Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
896 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
281
252
167
85
36
Contributors
186
165
115
89
73
Categories
272
249
213
183
162
Platforms
877
18
11
6
4
Products / Services
10,665
9,773
6,705
4,421
3,749
896
MITRE Techniques
455
268
245
192
132
CVEs
17
6
4
4
4
IDS Classtypes
4
1
IDS Protocols
4
Detects two distinct malicious PowerShell behaviors: memory-resident script execution using Base64 and XOR obfuscation, and unauthorized modification of Windows Defender preferences to add exclusions.
Detects evidence of AsyncRAT infection involving process hollowing into RegAsm.exe. The rule monitors for suspicious PowerShell activity involving specific artifacts ('cap.ps1', 'ConsoleApp1') used to perform reflective assembly loading, attempts to add Windows Defender exclusions for RegAsm.exe, and subsequent suspicious outbound network connections from RegAsm.exe to known C2 infrastructure.
Detects suspicious PowerShell activity characteristic of the ScreenConnect AsyncRAT campaign, specifically the use of Add-MpPreference to add Windows Defender exclusions for RegAsm.exe and drive roots, and the modification of ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin to suppress UAC prompts. These actions facilitate process hollowing and malware execution with elevated privileges.
This rule detects attempts to modify Windows Defender exclusions using PowerShell cmdlets (Add-MpPreference, Set-MpPreference) or direct Registry manipulation. Adversaries often modify these exclusions to hide malicious files or directories from antivirus scanning, a technique used to impair defensive security tools.
Detects the execution of batch scripts or direct command-line operations (taskkill, sc, net, powershell, wmic) specifically targeting the termination, deletion, or disabling of common endpoint security software such as Microsoft Defender, Sysmon, Filebeat, and other agent-based security tools.
Detects attempts to disable or tamper with Microsoft Defender Antivirus settings, including real-time monitoring, behavior monitoring, and antispyware features, or attempts to stop/disable the WinDefend service.
Detects the execution of 'i.bat' script accompanied by subsequent commands intended to exhaustively impair security defenses on a Windows host. The rule identifies the combination of the script execution and targeted commands to disable Microsoft Defender, stop Sysmon/Filebeat services, and uninstall or misconfigure ModSecurity modules.
Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports password dumpers and stealers.
This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place and check if passwords need to be reset.
This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place and check if passwords need to be reset.
Detects the execution of known Millenium RAT masqueraded binaries (svchost.exe or MsEdgeUpdate.exe) from AppData directories, followed immediately by a PowerShell command to add the root drive C:\ to Windows Defender exclusions. This sequence indicates a malware stage where a RAT attempts to persist and avoid detection by modifying security tool configurations.
Detects the use of PowerShell to modify Microsoft Defender preferences by adding an exclusion path. This activity is commonly used by adversaries to prevent security software from scanning specific directories where malicious tools or payloads are staged.
Detects the modification of Windows Defender exclusion settings using the Add-MpPreference or Set-MpPreference PowerShell cmdlets. Adversaries often abuse these cmdlets to add malicious files or directories to the exclusion list, allowing them to evade antivirus detection.
Loader used in click-hijacking traffic distribution scheme
Loader malware delivering follow-on ransomware payloads
Ransomware group exploiting edge devices and managed file transfer software
Ransomware group exploiting edge devices and managed file transfer software
Ransomware group exploiting edge devices and managed file transfer software
Detects anomalous activity associated with the RoguePlanet (CVE-2026-50656) exploit. The rule identifies suspicious file operations by MsMpEng.exe within temporary staging directories (RP_<UUID>), execution of non-Microsoft signed binaries from these staging paths, and unexpected file activity involving 'wdtest_temp' paths, which are indicative of an NTFS junction swap exploit sequence.
This rule monitors for two high-confidence indicators of malicious activity: the execution of known Payouts King ransomware binaries and the termination of security software processes by non-system actors, which is indicative of defensive evasion techniques such as syscall abuse.
Detects suspicious browser-downloaded executables using image, screenshot, document, invoice, scan, or receipt-themed filenames that execute from user-writable locations and are followed by suspicious payload creation, Run-key persistence, or outbound network activity. This behavior is commonly associated with malware loaders, fake image/document lures, and user-executed initial access payloads.
This rule detects attempts to evade Windows Defender by adding exclusion paths or processes using PowerShell's Add-MpPreference cmdlet. Specifically, it looks for commands that attempt to exclude 'C:\' or 'powershell.exe', a technique known to be leveraged by AsyncRAT.
Detects the enumeration of installed security and monitoring software, such as Sysmon, Filebeat, and Microsoft Defender, using common system administration tools including sc.exe, tasklist.exe, wmic.exe, PowerShell, and reg.exe. This activity is often associated with reconnaissance performed prior to disabling security features on a compromised host.
Page 20 of 43