Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the creation or configuration of a scheduled task named 'GoogleErrorReport' which references 'Fondue.exe' located in the 'C:\Users\Public' directory. This specific pattern is associated with 'Dropping Elephant' malware persistence, where the task ensures the binary executes persistently on the host.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe that point to the ProgramData directory, which is a common persistence location for malware like SystemBC. The rule excludes common, benign software installers and updaters that frequently use this directory to avoid false positives.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task via schtasks.exe that executes a command interpreter or script engine (e.g., PowerShell, cmd, wscript) where the parent process is not signed by Microsoft. This behavior is often associated with the execution of malicious payloads, persistence mechanisms, or lateral movement.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe, where the command line arguments reference known LOLBins (Living Off the Land Binaries) such as certutil, regsvr32, mshta, wscript, cscript, rundll32, or encoded command execution via cmd.exe. This activity often indicates an attempt to establish persistence or execute malicious code using trusted system binaries.
Detects potential persistence activity associated with LegionLoader by monitoring for the execution of an MSI installer from user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Temp), followed by the creation of a scheduled task via schtasks.exe, and the creation of files within the AppData\Roaming directory within a 5-minute window.
This rule monitors for the creation of scheduled tasks using the Windows 'schtasks.exe' utility that contain command-line strings associated with BeepRAT malware activity. Specifically, it identifies task names or configurations used for persistence or payload execution, such as 'WindowsUpdateTempFileCleanUp', 'TCC\\config.ini.c', 'HFY.exe', and various TCC loader arguments.
Detects the use of the 'schtasks.exe' utility with command line arguments containing strings associated with suspicious activity or known malicious patterns, such as file cleanup or configuration manipulation, often used for persistence or stealthy execution.
Detects indicators of the BeepRAT malware (associated with Operation DragonClone), including specific process execution patterns of HFY.exe, LuaJit.exe, or tcc.exe, network connections to known C2 infrastructure on port 18848, keylogger file creation, and malicious task scheduling or TCC loader execution techniques.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe with command-line arguments that contain suspicious file names, paths, or flags often associated with malicious behavior, such as persistence mechanisms or potential lateral movement tools.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using 'schtasks.exe' with command-line arguments containing specific patterns such as 'WindowsUpdateTempFileCleanUp', 'config.ini.c', 'SchTask_x86', or 'SchTask_x64'. These patterns are often associated with the deployment of malicious persistence mechanisms or software execution.
Detects evidence of SystemBC (Coroxy) malware persistence, characterized by the creation of a scheduled task using 'schtasks.exe' that executes a random binary residing in '%ProgramData%' with a 'start' argument, coupled with concurrent modifications to the Windows 'Run' registry keys in a persistent path.
Detects a batch or script artifact that creates a scheduled task named 'ApphostRagistreationVerifier' (a likely typo for 'ApphostRegistrationVerifier') which is configured to execute a file located within the 'Windows\Fonts\' directory. The detection specifically looks for the presence of 'schtasks' command, 'ONSTART' trigger, and 'SYSTEM' user context, indicating a persistent scheduled task.
This rule detects the creation or registration of scheduled tasks that involve the 'PerfWatson2.exe' utility or execution paths originating from within the local AppData directory. These patterns are often associated with persistence mechanisms used by malware or malicious scripts to maintain execution after reboots.
Detects the deployment of the Kazuar backdoor, initiated by the Gamaredon group's PteroPaste loader. The rule monitors for a suspicious file creation event where a PowerShell or rundll32 process writes a DLL to a user-writable directory (AppData/Local or AppData/Roaming), followed immediately by the creation of a scheduled task (using schtasks) designed to trigger the execution of the dropped DLL via system binaries such as regsvr32, rundll32, or mshta.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task using the schtasks.exe utility with persistence-related triggers such as system startup or user logon. The rule excludes common trusted processes that frequently interact with the Task Scheduler to minimize false positives.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task using schtasks.exe where the command line includes indicators of potential script execution or remote command execution (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe, or 'http'). This is a common pattern for persistence mechanisms involving staged payloads.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task using schtasks.exe where the command line includes indicators of potential script execution or remote command execution (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe, or 'http'). This is a common pattern for persistence mechanisms involving staged payloads.
Detects instances where common Office applications or web browsers initiate the execution of schtasks.exe to create or modify scheduled tasks. This behavior is a common indicator of persistence mechanisms being established by malicious documents or browser-based exploits, excluding processes signed by Microsoft.
Detects instances where common Office applications or web browsers initiate the execution of schtasks.exe to create or modify scheduled tasks. This behavior is a common indicator of persistence mechanisms being established by malicious documents or browser-based exploits, excluding processes signed by Microsoft.
Detects the creation or modification of Windows scheduled tasks using Security Event IDs 4698 and 4702. This rule parses the event data to extract key task information such as task name, command, arguments, and the author of the task.
This rule detects various activities associated with the SilverFox loader chain, including Defender exclusion modifications, suspicious child processes spawned from trojanized OEM binaries, VirtuOne DLL loading, scheduled task creation with specific names or unusual principals, creation of 'checktime.vbs' in public user directories, and masquerading of 'svchost.exe' in the Windows directory.
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