Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potential execution of Vidar Stealer by identifying specific diagnostic loader strings (e.g., 'Loader: write failed') within file modification and process execution events. The presence of these strings in file metadata or command-line arguments indicates stage-specific activity related to the malware's loading process.
Detects a SYSTEM-level dllhost.exe process, associated with specific COM object instantiation (CLSID {135fd325-45b7-4c30-89f8-4386961669f0}), loading a DLL from the C:\ProgramData\ directory. This behavior is indicative of an attacker-planted DLL being unmarshaled through a crafted OBJREF, effectively bypassing security controls like EOAC_NO_CUSTOM_MARSHAL.
Detects the compiled x86/x64 fetch-decode-execute dispatch loop used by the Vidar Stealer custom VM bytecode interpreter (v2.0+). The rule identifies the structural jump-table bounds-check and computed-jump idiom that is consistent across different builds of the malware, despite randomization of opcode values and XOR keys.
This rule monitors for a variety of indicators associated with malicious activity, including connections to known malicious IP addresses, the presence of specific malicious file hashes or filenames, modifications to Windows system policies (specifically Legal Notice configuration), and changes to Active Directory Group Policy Objects using specified GUIDs.
Detects malformed HEIF/HEIC image files with anomalous ftyp/box structure consistent with the libheif memory corruption exploit (CVE-2026-32882) used against Discourse forum image upload endpoints
This rule detects network connections from internal devices to a list of known malicious domains and IP addresses. These indicators are commonly associated with command and control (C2) infrastructure or malicious activity, and alerting on these connections can help identify compromised systems within the environment.
This rule detects instances where the Terraform CLI tool connects to suspected lookalike domains associated with supply chain compromise attempts (e.g., hashicorp-aws[.]com or hashicorp-terraform[.]io) during common initialization or application workflows. It correlates process execution with network connection logs and optionally validates the presence of a related .terraform.lock.hcl file associated with the malicious origin.
The following analytic detects an uncommon process requesting full access rights to winlogon.exe, which may indicate Rubeus exporting Kerberos tickets from memory.
It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 and checks for full-access rights, specifically the value 0x1f3fff.
It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 and checks for full-access rights, specifically the value 0x1f3fff.
Detects post-exploitation shell activity spawned from the IIS worker process (w3wp.exe), narrowed to command lines carrying encoded/obfuscated PowerShell flags, remote-download cradles, or basic recon/persistence commands (whoami, certutil, bitsadmin, schtasks, reg add). This reduces noise from benign w3wp.exe-initiated automation while retaining the behavioral pattern seen in the Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX unauthenticated RCE chain (webshell/in-memory DLL execution dropping to a shell).
IOC hunt for the HEAVYGRAM/CRUDEEXCLUDE campaign: matches known SHA256 file hashes (first-stage malware, implant, RAR/ZIP artefacts) via DeviceFileEvents and DeviceProcessEvents, plus known-malicious domains/staging infrastructure by parsed hostname across network connections, process command lines, and file origin URLs.
This rule monitors for execution of suspicious files or processes and network communication associated with known malicious indicators (hashes, domains, and IP addresses) typically used by specific threat actors for command and control (C2) and payload delivery.
This rule monitors for execution of suspicious files or processes and network communication associated with known malicious indicators (hashes, domains, and IP addresses) typically used by specific threat actors for command and control (C2) and payload delivery.
This rule monitors for execution of suspicious files or processes and network communication associated with known malicious indicators (hashes, domains, and IP addresses) typically used by specific threat actors for command and control (C2) and payload delivery.
Detects suspicious PowerShell command lines that load a .dat file, decode its Base64 content, and execute it in-memory. This behavior is indicative of the 'TASK#STOMP' loader pattern, where malicious code is hidden in external files and invoked directly into memory to bypass traditional file-based security controls.
Detects suspicious PowerShell command lines that load a .dat file, decode its Base64 content, and execute it in-memory. This behavior is indicative of the 'TASK#STOMP' loader pattern, where malicious code is hidden in external files and invoked directly into memory to bypass traditional file-based security controls.
Detects suspicious PowerShell command lines that load a .dat file, decode its Base64 content, and execute it in-memory. This behavior is indicative of the 'TASK#STOMP' loader pattern, where malicious code is hidden in external files and invoked directly into memory to bypass traditional file-based security controls.
This rule identifies suspicious command and control (C2) activity by monitoring network connections to specific known malicious domains, detection of specific authentication tokens in process command lines, and the use of spoofed User-Agent strings associated with predefined C2 URI paths.
This rule identifies suspicious command and control (C2) activity by monitoring network connections to specific known malicious domains, detection of specific authentication tokens in process command lines, and the use of spoofed User-Agent strings associated with predefined C2 URI paths.
Detects PowerShell processes using the .NET System.IO.File methods (SetLastWriteTime, SetCreationTime, SetLastAccessTime) to modify file timestamps, a common anti-forensic technique to obfuscate file creation or modification times.
This rule identifies suspicious command and control (C2) activity by monitoring network connections to specific known malicious domains, detection of specific authentication tokens in process command lines, and the use of spoofed User-Agent strings associated with predefined C2 URI paths.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task via schtasks.exe initiated by wscript.exe or cscript.exe where the task configuration or execution occurs within common user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Temp, Downloads). The rule specifically flags behavior involving multiple task invocations in a short time frame, which is indicative of persistence mechanisms used by scripts.
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