Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects rapid, machine-speed, sequential attack-path adaptation by suspected AI agent binaries. The rule monitors for a correlation of four stages occurring within a tight 20-minute window: 1) Failed service connections across three or more distinct protocols (SMB, SSH, HTTP, RDP, WinRM), 2) Credential access attempts (Logon events or execution of known credential-dumping tools), and 3) A lateral movement pivot to a new, previously un-targeted internal destination. The rule specifically keys on the InitiatingProcessId and InitiatingProcessCreationTime to ensure the sequence is attributed to a single process instance, distinguishing it from human manual penetration testing activity. Covers T1190, T1210, T1078
Detects rapid, multi-category system and network enumeration performed by AI-assisted development tools (e.g., Cursor, Claude, ChatGPT). The rule triggers when an AI agent process performs a comprehensive scan of the host environment, specifically covering machine/OS identity, network configuration, process listings, installed software, and access to sensitive credential files within a 10-minute window. It requires at least 5 distinct discovery categories and 6 total events to reduce noise from routine debugging. Covers T1082, T1016, T1057, T1518
Detects rapid, multi-category system and network enumeration performed by AI-assisted development tools (e.g., Cursor, Claude, ChatGPT). The rule triggers when an AI agent process performs a comprehensive scan of the host environment, specifically covering machine/OS identity, network configuration, process listings, installed software, and access to sensitive credential files within a 10-minute window. It requires at least 5 distinct discovery categories and 6 total events to reduce noise from routine debugging. Covers T1082, T1016, T1057, T1518
Detects rapid, multi-category system and network enumeration performed by AI-assisted development tools (e.g., Cursor, Claude, ChatGPT). The rule triggers when an AI agent process performs a comprehensive scan of the host environment, specifically covering machine/OS identity, network configuration, process listings, installed software, and access to sensitive credential files within a 10-minute window. It requires at least 5 distinct discovery categories and 6 total events to reduce noise from routine debugging. Covers T1082, T1016, T1057, T1518
Detects file hash hits matching known malicious IOCs or network connections to suspicious domains/URLs.
Detects a sequence of activity where a user receives a high volume of inbound emails (potential vishing or social engineering lures) within a short window, followed by the user executing Windows Remote Assistance or Quick Assist tools within the next 6 hours, which is highly indicative of remote access social engineering pre-cursors.
Detects a potential ClickFix social engineering attack pattern where a user manually launches a script interpreter (e.g., PowerShell, cmd, mshta) from Windows Explorer followed within 30 minutes by the execution of 'rnpkeys.exe', a known indicator in installer side-load chains.
Detects anomalous network traffic patterns from 'rnpkeys.exe', a known loader associated with the Sauron malware, communicating with predefined command-and-control (C2) domains or over HTTPS. The rule identifies high volumes of short-lived, frequent connections indicative of fragmented exfiltration (e.g., screenshots) blended into regular beaconing activity.
Detects anomalous network traffic patterns from 'rnpkeys.exe', a known loader associated with the Sauron malware, communicating with predefined command-and-control (C2) domains or over HTTPS. The rule identifies high volumes of short-lived, frequent connections indicative of fragmented exfiltration (e.g., screenshots) blended into regular beaconing activity.
Detects the Sauron Loader execution chain, which involves a specific process (rnpkeys.exe, rnp.dll, or tdwp.dll) performing a network request (beacon), followed by the creation of a new file (executable, script, or library), and the subsequent execution of that same file. This pattern is characteristic of operator-issued download-and-run tasking.
Detects the Sauron Loader execution chain, which involves a specific process (rnpkeys.exe, rnp.dll, or tdwp.dll) performing a network request (beacon), followed by the creation of a new file (executable, script, or library), and the subsequent execution of that same file. This pattern is characteristic of operator-issued download-and-run tasking.
Detects the loading of 'tdwp.dll' in a process that has previously loaded 'rnp.dll', which is characteristic of the Sauron loader (also known as Remsec) in-memory decryption chain performed by the 'rnpkeys.exe' executable.
Detects a potential ClickFix social engineering attack pattern where a user manually launches a script interpreter (e.g., PowerShell, cmd, mshta) from Windows Explorer followed within 30 minutes by the execution of 'rnpkeys.exe', a known indicator in installer side-load chains.
Detects anomalous network traffic patterns from 'rnpkeys.exe', a known loader associated with the Sauron malware, communicating with predefined command-and-control (C2) domains or over HTTPS. The rule identifies high volumes of short-lived, frequent connections indicative of fragmented exfiltration (e.g., screenshots) blended into regular beaconing activity.
Detects the Sauron Loader execution chain, which involves a specific process (rnpkeys.exe, rnp.dll, or tdwp.dll) performing a network request (beacon), followed by the creation of a new file (executable, script, or library), and the subsequent execution of that same file. This pattern is characteristic of operator-issued download-and-run tasking.
Detects the creation of files named 'parser.js' or 'loader.js' within hidden or suspicious VSCode directories (e.g., .npm/.vscode/ or AppData/VSCode/). The detection also flags potential signs of malicious intent, such as the existence of a 'package.json' file nearby or the presence of 'tokenapp' in the file path, which are often indicative of the GHAPPIER implant behavior.
Detects the execution of rundll32.exe with a command line containing 'DavWWWRoot', indicating the loading of a DLL from a remote WebDAV share. This is a common technique used by attackers to execute remote malicious code while bypassing local execution policies or attempting to evade local file-based detection.
Detects anomalous, high-frequency access to clipboard APIs (GetClipboardData/SetClipboardData) by non-standard, unrecognized processes. The rule specifically monitors for patterns consistent with clipper malware, which polls the clipboard for cryptocurrency address formats and replaces them with attacker-controlled addresses.
This rule identifies processes that delete themselves shortly after execution. It joins process creation events with file deletion events on the same device, filtering for cases where the initiating process file name, ID, and hash match the deleted file, and where the deletion occurs within 120 seconds of the process creation. This behavior is commonly associated with malware or adversary tools attempting to remove traces of their activity.
This rule detects the creation of multiple suspicious files within the \Windows\Temp\nb_ directory. The monitored filenames, such as 'agent.json', 'pk.der', 'sleepmask.o', and 'core.pak', are highly characteristic of post-exploitation toolkits, specifically those associated with beaconing, shellcode injection, or modular C2 agents. Detecting these files in temporary locations, especially when appearing in combination, strongly indicates potential adversary activity involving the staging and execution of malicious payloads.
Detects the execution of rundll32.exe from a WebDAV network path ('@\DavWWWRoot\') where specific suspicious substrings (e.g., 'verification.google', 'pf.ch', 'moor', 'CfgInspectModuleData') are present in the command line. This pattern is commonly associated with the execution of remote payloads or malicious DLLs to bypass security controls.
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