Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,063 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
15,361
13,596
2,797
1,803
1,725
Contributors
7,678
5,999
5,315
4,504
4,191
Categories
18,113
9,760
3,854
3,760
3,714
Platforms
40,063
7,331
6,542
3,907
3,666
Products / Services
10,442
9,677
6,722
1,888
1,879
MITRE Techniques
13,738
13,119
8,068
5,949
4,415
CVEs
49
45
30
30
29
IDS Classtypes
214
56
43
23
19
IDS Protocols
183
172
20
16
8
Detects the execution of 'mshta.exe' loading an .hta file containing specific suspicious terms ('VLC', 'Presentation', 'Denver'), followed by the spawning of child processes such as 'wscript.exe', 'cscript.exe', 'powershell.exe', 'cmd.exe', or 'wmic.exe'. This pattern is frequently used to proxy execution of malicious scripts via legitimate Windows binaries.
Detects the execution of a specific Visual Basic script named 'Telegram_Private_Call_Session.vbs' by Windows scripting utilities (wscript.exe, cscript.exe) or the Microsoft HTML Application host (mshta.exe). This pattern is often associated with the execution of malicious scripts disguised as legitimate communication application components.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with obfuscation-related flags (-NoProfile, -WindowStyle Hidden, -EncodedCommand) initiated by common scripting interpreters (wscript.exe, mshta.exe, cscript.exe). This pattern is often indicative of malicious scripts, such as HTA or VBScript files, attempting to execute encoded PowerShell commands in a high-privilege context.
Detects attempts to disable PowerShell Script Block Logging via registry modification or by using the Set-ItemProperty command. Disabling this security feature prevents visibility into the actual contents of executed PowerShell scripts, which is a common tactic used by adversaries to evade detection.
Detects the presence or execution of artifacts associated with the TrustSink proof-of-concept (deploy.py, cleanup_eam.py, deploy_state.json), which is used to register or remove rogue Entra authentication providers.
Detects anomalous process spawning behavior initiated by Python interpreters (pip/conda) on machine learning developer or training hosts, which may indicate a supply chain compromise where a malicious package executes code during or shortly after installation.
Detects the execution of the Windows FTP client (ftp.exe) using command-line arguments that include scripts (-s:), initiated by unconventional parent processes such as explorer.exe or cmd.exe. This behavior is often associated with the execution of automated FTP scripts for data exfiltration or malware delivery.
Detects a specific sandbox/analysis evasion pattern associated with the QUICAgent malware, which involves a tight hashing loop and a randomized 100-600ms delay occurring between process initiation and the first outbound network connection.
Detects file creation, renaming, or deletion events within the Recycle Bin directory involving suspicious filenames or PDF files, which may indicate an adversary attempting to hide, stage, or delete evidence.
This rule monitors for suspicious network traffic to SMTP services and specific external email addresses, as well as process command lines containing these indicators. Additionally, it tracks email events involving specific sender, recipient, and subject indicators which may be indicative of unauthorized communication or data exfiltration attempts.
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of events where a process related to Electron (a framework often used for cross-platform desktop applications) executes a hidden, obfuscated PowerShell command, followed by a subsequent PowerShell command to modify Microsoft Defender settings by adding an exclusion path for the 'AppData' directory within 10 minutes of the first process.
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of events where a process related to Electron (a framework often used for cross-platform desktop applications) executes a hidden, obfuscated PowerShell command, followed by a subsequent PowerShell command to modify Microsoft Defender settings by adding an exclusion path for the 'AppData' directory within 10 minutes of the first process.
This rule monitors for file and process creation events associated with known MD5 and SHA256 hashes linked to the Vidar infostealer malware.
This rule monitors for file and process creation events associated with known MD5 and SHA256 hashes linked to the Vidar infostealer malware.
Matches known Vidar Stealer sample SHA256 hashes spanning versions 2.0 through 3.4 as identified by Zscaler ThreatLabz
Detects Vidar Stealer v2.x-3.x custom VM bytecode interpreter used to deobfuscate strings via a fetch-decode-execute loop with sparse opcode dispatch and single accumulator
Detects Vidar Stealer v2.x-3.x custom VM bytecode interpreter used to deobfuscate strings via a fetch-decode-execute loop with sparse opcode dispatch and single accumulator
Detects Vidar's custom stream cipher used for string/config decryption: FNV-1a mixing of the VM-derived key combined with golden-ratio nonce mixing and per-build ARX round constants
Detects the execution of PowerShell with execution policy bypass flags that simultaneously attempts to use curl.exe and Copy-Item to interact with suspicious remote domains or obfuscated command line arguments, potentially indicating a malicious payload delivery and staging attempt.
This rule detects the use of xcopy.exe with a specific set of flags (/s, /e, /y, /c, /q, /h, /b) typically used for recursive, forced, and quiet file copying, when executed from a path matching 'C:\Users\Public\[A-Za-z0-9]+'. This behavior is often associated with adversaries staging data for exfiltration or moving lateral movement tools within a compromise directory.
Detects the registration of the 'gitlab-runner' Windows Event Log provider on hosts that are not recognized as legitimate CI/CD build servers. This can indicate unauthorized installation of GitLab runner agents or persistence mechanisms leveraging service-related event logging.
Page 228 of 1908