Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors for suspicious activities involving digital certificates. It detects PowerShell processes attempting to import a certificate into the Root store, which could indicate persistence or credential interception, and it detects the use of curl to download files named 'cert.pem' with insecure SSL settings (no certificate verification).
Detects instances where PowerShell scripts perform Base64-encoded operations related to cryptographic functions and shortly thereafter establish network connections to known or suspect domains associated with C2 activity.
Detects the use of 7-zip (7z.exe) to interact with a specific file (drata.dat) using command-line arguments typical of an archival or extraction operation. This may indicate an adversary attempting to stage, compress, or exfiltrate sensitive data.
Detects the execution of a PowerShell script named 'lightlife.ps1'. The rule flags instances where this specific script is invoked with bypass execution policies or when it is initiated by script hosts like wscript.exe or mshta.exe, which are common patterns for obfuscated or secondary script execution.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with suspicious command-line arguments (hidden window, no profile, encoded command) initiated by wscript.exe or mshta.exe. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries to execute obfuscated malicious payloads while proxying the execution through legitimate Windows utilities.
Detects attempts to disable PowerShell Script Block Logging via registry modification or by using the Set-ItemProperty command. Disabling this security feature prevents visibility into the actual contents of executed PowerShell scripts, which is a common tactic used by adversaries to evade detection.
This rule detects potential command-and-control (C2) activity by monitoring network connections to a specific malicious IP address (91.196.32.232) over port 8089 and correlating this with suspicious PowerShell commands. The rule looks for PowerShell scripts executing 'Invoke-RestMethod' to reach out to the C2, as well as obfuscated or beaconing-like behavior involving 'Start-Sleep' intervals paired with C2-related keywords.
Detects the creation or modification of a Windows Registry 'Run' key that triggers a PowerShell script named 'Update.ps1' with hidden execution policies. The rule also captures direct execution of the same PowerShell script via process creation events.
Detects a sequence of events consistent with credential dumping of sensitive Windows registry hives (SAM, SYSTEM, SECURITY). The attack involves querying shadow copies using vssadmin, creating a symbolic link to the shadow copy volume via mklink, and copying the hive files from that location. Cleanup attempts using rmdir are also monitored.
Detects a multi-stage installation of the Level RMM agent. This rule monitors for a correlation of events including the execution of 'LevelInstaller.exe' with specific installation arguments, file drops in potentially spoofed vendor paths (Dell or Level), the creation of a 'Level' service, and the addition of a 'Level Watchdog' scheduled task on the same device within a 24-hour window.
Detects potential lateral movement or pivot attempts by correlating repeated failed RDP logons (RemoteInteractive) against sensitive targets (Domain Controllers, File Servers, Backup Servers) with concurrent security tool blocks (e.g., Microsoft Defender Antivirus, Exploit Guard) on the originating beachhead device within a 4-hour window.
This rule detects the creation of a scheduled task using an XML definition located in the user's AppData\Local\Temp directory, which is a common staging location for malware. This event is correlated with subsequent high-frequency, short-lived execution of pythonw.exe using .pyw scripts, characteristic of automated implant persistence and re-launch mechanisms.
Detects the installation of a potential remote monitoring and management (RMM) agent via common tools like msiexec, nssm, or sc.exe, followed by consistent HTTPS beaconing to domains hosted on Azurewebsites.net. This pattern is indicative of unauthorized remote access tools used for command and control.
This rule detects the creation of a Windows scheduled task that triggers an hourly execution of an obfuscated PowerShell script. The script incorporates XOR-encoded data and references known external malicious URLs, suggesting a persistence mechanism used by malware to download or communicate with attacker-controlled infrastructure.
This rule detects a malicious execution chain starting with an MSI file being launched by explorer.exe from user-downloaded folders. The installer spawns chrome.exe, drops a specific loader file (e.g., PavokwiLoader.exe or Loader.exe) into the %LOCALAPPDATA%\Temp\modules\ directory, and establishes persistence via the HKCU 'Load' registry value pointing to that location.
This rule detects rundll32.exe executing a DLL from the ProgramData directory and subsequently establishing five or more outbound network connections to external IP addresses over non-standard ports (excluding 80 and 443) within a one-hour window. This behavior is indicative of a potential malware beaconing or data staging activity using a proxy binary to evade detection.
Detects a sequence of multiple process injection-related API calls (VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, CreateRemoteThread) initiated by a process. This rule monitors for patterns indicating cross-process memory manipulation which is commonly used to inject malicious code into other processes. It specifically looks for API calls interacting with kernel32.dll and filters out known Microsoft security products.
Detects a dual persistence mechanism where an adversary establishes both an identically-named Registry Run key and a Scheduled Task, both masquerading as legitimate Canon or Stardock configuration software. These artifacts are configured to launch side-loaded host binaries (COTFileReadApp.exe or DeElevate64.exe) to maintain persistence on a Windows host.
Detects the execution of PowerShell scripts that utilize large arrays of negative integers to reconstruct and dynamically execute code via the [scriptblock]::Create method. This technique is commonly used to obfuscate malicious payloads such as downloaders or API calls from static analysis.
Detects a sequence of distinct system and network reconnaissance commands typically performed by malware or RATs for environment fingerprinting. The rule triggers when three or more unique reconnaissance activities—such as querying antivirus status, enumerating network adapters, checking domain information, or listing installed software—occur from the same host within a 5-minute window.
Detects malicious DLLs identified by specific exports and imports (e.g., rdCore.dll, I++u.dll) that are intended to be sideloaded by signed binaries such as Canon's COTFileReadApp.exe or Stardock software. The detection relies on identifying the combination of sideloaded component names and the presence of suspicious import structures characteristic of these specific staging loaders.
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