Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects network connection attempts from endpoints to known proxy service domains (IPRoyal, LightningProxies) that have been observed acting as infrastructure for CHOSEN BRICK Telegram-based C2 and exfiltration traffic.
Detects network connection attempts from endpoints to known proxy service domains (IPRoyal, LightningProxies) that have been observed acting as infrastructure for CHOSEN BRICK Telegram-based C2 and exfiltration traffic.
This rule performs a retrospective hunt for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the ClosedQuorum malware. It identifies suspicious activity by matching against known file hashes, specific filenames, and network traffic directed towards services (such as DeepSeek, OpenRouter, Mistral, and Discord) which the malware uses for C2 or data exfiltration. The detection logic aggregates results from file system, process, and network telemetry.
This rule performs a retrospective hunt for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the ClosedQuorum malware. It identifies suspicious activity by matching against known file hashes, specific filenames, and network traffic directed towards services (such as DeepSeek, OpenRouter, Mistral, and Discord) which the malware uses for C2 or data exfiltration. The detection logic aggregates results from file system, process, and network telemetry.
Detects unauthorized processes attempting to read or manipulate local storage, session storage, or database files associated with messaging applications like Telegram and WhatsApp, or email clients like Outlook and Thunderbird. This behavior is indicative of credential or data theft by malicious software or unauthorized scripts.
Detects the use of the WinGet 'configure' command to process PowerShell DSC configuration files. This method can be abused to execute arbitrary PowerShell code within a Script resource without explicitly invoking powershell.exe, potentially bypassing certain monitoring or security controls focused solely on the PowerShell executable.
Detects access or interrogation of the WinGet configuration history database (config.db) by non-standard or user-supplied Python scripts, which may indicate an attempt to enumerate installed package configurations or extract sensitive information from the local configuration state.
Detects instances where cmd.exe spawns a PowerShell process with the '-executionpolicy bypass' argument. This pattern is commonly used by attackers to execute malicious scripts while circumventing Windows PowerShell execution policy restrictions.
Detects the download and subsequent extraction of the Python embeddable zip package to directories under 'C:\Users\Public'. This activity is consistent with techniques used by threat actors, such as APT37, to establish a covert Python runtime environment on a compromised host for further malicious operations.
Detects the execution of cmd.exe spawned by explorer.exe that contains suspicious command line parameters. The rule specifically targets the use of obfuscated Windows batch substring expansion (e.g., %VAR:~0,1%) or commands being executed directly from common user-writable directories like Temp or Downloads, which are common indicators of malicious LNK file abuse.
Detects the use of Windows command shell variable substring expansion to obfuscate commands. Adversaries use this technique to build malicious command lines dynamically, making them less visible to standard keyword-based detection mechanisms by storing parts of strings in environment variables and reassembling them using substring notation (e.g., %var:~start,length%).
Detects the creation of files in the Windows Temp directory that match specific naming patterns associated with UnixStealer, including tool executables, database files, stolen data archives, and debug logs. These artifacts are characteristic of the tool's staging and activity tracking behaviors.
Detects the use of the Windows command shell 'copy' utility to concatenate separate files, such as 'header.doc' and 'body.doc', into an executable file named 'Windowsupdate.exe'. This technique is commonly used by adversaries to reassemble malicious payloads that were split to evade signature-based detection or bypass security controls.
Detects the creation of a 'SystemIn.lnk' persistence shortcut on Windows systems using PowerShell and the WScript.Shell COM object. This activity is associated with the QUICAgent backdoor, part of the QUICSILVER operation, which uses temporary PowerShell scripts to establish persistence.
Detects potential process injection attempts by unidentified executable files originating from suspicious directories (AppData or Temp) targeting critical system or service processes (e.g., explorer.exe, svchost.exe). The rule monitors CreateRemoteThread events and excludes signed dotnet host processes, characteristic of Hannibal Stealer behavior.
Detects the execution of AutoIt3.exe or AutoIt-related scripts (.a3x, .au3) spawned by mshta.exe. MSHTA is a legitimate utility that can be abused to proxy the execution of malicious code, and in this context, it may be used to launch AutoIt scripts to evade security controls or execute payloads.
Detects the creation or modification of Windows Registry Run keys associated with the name 'SnapCart'. This behavior is characteristic of adversaries attempting to achieve persistence on a host by ensuring malicious code executes automatically upon user logon.
Detects the creation or modification of a Windows service named 'ProcAuditManager' using 'sc.exe' or 'services.exe' command-line utilities, or by direct modification of the associated registry key. This activity may indicate persistence establishment or service manipulation by an adversary.
Detects process execution events where a process is launched with command line arguments containing 's' as an isolated character (often indicative of token stealing tools like Incognito or similar utilities) combined with a discrepancy in the initiating process account or logon session, suggesting potential token duplication or impersonation.
Detects potential Casbaneiro banking trojan activity characterized by a user accessing a known Latin American banking domain via a web browser, followed within 10 minutes by a suspicious process (RegSvcs.exe or mobsync.exe) establishing an outbound network connection, which is consistent with command-and-control (C2) behavior often seen in this malware family.
Detects memory allocation (VirtualAlloc/AllocateVirtualMemory) or protection (VirtualProtect/ProtectVirtualMemory) API calls performed with 'EXECUTE_READWRITE' permissions where the call stack is missing, unbacked, or contains unknown modules. This behavior is highly indicative of code injection techniques where an adversary attempts to execute shellcode or reflectively load a payload into memory while attempting to hide the origin of the execution.
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