Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,063 detections
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Detects high-frequency anonymous comment submissions to 'wp-comments-post.php' from a single IP address within a 10-minute window, characterized by minimal variations in User-Agent. This behavior is indicative of an automated script attempting to bypass comment moderation settings, potentially exploiting known vulnerabilities (e.g., CVE-2026-93485) to inject content without administrative approval.
Detects high-frequency anonymous comment submissions to 'wp-comments-post.php' from a single IP address within a 10-minute window, characterized by minimal variations in User-Agent. This behavior is indicative of an automated script attempting to bypass comment moderation settings, potentially exploiting known vulnerabilities (e.g., CVE-2026-93485) to inject content without administrative approval.
Detects the creation of specific named mutexes used by the CHOSEN BRICK malware. The malware utilizes these mutexes as an execution guardrail to ensure only one instance of the infection persists on a host. Identification of these mutexes is a high-confidence indicator of CHOSEN BRICK infection activity, often accompanying persistence via Registry Run keys and subsequent communication with Telegram-based command and control servers.
Detects malicious software bundles consistent with the Contagious Interview (G1052) threat group's multi-stage infection chain. The rule identifies the presence of multiple malware family identifiers (such as BeaverTail, InvisibleFerret, and others) within the context of npm or VS Code task configuration files, which are commonly used in job-assessment themed social engineering campaigns.
Detects execution of GitLab Runner registration commands via PowerShell Script Block Logging (EID 4104). This rule identifies potentially sensitive configuration parameters, such as registration tokens or executor configurations, being passed in cleartext during the enrollment process.
Detects instances of node.exe being spawned by potentially suspicious parent processes like msiexec.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe, or explorer.exe, or being executed from unusual locations often associated with malicious staging or masquerading, such as Windows Libraries or Themes directories.
This rule detects Terraform CLI execution of the 'init' command correlated with network access to HashiCorp AWS registry domains, or the presence of Terraform lock files in specific sensitive or project-related directory paths. This combination often indicates infrastructure-as-code management activities or potential misuse of Terraform in a production environment.
This rule detects the creation, modification, or renaming of files within specific sensitive directories under Local AppData (such as ComponentTask33, INetCache/FilterManager, or Shell/RemoteTempPrimary) that are closely timed with the execution of a PowerShell script named '*_scatter.ps1'. This behavior is indicative of potential malicious staging, data dropping, or modular deployment associated with a specific script-based attack chain.
This rule detects instances where PowerShell is executed by a Windows Script Host process (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) using common suspicious command-line arguments. This pattern is frequently used by adversaries to execute obfuscated or bypassed PowerShell scripts while attempting to hide or proxy the execution through legitimate scripting host processes.
Detects the execution of regsvcs.exe when initiated by PowerShell, or when invoked with specific command line arguments indicating .NET reflection (GetType, GetMethod, method.Invoke) typically associated with fileless execution or proxying malicious code. The rule specifically targets instances involving .NET Framework directories.
Detects unauthorized access to web browser credential stores (e.g., Login Data, Cookies) by non-browser processes, such as scripting engines (PowerShell, WScript) or common LOLBins (MSBuild, InstallUtil). This behavior is indicative of credential theft or data exfiltration attempts by malicious software, including stealers like PureLog.
Detects access to sensitive cryptocurrency wallet files (e.g., wallet.dat, keystore) by processes typically associated with LOLBins (Living-off-the-land Binaries) like PowerShell, MSBuild, or non-executable utilities. This activity is indicative of credential theft or data staging for exfiltration of cryptocurrency assets.
This rule detects potential data staging activity associated with the REMUS malware. It correlates Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) queries for antivirus information (e.g., 'AntiVirusProduct', 'WbemLocator') with subsequent file creation events in non-standard directories. This behavior is indicative of an adversary preparing or staging system profile data for exfiltration.
Detects command execution patterns consistent with the ClickFix attack technique, where users are socially engineered into pasting and executing commands (often via the Windows Run dialog or web browsers) to bypass fake CAPTCHA prompts. The rule looks for common living-off-the-land binaries (powershell.exe, cmd.exe, etc.) spawned from browsers or explorer.exe executing suspicious downloader/execution cmdlets.
Detects a sequence of API calls (NtAllocateVirtualMemory, WriteProcessMemory, and CreateRemoteThread) targeting browser processes (chrome.exe, msedge.exe) from a non-browser process, consistent with shellcode injection patterns used by the Remus infostealer to bypass browser security features.
Detects the presence of a specific Russian-language error string ("Не удалось сгенерировать HWID") within binary files, which is characteristic of the HWID generation mechanism used by Vidar Stealer malware.
This rule detects malicious deserialization attempts targeting Microsoft SharePoint, specifically leveraging System.Data.Services.Internal.ExpandedWrapper combined with LosFormatter and System.Xaml.XamlServices. This signature is indicative of exploitation attempts related to CVE-2026-65660, allowing an attacker to achieve remote code execution by bypassing SafeControls restrictions.
Detects network connections from workstation subnets to domain controllers using administrative protocols such as SMB (445), RPC (135), RDP (3389), or WinRM (5985/5986). This activity is indicative of lateral movement attempts by an adversary attempting to reach critical infrastructure from a compromised workstation in a flat or poorly segmented environment.
Detects an exploitation attempt against the SharePoint WebPartPagesWebService using the GetWebPartPageConnectionInfo method. The rule monitors for suspicious input patterns such as 'Register' and 'ignoreParentFrozen' within the URI query, which are indicative of a directive injection vulnerability.
Detects VBScript files that exhibit characteristics of a downloader or dropper, including common Windows API usage (WScript.Shell, Shell.Application, MSXML2.XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream), staging in the C:\Users\Public\ directory, and performing sandbox evasion via WMI InstallDate checks.
This rule detects potential dropper activity associated with the TrustSink/XHOPLESS threat actor, specifically involving an 'Evernote.zip' file staged in the C:\Users\Public directory. It monitors for the automated extraction of files (like a repurposed notepad++.exe) using VBScript's Shell.Application or WScript.Shell, which is indicative of a side-loading attack chain.
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