Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a suspicious sequence of identity-related operations performed by a single user within a 2-hour window. The chain consists of a password reset, MFA method modification, new device registration, and a subsequent privilege escalation event (such as role assignment or application consent). This pattern is consistent with helpdesk-vishing campaigns often used by threat actors like Scattered Spider to perform full account takeovers.
This rule detects the creation of a new Azure AD (Entra ID) application with a name containing AI-related keywords (e.g., 'ai', 'copilot', 'gpt') that is subsequently granted high-privilege Microsoft Graph API permissions within a 24-hour window. This behavior is often associated with attackers setting up seemingly benign-looking applications to conduct OAuth-based persistent access or data exfiltration.
Detects successful sign-ins to Azure AI/ML related administrative consoles (such as Azure OpenAI, Azure Machine Learning, and Cognitive Services) from different countries within a short time window (4 hours), which is indicative of potential account compromise or credential abuse.
Detects a suspicious pattern where a user authenticates via device code and, within a short timeframe (two hours), registers a new device to their account. This behavior is indicative of the 'ARToken' persistence pattern, where an adversary uses a stolen session to bind a rogue device to the victim's account, potentially to mint a Primary Refresh Token (PRT) for persistent access.
Detects anomalous authentication patterns where multiple distinct user identities authenticate from the same source IP (often a VPN or proxy) within a short timeframe, characteristic of North Korean IT worker laptop-farm or identity-mule operations where a single operator manages multiple contractor accounts.
This rule detects scenarios where a user completes a device-code authentication flow, followed immediately (within 10 minutes) by the registration of an unmanaged, non-compliant device to their account. This behavior is indicative of potential token theft (e.g., EvilTokens) where an adversary uses a stolen token to register their own device as a persistent, unmanaged entity, bypassing standard corporate device enrollment controls.
This rule detects large-scale, non-interactive password-spraying campaigns targeting Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD) accounts. It specifically identifies anomalous login behavior originating from Azure CLI or similar non-interactive clients, where a single source IP attempts to authenticate against a large number of distinct user accounts with a low number of failures per user within a short timeframe, characteristic of 'low-and-slow' password spraying.
Detects the 'auto-exfil' pattern associated with the TeamFiltration tool. The rule identifies a sequence of SharePoint Online file access immediately followed by a Microsoft Graph token request from the SharePoint Online Web Client Extensibility app. To reduce noise, it mandates a very short time delta between events (<= 60 seconds) combined with either the use of an IP address/ASN not previously seen for the account in the last 14 days, or a preceding failed sign-in attempt for the account.
Detects a suspected account compromise sequence where an account first authenticates to a Microsoft Teams application from infrastructure associated with TeamFiltration (e.g., specific AWS ranges), followed by a rapid (within 2 minutes) authentication to a VPN or SAML service provider from a different IP address, indicative of an account pivot.
Detects the TeamFiltration/UNK_CondorFiltration spray signature: a large
number of distinct target UserPrincipalNames within a single tenant, each
receiving only a handful of sign-in attempts, spread across many distinct
AWS EC2-hosted source IPs/regions within a short time window. Individual
sign-ins from AWS-hosted IP ranges (VPN gateways, corporate cloud proxies,
remote contractors) are not flagged on their own; the rule requires both
the account-fanout and the IP-rotation dimensions to co-occur for the same
tenant in the same window.
number of distinct target UserPrincipalNames within a single tenant, each
receiving only a handful of sign-in attempts, spread across many distinct
AWS EC2-hosted source IPs/regions within a short time window. Individual
sign-ins from AWS-hosted IP ranges (VPN gateways, corporate cloud proxies,
remote contractors) are not flagged on their own; the rule requires both
the account-fanout and the IP-rotation dimensions to co-occur for the same
tenant in the same window.
Detects anomalous, high-volume reconnaissance activity against multiple Microsoft Graph API endpoints (users, groups, roles, authentication methods, service principals, sites, and drives) by a single identity within a one-hour window. This behavior is indicative of post-compromise enumeration, often associated with threats like UNC6671/Storm-3121.
Detects instances where a user successfully authenticates via the OAuth Device Code flow using an unmanaged or non-compliant device, followed closely by high-privileged Azure/Graph API administrative actions within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of a device-code phishing attack aimed at bypassing MFA controls, including FIDO2/passkeys, by compromising an active session.
Detects instances where a user successfully authenticates via the OAuth Device Code flow using an unmanaged or non-compliant device, followed closely by high-privileged Azure/Graph API administrative actions within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of a device-code phishing attack aimed at bypassing MFA controls, including FIDO2/passkeys, by compromising an active session.
This rule normalizes common Azure AD sign-in fields such as user principal names, source IP addresses, application display names, and authentication requirements for consistent monitoring and analysis.
Detects the reuse of a session or refresh token within a short timeframe (<= 900 seconds) where the source IP location, device identifier, or User-Agent string has materially changed. This behavior is indicative of Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) attacks, where a session cookie has been stolen and replayed from an attacker's infrastructure to hijack a legitimate user's session.
Detects activity from known Storm-3168 (JADEPUFFER) campaign IP addresses across Azure control-plane, sign-in, and App Service logs. The rule monitors for malicious indicators in Azure Activity logs, Azure Sign-in logs, and Service Principal sign-ins, as well as specific sensitive URI paths (e.g., shells, admin login paths) within App Service HTTP logs.
Detects rapid, large-scale deletion of Azure storage accounts by a single identity within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of destructive activity, such as a malicious actor attempting to disrupt service availability or impact organizational data, rather than typical administrative teardown.
This rule detects reconnaissance activity targeting Azure App Service instances, specifically looking for attempts to access web-shell-like files, WordPress administration paths, PHP-CGI endpoints, or LangFlow code validation paths. It identifies potential Storm-3168 actor infrastructure through known IOCs or through patterns of high-volume, path-diverse HTTP requests that deviate from typical noise, helping to distinguish targeted probing from common internet background scanning.
This rule detects reconnaissance activity targeting Azure App Service instances, specifically looking for attempts to access web-shell-like files, WordPress administration paths, PHP-CGI endpoints, or LangFlow code validation paths. It identifies potential Storm-3168 actor infrastructure through known IOCs or through patterns of high-volume, path-diverse HTTP requests that deviate from typical noise, helping to distinguish targeted probing from common internet background scanning.
Detects sign-in events within Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) that utilize the 'deviceCode' authentication protocol. This OAuth 2.0 flow is designed for devices with limited input (e.g., smart TVs, IoT devices, CLI tools) but is frequently abused by attackers in 'device code phishing' campaigns to obtain access tokens by tricking users into entering a code on a malicious site.
Detects instances where a privileged account (such as an administrator or helpdesk user) removes MFA security information or resets a password for a target account, followed shortly (within 4 hours) by a sign-in attempt from that same target account exhibiting risk characteristics such as impossible travel or unfamiliar features. This pattern is often associated with social engineering attacks, such as those attributed to Scattered Spider, where an attacker coerces support staff to disable MFA protections for an account.
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