Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects attempts to enumerate security products on a target system via Remote WMI over SMB (port 445). It specifically looks for the string "AntiVirusProduct" in TCP traffic directed to port 445, indicating a potential query for installed antivirus software. This activity is often associated with discovery tactics used by attackers to understand the security posture of a compromised system or network.
This rule detects attempts to query the list of system drivers on a remote Windows host via a WMI session over SMB (port 445). The detection is based on the presence of the string "Win32_SystemDriver" in the network traffic, indicating a WMI query for system driver information. This activity can be indicative of reconnaissance by an attacker.
Detects wscript.exe executing WMI queries targeting specific Win32 classes (such as Win32_SystemEnclosure, Win32_VideoController, etc.) to profile the host system. This behavior is associated with JS.MonoGlyphRAT, which extensively profiles systems before deploying secondary payloads.
Detects wscript.exe querying multiple Win32 WMI classes within a short timeframe to gather host telemetry. This behavior aligns with JS.MonoGlyphRAT's pre-payload execution profiling.
Detects modification of Windows Boot Configuration Data (BCD) to enable SafeBoot (Minimal or Network) via WMI methods. This technique is commonly used by attackers to reboot the system into Safe Mode where EDR and AV kernel drivers are not loaded.
Detects the creation of WMI event consumers associated with the Dragon Boss AV killer, specifically looking for names containing 'MbRemovalMbSetupKillConsumer'. This mechanism is actively used by this campaign to ensure immediate termination of AV setup processes upon system boot.
Detects usage of the WMI class "Win32_NTEventlogFile" in a potentially suspicious way (delete, backup, change permissions, etc.) from a PowerShell script
Detects usage of the WMI class "Win32_NTEventlogFile" in a potentially suspicious way (delete, backup, change permissions, etc.) from a PowerShell script
Detects DeepLoad-related behavioral chains including ClickFix PowerShell execution, mshta retrieval, scheduled task persistence, Add-Type or APC style injection, LockAppHost or related target process launches, WMI based re-execution, filemanager.exe execution, USB spread indicators, and known DeepLoad infrastructure communication.
This rule detects various stages of DeepLoad malware activity, including initial delivery via PowerShell execution policy bypass with IEX/IRM style ClickFix, network retrieval using mshta.exe, persistence mechanisms like scheduled task creation and WMI, fileless injection through PowerShell Add-Type compilation and suspicious child processes (LockAppHost.exe, makecab.exe, Magnify.exe), credential stealing via filemanager.exe, and USB propagation indicators including specific C2 paths and LNK themed installer names. It also identifies known DeepLoad infrastructure domains.
Detects WMI Managed Object Format (MOF) files creating persistent event subscriptions
Detects WMI executing script engines as possible persistence mechanism
Detects a Windows Script Host process (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) using WMI to spawn a PowerShell process. This technique is used by malware, such as in the Remcos RAT delivery chain, to break the parent-child process relationship and evade detections based on process ancestry.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task using schtasks.exe that is triggered by a network connection event (Event ID 10000 from the NetworkProfile provider). This is an unusual persistence technique used by the CRESCENTHARVEST malware to ensure execution only when the machine is online.
This rule detects attempts to add a file or path exclusion to Microsoft Defender using the WMI command-line tool (wmic.exe/wmice.exe). This is a known defense evasion technique used by malware like MKDOOR to prevent detection.
Detects the setup for a Time-of-Check-to-Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) attack exploiting CVE-2025-64669 in Windows Admin Center. An attacker uses PowerShell with Register-WmiEvent to monitor for the WAC updater process, intending to perform a DLL hijack for privilege escalation.
Detects multiple WMI or PowerShell commands used by a Lumma Stealer loader to perform anti-VM and anti-sandbox checks. This includes querying for video controller details, refresh rates, and disk drive models.
Detects suspicious commands that are related to scripting/powershell in WMI Event Consumers
Detects suspicious encoded payloads in WMI Event Consumers
Detects enabling or disabling of Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) using alternate methods such as WMIC or PowerShell.
In PowerShell one-liner commands, the "SetAllowTSConnections" method of the "Win32_TerminalServiceSetting" class may be used to enable or disable RDP.
In WMIC, the "rdtoggle" alias or "Win32_TerminalServiceSetting" class may be used for the same purpose.
In PowerShell one-liner commands, the "SetAllowTSConnections" method of the "Win32_TerminalServiceSetting" class may be used to enable or disable RDP.
In WMIC, the "rdtoggle" alias or "Win32_TerminalServiceSetting" class may be used for the same purpose.
The following analytic detects the use of default or publicly known named pipes associated with Cobalt Strike. It leverages Sysmon EventID 17 and 18 to identify specific named pipes commonly used by Cobalt Strike's Artifact Kit and Malleable C2 Profiles. This activity is significant because Cobalt Strike is a popular tool for adversaries to conduct post-exploitation tasks, and identifying its named pipes can reveal potential malicious activity. If confirmed malicious, this could indicate an active Cobalt Strike beacon, leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.
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