusted AWS account. This is a common persistence technique used by attackers to maintain access to a compromised environment by allowing their external account to assume the role.
Looking for changes of remiving the delivery channel or configuration recorder for AWS Config.
Indicative of defense evasion or someone covering their tracks.
This would stop all data such as configuration snapshots and rule compliance notifications from getting to the S3 bucket/SNS topic.
Note: Before you can delete a delivery channel, you must first stop the customer-managed configuration recorder
Indicative of defense evasion or someone covering their tracks.
This would stop all data such as configuration snapshots and rule compliance notifications from getting to the S3 bucket/SNS topic.
Note: Before you can delete a delivery channel, you must first stop the customer-managed configuration recorder
This rule detects successful 'GetObject' operations on AWS S3 buckets originating from external IP addresses (not within common private IP ranges). This could indicate an attempt to exfiltrate data from S3 buckets by an unauthorized entity or compromised credential.
This rule detects attempts to delete S3 bucket logging configurations originating from IP addresses not associated with AWS infrastructure. This could indicate an attacker attempting to cover their tracks by disabling logging for an S3 bucket after gaining unauthorized access.
High AWS S3 Object Deletion Count
Cortex XDR
Detects when a single IP address or identity performs a high number of S3 object or bucket deletions within a short timeframe. This could indicate an attacker attempting to destroy data, evade detection, or disrupt services.
Detects a sequence of events where an AWS IAM Role Trust Policy or a Role's managed policy is modified (UpdateAssumeRolePolicy, PutRolePolicy) and is immediately followed by a successful assumption of that role (AssumeRole, AssumeRoleWithSAML, etc.) within a 10-minute window. This behavior is characteristic of an attacker setting up a backdoor or escalating privileges by granting a new, unauthorized principal (user, service, or account) permission to assume a critical role.
This rule detects when known code scanning tools like Trufflehog, Gitleaks, or Gittyleaks attempt to read the AWS credentials file. This activity could indicate an adversary or an internal security tool searching for sensitive AWS access keys and tokens.
This rule detects Amazon S3 PutObject events where server-side encryption is performed using SSE-C (Server-Side Encryption with Customer-Provided Keys) or where the request uses Signature Version 2 (SigV2). SSE-C relies on the customer to manage encryption keys, which can introduce risks if not handled securely. SigV2 is an older, less secure authentication protocol for AWS requests and its use is generally discouraged in favor of SigV4.
Detects attempts to tamper with AWS CloudTrail or GuardDuty logging configurations by monitoring specific API calls that can disable, modify, or delete logging mechanisms. This includes actions like stopping logging, deleting trails, updating trails, disassociating from master accounts, archiving findings, stopping member monitoring, and deleting or updating detectors. Successful execution of these actions without an error indicates potential malicious activity aimed at evading detection.
Detects AWS IAM roles whose trust policies were newly created or updated to allow cross account AWS principals to assume the role without any confused deputy protections in place.
Detects anomalous increases in AWS API calls resulting in "AccessDenied" errors for a single identity and source IP address, relative to that identity's historical baseline over the past 30 days. Sudden increases in denied requests or the variety of APIs being denied may indicate reconnaissance, permission probing, or misconfigured automation attempts by an adversary.
Detects when an AWS IAM role is assumed by an identity that has not used that specific role within a historical 7-day window. This behavior can indicate lateral movement, privilege escalation, compromised credentials, or a deviation from normal workload patterns. The rule excludes AWS internal service identities to focus on human and workload actors.
Detects the creation or modification of an IAM Role trust policy that grants assume-role permissions to an AWS account that is not part of the organization. This action creates a backdoor for an external entity to gain persistent access to your environment, often used by attackers to maintain unauthorized access. This rule relies on an `aws_org_accounts.csv` lookup table to identify accounts belonging to the organization. If this lookup is not established, manual filtering of AWS accounts will be required.
Service Accounts may need to be filtered.
Service Accounts may need to be filtered.
Detect when System Manager successfully executes commands against an instance.
Detects S3 object encryption using either customer-provided keys (SSE-C) or externally managed KMS keys (BYOK/XKS). These methods are leveraged by S3 ransomware variants to encrypt data with keys that are not controlled by the victim or AWS, making recovery difficult or impossible without paying a ransom.
This rule detects instances where PowerShell (powershell.exe or pwsh.exe) spawns 'node.exe' with command-line arguments containing '-e' and the process path is located within the 'AppData\Roaming' or 'AppData\Local' directories. This behavior can be indicative of malicious activity, such as the execution of Node.js-based scripts or malware by PowerShell, potentially for persistence or further execution within user-specific application data folders.
Detects various sensitive configuration modifications in AWS that could indicate malicious activity, such as privilege escalation, defense evasion, or data exposure. This rule looks for a curated list of API calls related to changes in IAM, EC2 security groups, S3 bucket policies, and logging configurations.
Detects the execution of TruffleHog, an open-source tool used for scanning repositories for secrets and sensitive information, within an AWS environment. This activity can indicate credential harvesting by threat actors. All detections should be investigated to determine if the usage is authorized by security teams or potentially malicious.
Detects the import or deletion of key material in AWS KMS, which can be used as part of ransomware attacks. This activity is uncommon and provides a high certainty signal.
Detects potentially suspicious events involving "GetSigninToken" in AWS. An adversary using the "aws_consoler" tool can leverage this console API to create temporary federated credentials, which can help obfuscate the compromised AWS credential (the original access key) and enable pivoting from the AWS CLI to console sessions without requiring MFA, using the newly issued access key.
Detects when an instance identity has taken an action that isn't inside SSM.
This can indicate that a compromised EC2 instance is being used as a pivot point.
This can indicate that a compromised EC2 instance is being used as a pivot point.
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