Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects instances where the Node.js runtime environment (node.exe) deletes a file named 'sharedLoad.min.js' located within a 'node_modules' directory. This behavior is indicative of anti-forensic cleanup activities where malicious npm packages attempt to remove their own footprints or temporary artifacts post-execution.
Detects a process that deletes its own executable or script file within a short time window after launch, which is a technique used by some implants.
Detects the modification of registry keys under HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\...\InProcServer32, which is a common method for achieving persistence. The rule flags when these registry keys point to file paths within the local user profile (AppData), which is frequently used by malicious actors to load custom DLLs when the corresponding COM object is initialized.
Detects the execution and behavioral patterns associated with the malicious 'indexed-btree' npm package. The rule specifically looks for code patterns where a malicious loader is injected into 'BTree.prototype.set' and triggered at runtime. It also monitors for suspicious process spawning behavior, such as running node processes with detached and hidden windows flags, often used by the package to maintain persistence or execute malicious payloads silently.
Detects the execution of the RUSTYSHADE Rust-based backdoor, observed during Operation RapidRust, associated with the threat group APT36 (Transparent Tribe). The rule monitors for the specific 'DriverInstaller.exe' filename, known malicious file hashes, and suspicious command-line patterns involving PowerShell-based downloads of 'DriverInstaller.zip' from Backblaze cloud storage.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with hidden window style attempting to download Node.js related files (e.g., .msi or node.exe) from nodejs.org using common download cmdlets or utilities.
Detects the launch or execution of common remote access tools such as AnyDesk, TeamViewer, Quick Assist, or Microsoft Remote Assistance (msra.exe) on an endpoint, excluding instances where these tools act as the parent process. This rule serves as one component of a broader detection chain for potentially unauthorized remote access.
Detects the modification or creation of COM InProcServer32 registry keys within HKCU or HKU hives where the associated server value points to a DLL located in the AppData directory. This pattern is commonly used for persistence and privilege escalation via COM hijacking.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events suggesting potential technical support scam or social engineering activity: a rapid influx of emails (email bombing) followed by an external Microsoft Teams call, and subsequently the execution of a common remote access tool on the same host within a short timeframe.
Detects the installation of specific known malicious NPM packages (indexed-btree, btree-core, mutex-forge) or execution of npm install commands targeting these packages, which are indicative of software supply chain compromise attempts.
Detects a sequence of events where a user is targeted by an email bombing attack, subsequently receives an external or anonymous Microsoft Teams call, and finally launches a known remote access tool (e.g., AnyDesk, TeamViewer) on the same host within a one-hour window. This pattern is consistent with social engineering campaigns designed to trick users into providing remote access to their systems.
Detects the execution of Node.js processes where the command line contains references to specific strings potentially associated with malicious packages or libraries often used in supply chain attacks or obfuscated payloads.
Detects the execution of AnyDesk or its installation from common user-writable directories (Downloads or AppData), as well as scenarios where a browser (msedge.exe) initiates an AnyDesk-related download. This is a common indicator of unauthorized remote access tool deployment.
Detects instances where a Node.js process (node.exe) attempts to execute native system discovery commands such as systeminfo, hostname, or wmic queries. This pattern is commonly observed in malicious Node.js applications or compromised environments attempting to gather system reconnaissance information.
This rule detects potential Quasar RAT post-infection activity by correlating the identification of keystroke logging API usage (specifically SetWindowsHookEx, GetAsyncKeyState, or GetKeyboardState) followed by an outbound network connection from the same process identifier within a ten-minute window, indicative of remote control functionality.
Detects the use of the Windows certutil utility to decode Base64-encoded files into executable, library, or script formats. This technique is commonly used by adversaries to decode malicious payloads that were dropped on a system in an encoded form to bypass signature-based security controls.
Detects the execution of MSBuild.exe with command line arguments pointing to project files (.xml or .csproj) that contain C# inline task structures (e.g., CodeTaskFactory, UsingTask). This technique is commonly used to proxy malicious code execution via a trusted Microsoft binary, bypassing certain application control policies.
Detects instances of rundll32.exe being executed with command line arguments that point to DLLs in common user-writable or non-standard directories (e.g., Temp, AppData, Downloads, ProgramData) or employing known malicious command patterns like Control_RunDLL, javascript: protocol handlers, or shell32.dll proxy execution techniques often used to evade security controls.
Detects msiexec.exe execution with flags intended for silent or standard installation when the source path points to a remote web resource (HTTP/HTTPS) or a UNC path. This behavior is indicative of using the native Windows Installer to proxy the download and execution of arbitrary, potentially malicious, MSI packages.
Detects the use of bitsadmin.exe to create or modify Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) jobs, specifically when combined with the /setnotifycmdline flag. This technique is used by adversaries to download malicious payloads and trigger their execution upon job completion, often bypassing network security controls that might otherwise flag traditional download-and-execute activity.
Detects the use of the Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line (WMIC) utility to initiate process creation on remote hosts. This is achieved by combining the '/node:' flag (to specify a remote target) with the 'process call create' command. This technique is frequently utilized by adversaries and ransomware operators for lateral movement across a Windows network.
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