Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
7,277 detections
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Detects the execution of PowerShell or Bash commands, potentially for implant delivery, spawned from Visual Studio Code extension host processes (node.exe, code.exe, code-server, cursor). This rule specifically looks for command-line patterns associated with the GLASSWORM.WASM threat, such as 'irm', 'iex', 'curl -fsSL', 'Invoke-Expression', 'IEX', or combinations of 'powershell -Command', 'curl -fsSL', and 'bash -c'.
Rust-based ransomware family targeting enterprise environments
Rust-based ransomware family targeting enterprise environments
Ransomware group exploiting edge devices and managed file transfer software
Detects unauthorized processes, such as shells, scripting engines, or command-line utilities, that attempt to display or access environment variables containing sensitive cloud credential patterns (e.g., AWS_ACCESS, API_KEY). This behavior often indicates an attempt to steal cloud provider credentials from the host environment.
This rule detects potentially malicious use of Managed Service Provider (MSP) credentials by correlating network or explicit authentication events (Logon Types 3, 9, or 10) occurring outside of typical business hours or originating from VPN/private network ranges, with concurrent SSH process activity on the same host. This pattern suggests an adversary may be using compromised credentials to move laterally or persist within an environment via SSH.
Detects activity associated with the BRICKSTORM threat actor, including known malicious ELF binary execution, unauthorized file path utilization, and suspicious DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) network traffic directed to public DNS resolvers.
Detects unauthorized modifications to cron jobs or RC scripts on Linux and BSD edge appliances, which is a persistence technique observed in the VerdantBamboo BRICKSTORM campaign. The rule flags suspicious file modifications in persistence-related directories, excluding activity from legitimate package managers.
This rule detects suspicious use of sudo, modification of the sudoers file, or privilege escalation patterns specifically targeting edge network appliances (e.g., pfSense, Synology, Egnyte). It monitors for commands like sudo tee, sudo -l for permission enumeration, or the introduction of NOPASSWD entries, which are common indicators of persistence or privilege escalation attempts by service accounts.
Detects the deployment of the IronWorm eBPF kernel rootkit by monitoring for unauthorized bpf() syscalls, specifically when invoked by suspicious parent processes such as npm or shells. The rule tracks the loading of eBPF programs, the usage of tools like bpftool, tc, and ip, and the presence of specific file artifacts and indicators associated with rootkit behavior like hiding PIDs or network sockets.
Detects instances where npm or node processes execute potentially malicious scripts (such as 'tools/setup' or '.github/scripts/precheck') during the package installation lifecycle, specifically when operating within a 'node_modules' context. This is indicative of supply chain attacks where malicious actors inject code into project dependencies.
Detects anomalous process behavior characterized by rapid access to multiple sensitive credential files or enumeration of critical environment variables (e.g., cloud, AI, or cryptocurrency wallet keys). This behavior aligns with the mass credential harvesting techniques observed in the IronWorm/Shai-Hulud campaign.
Detects the execution of non-JavaScript ELF binaries (e.g., Rust-compiled binaries) from within npm package directories or specific setup paths, typically during 'preinstall' or 'postinstall' npm lifecycle hooks. This behavior is indicative of potential supply-chain attacks where malicious code is executed during dependency installation.
Detects behavior associated with the IronWorm threat, including Tor-based command and control communication by unsigned binaries or Node.js processes, unauthorized DNS resolution of .onion domains, automated npm package management operations by Node.js, and git configuration modifications attempting to impersonate common developer automation identities.
Clipboard hijacking malware for cryptocurrency address substitution
Detects the execution of MeshCentral agent commands, specifically the 'RunCommand' functionality, which can be used to stage payloads or execute unauthorized commands on compromised systems. This detection monitors both process execution events on endpoints and generic syslog data.
Detects the execution of QEMU hypervisor binaries (qemu-system-x86_64, qemu.exe, etc.) when initiated from non-standard parent processes or from non-standard directories, or when associated with disk image files. This behavior may indicate the unauthorized deployment of virtualization software to facilitate lateral movement, data exfiltration, or environment evasion.
Detects instances where npm or node processes spawn child processes associated with common software supply chain attack patterns, specifically targeting 'preinstall' or setup lifecycle hooks as seen in IronWorm-like activity. The rule monitors for child processes executing in 'tools/setup', '.github/scripts/precheck', or within 'node_modules/.bin' directories while filtering out legitimate node-gyp build operations.
Detects processes that access a threshold of five or more sensitive configuration, credential, or browser-stored login files within a single execution context, which is indicative of credential harvesting or automated collection activity.
This rule monitors for suspicious child processes spawned by Node.js or npm-related processes (e.g., node, npm, node-gyp). It identifies potentially malicious activity such as shells, Python scripts, or custom scripts executing within the context of 'preinstall', 'postinstall', or 'binding.gyp' phases, which are common vectors for software supply chain compromises via malicious npm packages.
Detects IronWorm rootkit activity on Linux, specifically focusing on cases where npm or node processes spawn tools like bpftool, insmod, or modprobe to load eBPF programs or kernel modules. It also flags the usage of specific IronWorm-associated filenames (q2.bpf, libbpf) within directories managed by npm or node.
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