Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors inbound emails for sender domains or embedded URLs that contain strings related to popular AI service brands (e.g., ChatGPT, Gemini, Claude). It flags these occurrences when the domain does not match the official, legitimate domains for those services, indicating potential phishing or brand impersonation attempts.
Detects phishing messages that deliberately mix writing systems/scripts/homoglyphs in the Subject line as ONE corroborating signal within a broader, multi-signal phishing pattern. Hardened against false positives: brand/product tokens (e.g. Microsoft, PayPal) are stripped before the Latin-script check so a lone brand mention in non-Latin correspondence doesn't count as mixed-script; the suspicious-URL signal requires a high-confidence credential/urgency term (not generic business vocabulary); sender risk requires the domain to be new to both the recipient and the organization; and at least three independent signal categories (not two) must corroborate the language-confusion signal before the rule fires.
Detects anomalous post-authentication reconnaissance activities against the Microsoft Graph API, specifically the enumeration of directory objects, roles, or service principals. The rule triggers when a user account performs multi-endpoint enumeration via the Graph API within 30 minutes of a successful authentication session initiated via a device code flow that was flagged with elevated risk signals. This behavior is consistent with post-compromise reconnaissance techniques such as 'EvilTokens', where an adversary attempts to map the environment after gaining access.
This rule identifies potential phishing attempts by correlating email delivery events with known suspicious sender addresses and URLs containing typosquatting domains impersonating legitimate organizations.
Detects known file hashes associated with SideCopy/ReverseRAT.
Detects changes to Entra ID (Azure AD) federation settings, specifically targeting updates to trust and authentication parameters such as IssuerUri, ActiveLogOnUri, and TokenSigningCertificate. These modifications are critical indicators of potential Golden SAML attacks, where adversaries forge SAML tokens to bypass MFA and impersonate users.
Detects when high-privilege application permissions (e.g., Directory.ReadWrite.All, Application.ReadWrite.All) are granted to a service principal via admin consent. This behavior can be used by attackers to gain persistent, stealthy administrative access to a Microsoft Entra ID tenant.
Detects modifications to Entra ID (Azure AD) cross-tenant access settings, including inbound/outbound trust settings and B2B collaboration configurations. This activity may indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence or facilitate unauthorized access by creating a trust relationship with an external tenant they control.
Detects modifications to Entra ID (Azure AD) cross-tenant access settings, including inbound/outbound trust settings and B2B collaboration configurations. This activity may indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence or facilitate unauthorized access by creating a trust relationship with an external tenant they control.
This rule detects when a user or admin grants consent to an unverified OAuth application that simultaneously requests sensitive delegated permissions across multiple categories (Mail, Files, Directory, and Contacts). This pattern is a strong indicator of consent phishing attacks, where adversaries trick users into granting broad permissions to a malicious application to harvest sensitive data or gain persistent access to a Microsoft 365 environment.
Detects unauthorized changes to the token-signing certificate for federated domains in Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD). This behavior is often associated with the Golden SAML attack technique, where an adversary modifies federation settings to forge authentication tokens. The rule filters for events occurring outside of standard business hours and alerts when the modification is not performed by known automation service accounts.
Detects the registration of a new multi-tenant OAuth application in an enterprise cloud environment that requests high-risk scopes (e.g., mail access or directory write permissions). This behavior is often associated with OAuth-based consent phishing or the establishment of persistent backdoors in cloud environments.
Detects the registration of a new multi-tenant OAuth application in an enterprise cloud environment that requests high-risk scopes (e.g., mail access or directory write permissions). This behavior is often associated with OAuth-based consent phishing or the establishment of persistent backdoors in cloud environments.
Detects a mass influx of OAuth consent grant events for a single application from multiple users within a one-hour window. This behavior is indicative of a consent phishing campaign, where attackers lure users into granting excessive permissions to a malicious application to steal access tokens.
Detects the addition or update of federated identity credentials (FIC) on Entra ID applications or service principals that do not match an approved list of OIDC issuers. This technique, known as Workload Identity Federation, can be abused by adversaries for stealthy, token-less, secret-free persistence.
This rule detects when an OAuth application is granted sensitive Exchange Online permissions, such as 'full_access_as_app', 'Mail.Read', 'Mail.ReadWrite', or 'Mail.Send'. Granting these permissions allows an application to access mailboxes across the tenant without requiring a signed-in user context, which is a common persistence and data exfiltration technique used in Business Email Compromise (BEC) and espionage campaigns.
Detects modifications to Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) Conditional Access policies that lower security posture. This includes disabling an active policy, removing users or groups from enforcement scopes, or removing MFA requirements. Such actions are typical of an adversary attempting to maintain persistent access or evade authentication controls.
This rule detects scenarios where an Azure application's permissions (scopes) are upgraded to high-risk levels after an initial period, a technique known as 'incremental consent'. This is often used by attackers to avoid triggering high-risk consent alerts during the initial application authorization process, subsequently escalating privileges over time.
Detects modifications to Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) Conditional Access policies that lower security posture. This includes disabling an active policy, removing users or groups from enforcement scopes, or removing MFA requirements. Such actions are typical of an adversary attempting to maintain persistent access or evade authentication controls.
This rule detects scenarios where an Azure application's permissions (scopes) are upgraded to high-risk levels after an initial period, a technique known as 'incremental consent'. This is often used by attackers to avoid triggering high-risk consent alerts during the initial application authorization process, subsequently escalating privileges over time.
This rule detects the assignment of sensitive Microsoft Graph API application roles to a service principal, which can be an indicator of an adversary establishing a directory-wide backdoor in an Azure/Entra ID environment. This technique is often used to escalate privileges following an initial compromise of a low-privilege application registration.
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