Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
896 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
281
252
167
85
36
Contributors
186
165
115
89
73
Categories
272
249
213
183
162
Platforms
877
18
11
6
4
Products / Services
10,665
9,773
6,705
4,421
3,749
896
MITRE Techniques
455
268
245
192
132
CVEs
17
6
4
4
4
IDS Classtypes
4
1
IDS Protocols
4
Detects the use of WMIC to interact with the MSFT_MpPreference WMI namespace to add folder or file extension exclusions to Microsoft Defender. This technique is often used by attackers to exempt malicious files or tools from being scanned by security software.
Detects anomalous activity where a process or user attempts to stop or disable multiple security-related services (e.g., Windows Defender, Sysmon, EDR agents) within a short window. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to impair defensive monitoring and protection tools during a compromise.
Detects a suspicious pattern where a large volume of files (documents, archives, or media) are written to common user directories, followed within 10 minutes by attempts to impair system recovery (deleting shadow copies) or disable Microsoft Defender exclusions using native Windows utilities such as vssadmin, wmic, or PowerShell. This behavior is highly indicative of ransomware staging activities.
Detects LCRYX ransomware activity characterized by the execution of VBScript files via wscript/cscript, followed by attempts to disable security products (Windows Defender or third-party AVs) using command-line utilities, and establishing persistence via Registry Run keys within a 10-minute window on the same host.
Detects attempts to disable or tamper with Windows security products and logging mechanisms. This includes stopping security services, clearing event logs, using PowerShell to modify security preferences (e.g., Windows Defender exclusions or real-time monitoring), and modifying registry keys to disable security features.
This rule detects multiple distinct attempts to tamper with security products on a host. It identifies processes attempting to stop security-related services (via sc.exe or net.exe), processes attempting to kill security-related applications (via taskkill.exe), modifications to Windows Defender registry keys, or the use of PowerShell Set-MpPreference to disable security features. The rule triggers when two or more of these evasion events or types occur within a 5-minute window on the same host.
Detects multi-stage cryptojacking campaign: autorun.dll sideload, silent msiexec install, and post-exploitation .NET binary process hollowing
Detects attempts by LCRYX ransomware to disable security protections, including Windows Defender real-time monitoring and firewall, as well as third-party antivirus software (Bitdefender, Kaspersky). The detection monitors process creation events for malicious command-line arguments, excluding legitimate administrative processes like msiexec.exe or services.exe.
Detects potential exploitation of CVE-2026-45498 (UnDefend) or related defense evasion by identifying registry modifications that disable Microsoft Defender AntiSpyware or real-time monitoring protections under the Windows Defender policy key, or suspicious invocation of MpCmdRun.exe with signature update arguments from an unexpected parent process.
Detects DLL side-loading behaviors associated with the Grandoreiro banking trojan. The rule identifies malicious DLLs compiled with Delphi/Embarcadero, utilizing sgcWebSockets for C2 communication via WebRTC, and including specific anti-analysis and banking-related strings, often executed via legitimate software binaries.
Detects attempts to disable or impair Microsoft Defender Antivirus using legitimate system administration tools such as PowerShell (Set-MpPreference, Add-MpPreference), WMIC, sc.exe, or net.exe. Adversaries may use these tools to bypass security controls by disabling real-time monitoring or adding unauthorized exclusion paths.
Detects attempts to disable Windows Defender real-time protection by modifying the DisableRealtimeMonitoring registry key using the reg.exe utility.
This rule detects attempts to tamper with Windows Defender services (WinDefend, SecurityHealthService, wscsvc) by stopping or disabling them. It covers actions performed via 'sc.exe' commands, 'Set-Service' PowerShell cmdlets, and direct modification of registry keys related to these services. The rule specifically filters out legitimate system and TrustedInstaller processes when detecting registry modifications to reduce false positives.
Detects modifications to Windows Defender registry keys intended to disable core security features, including real-time monitoring and threat reporting, when performed by non-Microsoft signed processes.
Detects an Antivirus alert in a highly relevant file path or with a relevant file name.
This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.
This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.
Detects potential exploitation of CVE-2026-45498 (UnDefend) or related defense evasion by identifying registry modifications that disable Microsoft Defender AntiSpyware or real-time monitoring protections under the Windows Defender policy key, or suspicious invocation of MpCmdRun.exe with signature update arguments from an unexpected parent process.
ClickFix style social engineering cluster delivering Mistic and ModeloRAT
IoT botnet malware family used for DDoS and proxy infrastructure
Stealthy backdoor MLTBackdoor linked to KongTuke ClickFix and ModeloRAT campaigns
Latin American banking trojan using DLL side-loading and overlay attacks
Credential and browser data stealer distributed via OXLOADER campaigns
Page 22 of 43