Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,063 detections
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Detects instances where the GOMCam2024 executable launches or spawns a Chrome process with specific command-line arguments involving the user-data-directory being set to the system Temp folder. This behavior is often indicative of process injection, proxy-based credential theft, or attempts to execute browser sessions in a non-standard, potentially malicious context.
Detects the creation of a Windows scheduled task using 'schtasks.exe' or the system's scheduled task creation event where the command line or task details contain the string 'psychedelicloveUtils'. This pattern is often indicative of specific malicious persistence mechanisms or automated task-based payloads.
This rule detects the creation or modification of browser native messaging host configuration files (e.g., com.lunex.explorer.json) combined with the simultaneous or subsequent termination of common web browsers. This pattern is indicative of potential browser hijacking, where an adversary sets up a malicious native messaging host to facilitate persistence or intercept browser communications and subsequently restarts or terminates the browser process to reload the configuration.
Detects the execution of msiexec.exe to install an MSI package from a remote URL. This pattern involves the Windows Installer utility being invoked by explorer.exe with the /i (install) and /passive (unattended installation) flags, indicating a potentially malicious download and execution chain often used to deliver payloads via social engineering.
Detects the exploitation of the CMSTPLUA COM-object (CLSID 3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7) to bypass User Account Control (UAC). The rule monitors for PowerShell processes instantiating this object, followed by the execution of a hidden-window PowerShell process, bypassing the consent.exe UAC prompt.
Detects evidence of the CARBONATO post-exploitation pattern, specifically identifying the installation of a Hermes Agent by monitoring the creation of a 'SOUL.md' persona file within a '.hermes' folder, followed by correlated outbound network traffic to a specific LLM gateway or known Vercel proxy infrastructure used for command relay.
Detects a specific command and control (C2) communication pattern characteristic of RatHat malware, involving the retrieval of HTML overlay templates followed by the submission of captured form or credential data from the same device within a one-hour window.
Detects instances where msiexec.exe is used in conjunction with specific application names (Spotify, Zoom, Teams) in the command line, and subsequently launches suspicious child processes such as wscript.exe, cscript.exe, or powershell.exe with specific script or executable arguments. This pattern is often associated with malicious installers or trojanized software attempting to execute embedded payloads.
Detects potentially malicious script execution chains where a user launches a JavaScript file (.js/.jse) from commonly abused directories (Downloads, Documents, Desktop, AppData, WinRAR temporary folders) via wscript.exe, which subsequently spawns PowerShell and establishes an external network connection within a short time window. This behavior is commonly associated with malware loaders, phishing attachments, and initial access payloads.
Detects the compilation of a Managed Object Format (MOF) file using mofcomp.exe from the temporary directory of the MSSQL service account. This behavior is indicative of an attacker leveraging the xp_cmdshell procedure in MSSQL to deploy a malicious MOF file, which registers a WMI permanent event subscription to establish persistence or facilitate secondary payload execution.
Detects a successful authentication to Microsoft SQL Server using the 'sa' account from a non-local address. This rule is designed to alert on potentially unauthorized access following a brute-force attack, as identified by the correlation of high-volume authentication failures (Event ID 18456) followed by a successful login (Event ID 18453/18454).
Detects the removal of persistence mechanisms related to the 'ComponentTask33Agent' task, specifically the deletion of a scheduled task or registry Run key, followed by the deletion of associated files within specific Microsoft-themed AppData subdirectories within a 30-minute window.
Detects the persistence sequence associated with 'ChainScript', which involves creating a hidden scheduled task using PowerShell or specific scripts, and a fallback mechanism that creates a registry run key entry if the task creation fails. The rule monitors for PowerShell commands, bridge script execution, and registry modifications involving the 'ComponentTask33Agent' or wscript.exe executing an '_agent.vbs' file.
Detects the creation of a local administrative account with a hidden naming convention (ending in $) accompanied by a cluster of registry modifications designed to obscure the account from the logon screen, enable WDigest plaintext credential caching, relax RDP authentication requirements (disable NLA, enable RDP), and disable UAC remote restrictions. This activity is highly indicative of post-exploitation persistence and credential harvesting configurations following initial access via SQL server exploitation.
Detects the creation of specific forensic log files (browser_decryption.log, sends.log) within the %TEMP% directory. These files are indicators of the data collection stage performed by the Rapuncel infostealer prior to archiving and exfiltration.
Detects execution of an XMRig cryptominer masquerading as the legitimate system process 'smss.exe' from a non-standard file path. This detection specifically identifies the presence of the WinRing0x64.sys kernel driver, often used by XMRig for hardware MSR access, and detects preceding malicious activity involving UnRAR extraction of the miner using a specific password.
Detects the NeedyMantis second-stage loader, typically encountered as a malicious script (e.g., encryptbase64.ps1). The detection identifies raw shellcode residing in files that exhibit specific traits: PEB-walking for API resolution using a ROR(11) hashing algorithm, the inclusion of the 'RtlDecompressBuffer' API for payload expansion, and the absence of standard PowerShell script headers at the start of the file.
Detects NeedyMantis malware loader components that utilize the RtlDecompressBuffer API for custom XOR-compressed archive extraction. The rule specifically looks for the presence of known staged file names (dnsapi.dll, ws2_32.dll, msvcrt140.dll, or encryptbase64.ps1) alongside decoy file references typically used by the threat actor.
Detects the NeedyMantis malware component loading configuration and communications modules (specifically dnsapi.dll or ws2_32.dll) from a non-standard system directory. This behavior is indicative of DLL hijacking or side-loading, where a malicious library is substituted for a legitimate Windows system library to facilitate command and control or malicious execution.
Detects a specific privilege escalation and code execution chain attributed to the PUROSANGUE methodology. This activity involves using a COM Elevation Moniker (specifically with the 'Elevation:Administrator!new:' syntax) to bypass UAC, followed by process hollowing into ServiceModelReg.exe. The attack is initiated from unconventional parent processes such as vsdbg.exe or its associated DLL.
Detects instances where common script interpreters (powershell.exe, cmd.exe, mshta.exe, etc.) are launched by developer-centric processes (node.exe, npm.exe, Code.exe) with suspicious command-line arguments often used for reconnaissance, payload downloading, or obfuscated command execution.
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