Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation or execution of a scheduled task named 'CreateObjectTask' via schtasks or PowerShell, which is associated with spawning 'dllhost.exe' as a child process under high-privileged parent processes (svchost, taskeng, or schtasks). This behavior is indicative of potential COM hijacking or privilege escalation techniques leveraging system tasks.
Detects web browser processes (e.g., Chrome, Edge, Firefox) spawned by parent processes that are not typical for web browser execution. This behavior is often associated with malware (such as infostealers) using unconventional process spawning to inject code or perform credential theft.
Detects batch scripts that execute renamed Mimikatz-style binaries (e.g., g.com, hs.com) for credential dumping purposes. The rule looks for the combination of command-line arguments to redirect output to text files, the subsequent deletion of the renamed binaries and associated artifacts (mimidrv.sys, temp files), and the execution of 'gpupdate /force', which is a common technique used to trigger or finalize credential dumping operations.
Detects the dllhost.exe process, running with SYSTEM privileges, loading a dynamic link library (DLL) from a user-writable path within the ProgramData directory. This behavior is consistent with the abuse of COM marshaling, specifically exploiting dangling CLSID entries to force a privileged COM host process to unmarshal and load an attacker-controlled DLL.
This rule detects the presence of Vidar Stealer version 2.0+ by identifying the specific ARX-based (Addition-Rotation-XOR) stream cipher implementation. The detection logic searches for stable cryptographic constants (FNV-1a prime and golden-ratio constants), unique per-build ARX transformation constants, and specific post-decryption artifacts in the file's binary content.
Detects the accumulator-based virtual machine (VM) skeleton used by Vidar Stealer (v2.0+) to obfuscate its internal configuration and strings. The rule specifically identifies a combination of bit-manipulation and arithmetic primitives (ROR, ROL, NOT, IMUL, ADD, SUB, XOR) acting as a dispatcher pattern within highly entropic executable sections, which is a characteristic behavioral artifact of the Vidar Stealer obfuscation engine.
Detects the presence of specific .NET deserialization gadget chain components (ExpandedWrapper, XamlServices, ObjectDataProvider, LosFormatter) within application traffic or logs, which are indicative of exploitation attempts targeting SharePoint pre-authentication remote code execution vulnerabilities like CVE-2026-65660.
Detects PE files masquerading as PuTTY executables that match the specific file size characteristics associated with the Exvicy Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) distribution model. The rule identifies suspicious executables by looking for PuTTY-related strings in files that are either unsigned or exhibit high entropy, suggesting potential packing or malicious modification.
Detects the presence of a shared client-side JavaScript framework used in 'ClickFix' MaaS (Malware-as-a-Service) panels, specifically associated with the Exvicy and ErrTraffic campaigns. The rule identifies specific function patterns (e.g., xdReq, xdDec, waitForToken) and state machine logic (tokens, deduplication hashing) commonly used for token interception and clipboard interaction.
Detects the establishment of a memory-resident webshell following the exploitation of SharePoint (e.g., ToolPane/EditingPageParser SafeControls bypass or XamlServices/LosFormatter deserialization). The rule identifies instances where w3wp.exe loads specific XAML/WPF assemblies used in known gadget chains and subsequently spawns child processes without any corresponding file creation activity on disk.
Detects HTTP POST requests to SharePoint ToolPane or WebPartPage endpoints containing serialized gadget chains (e.g., ysoserial ExpandedWrapper/ObjectDataProvider or XamlServices) indicative of deserialization exploitation attempts, specifically targeting CVE-2026-65660.
Detects instances of PowerShell being launched directly by Windows Explorer (explorer.exe), which is indicative of a user interacting with the 'Run' dialog (Win+R). The rule specifically flags common ClickFix social-engineering patterns, such as hidden windows and the use of download/execution cmdlets (e.g., Invoke-WebRequest, Invoke-RestMethod) used to fetch and run remote payloads.
Detects malicious exploitation attempts against the SharePoint WebPartPages.asmx SOAP endpoint. Attackers use this endpoint to bypass security patches by invoking template-parsing functions like GetWebPartPageConnectionInfo, which facilitates Register-directive injection and XamlServices deserialization chains for remote code execution.
This rule detects malicious PowerShell execution originating from common Office or script-based parent processes (explorer.exe, mshta.exe, wscript.exe). The detection specifically looks for hidden command-line flags combined with indicators related to the Konni/VelvetCake campaign, such as specific artifact filenames (update1.vbs, update2.ps1) or remote downloads from raw.githubusercontent.com.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'OneDriveUpdateScheduler' and the subsequent execution of 'update1.ps1' or 'update2.ps1' by 'explorer.exe'. This behavior is associated with the Konni/VelvetCake malware families, which use this technique to maintain persistence and C2 connectivity.
Detects execution of PowerShell commands initiated by LNK files, characteristic of Konni/VelvetCake spear-phishing campaigns. The rule monitors for PowerShell processes launched by shell applications (explorer, rundll32, etc.) using hidden windows and fetching specific malware-related filenames or downloading from AppData directories.
Detects second-stage reconnaissance patterns indicative of the VelvetCake framework. The rule identifies PowerShell execution that combines multiple discovery commands (system information, network configuration, process listing, file system inspection, and antivirus/security software enumeration) within a single execution sequence or related process events.
Detects non-browser and non-messaging processes accessing both browser credential stores (like 'Login Data' or 'Cookies') and messaging application session storage (Slack/Discord LevelDB) in a single session. This pattern is characteristic of credential-stealing malware, such as RevStealer, which targets both saved web browser credentials and application session tokens for exfiltration.
Detects the initialization of known-malicious Terraform providers (dockerd) followed within one hour by the execution of a 'go run' process from the .terraform directory. This pattern is indicative of a supply chain compromise where an adversary leverages a typosquatted or malicious Terraform provider to facilitate the execution of a secondary payload.
Detects the initialization of known-malicious Terraform providers (dockerd) followed within one hour by the execution of a 'go run' process from the .terraform directory. This pattern is indicative of a supply chain compromise where an adversary leverages a typosquatted or malicious Terraform provider to facilitate the execution of a secondary payload.
Detects the loading of an unsigned or attacker-controlled DLL into a SYSTEM-context dllhost.exe process, consistent with the exploitation of dangling COM CrossDevice CLSIDs (e.g., forcing ICreateObject::Proc3 to LoadLibrary from a C:\ProgramData location).
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