Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects various methods of anti-forensics activity commonly used to hide attacker presence, including clearing Windows Event Logs via wevtutil or PowerShell, deleting the USN Journal via fsutil, and bulk file deletion using command-line utilities.
Detects evidence of log and artifact tampering on a Windows host, specifically the clearing of Windows System or Security logs using wevtutil or PowerShell, the stopping of the EventLog service, or the deletion of PowerShell PSReadLine history files. Such activity is often conducted by an adversary to conceal malicious actions.
This rule detects when critical Windows services or processes associated with Active Directory (NTDS, Netlogon, LSASS, LDAP) or the Print Spooler (Spooler, spoolsv.exe) crash multiple times (3 or more) on a machine within a 7-day period. This could indicate instability, a denial-of-service attempt, or a system compromise affecting core services.
This rule detects the creation of a Windows service where the service type is set to 'kernel' via the sc.exe command-line utility. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to load a kernel driver or perform low-level system modifications, which is often used by rootkits or malicious drivers. The rule filters out known trusted publishers to reduce noise.
This rule detects the use of PsExec or the Service Control Manager (sc.exe) to execute code remotely, which is a common technique used by attackers for lateral movement and remote code execution.
Detects the creation of new Windows services through suspicious or unexpected process chains. This includes services spawned by WinGet/DSC components, services created by sc.exe where the process path points to user-writable directories (e.g., Temp, AppData, User profiles), or system event logs (Event ID 7045) indicating service installation from non-standard locations. This rule is designed to identify potential persistence mechanisms or privilege escalation attempts involving unauthorized service creation.
Detects the installation and execution of the Cloudflare tunnel utility (cloudflared) as a Windows service. This behavior has been observed in Akira ransomware intrusions, where attackers use cloudflared to create a covert C2 tunnel and obscure RDP sessions by routing traffic through Cloudflare, effectively masking the true origin of connections to the compromised host.
Detects behaviors associated with 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) attacks, including the dropping of .sys driver files into non-canonical directories, the registration and execution of kernel services via sc.exe, the use of fltMC to load filter drivers, and the loading of driver modules from non-standard locations.
Detects the dropping, service creation, or execution of known vulnerable drivers and associated BYOVD tools. These tools are used by The Gentlemen RaaS group to escalate privileges to kernel level and terminate endpoint security products.
Detects the creation or modification of WMI event subscriptions via EventID 5861 from the Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity log. This activity, involving EventFilters, EventConsumers, or FilterToConsumerBindings, is a well-known technique used by adversaries to establish persistence and achieve execution triggered by system events, often resulting in elevated SYSTEM privileges.
Detects reconnaissance activities where an adversary attempts to identify installed security software (AV, EDR, logging tools) on a Windows host. The rule identifies the execution of common discovery commands including PowerShell Get-MpComputerStatus, wmic, sc query, tasklist, and reg query targeting specific security process names and registry paths.
Detects the creation of a new .vhdx virtual disk file by hypervisor management processes. This behavior is used by threat actors, specifically Akira ransomware, to instantiate new virtual machines that lack organizational security tooling to evade endpoint detection before proceeding with malicious activities.
This rule detects attempts to disable or interfere with endpoint security products, including Windows Defender and various third-party antivirus agents. It identifies suspicious process executions involving command-line tools like sc.exe, net.exe, or taskkill.exe targeting security services, or the direct modification of Windows registry keys associated with security policy disabling. The detection is further scoped to processes originating from or associated with common suspicious paths (e.g., AppData) or known malicious naming patterns.
Hunting rule for T1546.007 "Netsh Helper DLL Registration". No public in-the-wild intel reference available; correlate before alerting.
Hunting rule for T1546.007 "Netsh Helper DLL Registration". No public in-the-wild intel reference available; correlate before alerting.
Detects the execution of the Snowlight dropper (wusvc.exe) masquerading as a Windows Update service. The rule identifies instances where wusvc.exe is spawned by services.exe from an unconventional path, signaling a potential malicious service installation associated with the UNC5221 VSHELL RAT campaign. The payload is known to utilize Hell's Gate/Halo's Gate direct syscall techniques to evade security API hooks.
Detects the deployment, registration, and loading of known vulnerable drivers (e.g., mhyprot2.sys, gdrv.sys, rtcore64.sys) used in Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks. This rule monitors file creation, module loading, service registration via sc.exe, and registry modifications associated with service installation.
Monitors IIS web servers for signs of potential exploitation by tracking suspicious child processes spawned by worker processes (w3wp.exe/iisexpress.exe), tracking unexpected WER (Windows Error Reporting) crashes associated with IIS workers, aggregating IIS-related application crashes, and detecting anomalous W3C IIS log request patterns (e.g., malformed content-length, negative bytes, or suspicious URI characteristics).
This rule detects the creation of new user accounts via the Windows 'net user' command or Windows Security Event 4720 where the account name or command line arguments contain the string 'rage_master_'. This pattern suggests the potential creation of an unauthorized or backdoor account, possibly related to a specific naming convention used by an actor or a naming collision with malicious activity.
Detects the SNOWLIGHT dropper (disguised as the Windows Update Service 'wusvc.exe') attempting to establish an outbound network connection to a known malicious C2 infrastructure (38.60.253.35) on port 8084. The rule also accounts for the use of non-standard port communication and monitors for suspicious process masquerading outside of protected system directories.
Detects behavioral indicators associated with VILE ransomware, specifically focused on defense evasion through Windows event log clearing, termination of security-related processes, and the presence of specific ransomware-related configuration or identity files in common staging directories.
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